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I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly three decades, the territorial dispute over the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands among the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, and Japan has 
constantly re-erupted and become one of the most politically and 
emotionally sensitive conflicts between the Chinese and Japanese 
since the end of World War II. The origin of this long-standing 
dispute can be traced back to the late 1960s when reports by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE) suggested the possibility of the existence of large 
hydrocarbon reserves in the vicinity of the islands. Since then, the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute has flared up repeatedly in a 
series of crises --- in 1970-1972, 1978, 1990, and more recently 
1996-1997. During each crisis, however, the aforementioned 
governments have tried to keep the islands dispute as low-profile as 
possible for the sake of preventing a deterioration of wider political 
relations. As a result, the dispute over the islands has been 
repeatedly set aside and never resolved. 
While it is true that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute 
initially surfaced due to the discovery of potentially large oil 
reserves surrounding the islands, the significance of the islands is 
mainly political and far outweighs the commercial value the islands 
may hold. Clearly, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands controversy has 
turned into a nationalistic dispute. For the Chinese in particular, 
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands have become an important 
nationalistic symbol which reminds them of Japan's past military 
aggression, frequent evasion of war responsibility, and possible 
military revival. Moreover, national pride on both the Chinese and 
Japanese sides has made any solution to the dispute difficult, 
including such compromises as a two-way or three-way joint 
exploitation of the natural resources surrounding the islands, as 
none of the disputants is willing to put aside its sovereignty claims. 
Today, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute continues. 
While the dispute no longer receives the kind of public attention in 
Japan it did two decades ago, it continues to be a highly sensitive 
issue for the Chinese community. This is demonstrated by the 
wave of anti-Japanese sentiment that swept Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and China in 1996 following the installation of an aluminum 
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lighthouse on one of the disputed islands by a Japanese right-wing 
political organization. On September 26, 1996, the dispute took a 
further bitter turn when a Chinese activist from Hong Kong 
drowned in the stormy waters off the disputed island as he 
desperately tried to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty by planting a 
Chinese (PRC) flag. While it is believed that the situation will once 
again return to normal as the crisis "passes," it is also believed that as 
long as the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute is not resolved, 
replays of such crises will continue, as they did in 1978, 1990, and 
1996. 
While most of the Chinese public firmly believe that the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands are indisputably Chinese territory, few 
are truly able to clearly iterate the legal, historical, and geographical 
reasons why sovereignty over the islands should belong to China.I. 
Even fewer Chinese have a clear understanding of arguments held 
by the Japanese supporting their claim to the islands. This is also 
true for most Japanese, especially during a time when the Japanese 
public have become rather indifferent and often times even unaware 
of the on-going island dispute. This contrasts sharply with the well 
publicized 1978 crisis that erupted between Japan and the PRC. In 
short, very few Chinese and Japanese fully understand the 
arguments held by the other. 
As in most disputes, both sides of the story must be clearly 
understood before an acceptable solution can be reached. Given the 
1 For an excellent discussion of the islands dispute with respect to 
international law, see Tao Cheng, "The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai 
(Senkaku} Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition," Virginia journal of 
International Law, Vol. 14 (1974), pp. 221-266. It should be noted, however, that 
Cheng's study relied only on historical evidence that was available in the early 1970s 
during the initial stages of the islands controversy, much of which has over the years 
been disproved or replaced with newly uncovered evidence. 
This study does not attempt to include a discussion of the islands dispute 
with respect to the law of the sea and delimitation of maritime boundaries, since that 
is another complicated topic that deserves to be examined separately. For a 
comprehensive study in this area, see Ma Ying-jeou, Legal Problems of Seabed 
Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea (Baltimore: Univ. of Maryland, 
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1984}; Jonathan I. 
Charney, "The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Maritime and Territorial Dispute," 
Conference paper, International Law Conference on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 
Dispute between Taiwan and Japan (Yi-lan, Taiwan, April 2-3, 1997}; Choon-ho 
Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy," 
Harvard International Law journal, Vol. 4 (1973), p. 212. 
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unpleasant history of past Japanese aggression, the Chinese have 
undoubtedly, yet understandably, attached greater emotional 
sentiment to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute. Therefore, for 
the Chinese in particular, a thorough understanding not only of 
their own arguments, but also of those held by the Japanese, may 
allow them to respond and approach the issue more calmly, 
rationally and effectively. For the Japanese, on the other hand, 
understanding arguments made by the Chinese may also enable 
them to deal with the issue without provoking undesirable anti-
Japanese sentiments within Chinese communities. In short, it 
would be beneficial to the Chinese and Japanese alike to better 
understand each other's views regarding the islands. 
This study will begin with a brief geographical description 
of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and an overview of the history of 
the dispute over the islands, which extends from the late 1960s to 
the present day. The main focus of this paper is the rival legal 
claims and historical evidence laid out by the governments, 
academia, and media of the PRC, the ROC on Taiwan, and Japan. 
During the past twenty years, efforts by Chinese and Japanese 
academics to search for historical evidence to support their 
countries' claims have been enormous. These efforts have brought a 
considerable amount of new evidence to light and led to a re-
consideration of the validity of some evidence used in the past. By 
drawing upon new evidence from recent studies by Chinese and 
Japanese scholars alike, this paper demonstrates that certain past 
arguments and evidence used by the Chinese have been proven 
inaccurate, and that some used by the Japanese are unfounded as 
well. This study will also present a more detailed account of 
evidence that has been further confirmed through both subsequent 
studies and new discoveries. And finally, this paper demonstrates 
that the roots of this dispute can be found in the late 19th century, 
particularly in the past aggression of an emerging Meiji Japan and 
the inability of a weakening Chinese Empire to understand and 
employ prevailing international law for the purpose of defining and 
securing its territory traditionally recognized under the East Asian 
World Order. 
Previously, English translations of evidence provided by the 
Chinese and Japanese have been virtually nonexistent. For the first 
time since the beginning of the islands dispute nearly thirty years 
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ago, the majority of such evidence has been thoroughly translated 
into English for the purpose of this study, including all critical 
official Japanese documents from the Meiji period that explain the 
process by which the islands were incorporated into Japanese 
territory in 1895. I would like to direct special attention to these 
Meiji documents, not only due to their importance and greater 
implications for the dispute, but also because the enormous time 
and effort that went into gathering and translating them while 
preparing this paper. In short, all English translations of evidence 
provided in this paper are my own unless otherwise indicated --- in 
a few instances I have found elegant and accurate existing 
translations provided by other writers and chose not to retranslate 
them since they either need not or simply cannot be further 
improved upon.2 
As mentioned above, the point of focusing on the claims 
and evidence put forth by all disputants is to facilitate a basic 
understanding of the other side's argument. This focus also allows 
the issue to be approached and dealt with in a rational rather than 
highly-charged manner. It can be clearly seen from the past thirty 
years that none of these many patriotic yet provocative acts taken 
either by political or civil groups, Chinese and Japanese alike, such 
as erecting lighthouses or planting flags, has in any way actually 
strengthened the claim of one side or weakened the claim of the 
other, nor have such acts led to any constructive solution. To the 
contrary, such acts have only further heightened the tension and 
animosity between the governments and people of the concerned 
countries and further rendered the dispute difficult to resolve. 
During this process, much energy has been wasted, and in extreme 
cases, an invaluable life lost. 
In short, from a presentation and examination of the base 
claims of each disputant, it is hoped that an alternative mentality 
2 This study uses the pinyin system throughout for transliteration of Chinese 
names and terms, with exceptions for those that are more commonly known under 
the Wade-Giles system, in particular names of places and people from Taiwan. 
Chinese and Japanese personal names are usually given in their original 
order, with the surname preceding the given name {e.g. Li Hongzhang and Ito 
Hirobumi). In many cases, romanized personal names are followed by the original 
characters in their respective languages. 
In some instances where Chinese and Japanese terms may be difficult to 
translate into English, their original characters are provided when appropriate. 
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can be taken by all sides in approaching the issue --- a mentality 
based on historical facts, international law, and reason, instead of 
one based solely on nationalism, emotional sentiments and 
frequently misinterpreted facts. Only with such a mentality can it 
be possible for one to recognize that a solution should be reached 
not. by taking provocative actions against each other, but rather 
from an intention to settle the matter through rational and 
equitable means. This might include, for example, presenting the 
case to the International Court of Justice, or negotiating a joint 
development regime to cooperatively manage and apportion the 
islands' resources. This paper does not go into detailed discussion 
of what may be the most viable solutions to the dispute, or how 
these solutions should be brought about, for those are complex 
issues that cannot be handled sufficiently within the scope of this 
paper. Instead, as mentioned above, it is hoped that this paper can 
help all concerned parties to recognize the complexity of the 
dispute. This may serve as a reasonable first step in bringing this 
controversy, which has troubled the three governments for more 
than a quarter of a century, to an end. 
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II. GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLANDS 
At the center of this dispute are a chain of tiny islets 
commonly known today to the Chinese as the Diaoyutai (or simply 
Diaoyu) Islands f9f.ta~J ... and Senkaku Islands ~M91J~ to the 
Japanese. The islets are located in waters of the East China Sea 
about 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan, 200 nautical miles 
east of mainland China, and about 200 nautical miles southwest of 
the city of Naha, Okinawa. The islands lie within the 200-meter 
insobath, at the edge of the continental shelf that extends eastward 
from mainland China. The 2,270 meter deep Okinawa Trough lies 
immediately to the east of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and 
separates them geographically from the nearest undisputed Japanese 
islands of Okinawa. 
There are a total of eight islets in the chain in which five are 
uninhabitable islands and three are barren rocks. Geologically, all 
of the eight islets are volcanic formations from the Neocene age and 
share common geographical features characterized by high peaks 
and steep cliffs. 3 The principal and largest island of the chain is 
known as Diaoyu Yu f9f.I.M (or Diaoyutai f9f.ta) by the Chinese, 
and Uotsuri-shima ~$)~by the Japanese, which has a surface area 
of 3.5 square kilometers. The remaining islets in descending order 
in terms of their size are {with their Chinese name first followed by 
the Japanese): Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima fi~--/~:11~. 
Nanxiaodao/Minami-kojima i¥jlj',~/i¥.ilj\~, Beixiaodao/Kita-
kojima ~t,h!i\J~tlj\~, Chiwei Yu/Kubaseki-shima or Taisho-jima 
W-~--~~~~~ or ::klE~, Chongbeiyen/Okino Kitaiwa ttP~t;'filiJfl 
(l)~t~. Chongnanyen/Okino Minamiiwa jtpi¥j;'fitilfl(J)m~. 
Feilai/T obise JRill/ 1R:r.l. 4 Collectively, the islands are referred as 
the Diaoyutai Islands by the Chinese and the Senkaku Islands by 
the Japanese. The Chinese term, Diaoyutai, means "Fishing 
Platform" and is also transliterated into English as Tiao-yu-tai 
under the Wade-Giles system widely used in Taiwan. The 
collective term used by the Japanese, Senkaku Islands, is a 
3 Ma Ying-jeou, supra note I, p. 8. 
4 The Japanese also frequently refer to the islands Huangwei Yu/Kuba-
shima and Chiwei Yu/Taisho-jima by their original Chinese names, which are 
rendered into Japanese as Kobi Sho and Sekibi Sho, respectively. 
DIAOYUT AIISENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE 11 
translation of the islands' antiquated Western name, Pinnacle 
Islands, which was given by the British Navy upon seeing them 
during sailing missions to the Far East in mid-19th century.5 
All of the islands in the group are tiny and seemingly 
insignificant with only a few islands supporting various tropical 
plants; the rest are barren. Historically, due to the islands' 
remoteness and inhabitability, the islands held little intrinsic value. 
For the Chinese, the islands were, since the 14th century, used as 
navigational reference points by imperial envoys en route to the 
Ryukyu Kingdom, a military post of Chinese naval forces, and an 
operational base by fishermen from Taiwan.6 For the Japanese, 
recorded usage of the islands did not begin until the end of the 
19th century, when a Japanese civilian, Koga Tatsushiro I!JJ!~I~!U~~. 
began to use four of the islands for the family business of collecting 
albatross feathers and other marine products. Currently, aside from 
the political and strategic implications of the islands, their economic 
value lies in the waters surrounding the islands where there are 
commercially exploitable fish stocks and possible hydrocarbon 
deposits lodged in the seabed. 
Ill. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF 
THE DIAOYUTAI/SENKAKU ISlANDS DISPUTE 
After the conclusion of the Second World War, all islands 
(including the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands) once designated under 
the Nansei Islands within the pre-war Japanese Empire were 
occupied by the United States military and later placed under U.S. 
administration. Actual U.S. administration of these islands began 
5 Inoue Kiyoshi :Jf J: ffl, "Senkaku" Islands: A Historical Explanation of the 
Diaoyu Islands r ~/1f111111JJ -19;ff!lllfiJg]Ji!fi9MII}l (Tokyo: Daisan shokan, 1996), 
pp. 69-82. 
6 Today, fishermen from Taiwan continue to operate heavily around the 
disputed islands. Statistical figures provided by the ROC Government Information 
Office informational pamphlet, An Objective Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Islands 
Dispute lflftrfs11111MP.'JIAZfS/il (1996), estimates that these Taiwanese fishermen 
capture annually as much as 54,000 tons of fish in the area, a total value of $NT 
1.514,000,000 {approx. $US 50,466,000). 
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in 1953 pursuant to Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty with Japan, by which the United States obtained the rights 
"to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and 
jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, 
including their territorial waters."? Since the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 
Islands were previously grouped together with the Ryukyu Islands 
(which were within the geographic boundaries of the Nansei Islands 
prior to the end of the war), the United States also assumed its role 
as the sole administrating authority over the disputed islands. U.S. 
administration of the aforementioned islands came to an end when 
they were handed over to Japanese control on May 15, 1972 
according to the "Treaty Between Japan and the United States of 
America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" ---
or more commonly known as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 
June 17, 1971. 
During the period of U.S. administration, the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands stirred very little Chinese or Japanese 
interest, since, as mentioned before, they were traditionally 
regarded as having very little intrinsic value. However, toward the 
end of their U.S. administration in the late 1960s, it was learned 
that there might exist large oil and gas reserves around them. The 
question of sovereignty over the islands and its surrounding waters 
was thus immediately pushed into the consciousness of all the 
parties concerned, i.e., the People's Republic of China, the Republic 
of China on Taiwan, and Japan. Over the next twenty-five years, 
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute has flared up repeatedly ---
in 1970-1972, 1978, 1990, and 1996-1997. What follows is an 
overview of the history of the islands dispute, crisis by crisis.8 
7 United Nations, Unitt;d Nations Tr~aty Seri~s. Vol. 136, p. 50. 
8 For studies that provide a balanced overview and discussion of the history 
of the islands dispute beginning from its early stages in the 1970s, see Phil Deans, 
The Diaoyutai!Senkaku Dispute: Th~ Unwanted Controvmy. [online] Available 
HTTP: http:/ /snipe.ukc.ac.uklinternationalpapers/dir/deans.html; Daniel Dzurek, 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute. [online] Available HTTP: 
http:/ /www.ibru.dur.ac. uklsenkaku.html. 
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1. The 1970-1972 Crisis 
The first signs of tension between the Republic of China on 
Taiwan and Japan began unfolding in 1968 after reports were made 
public by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE) suggesting that there might exist lucrative 
reserves of oil and natural gas in the waters surrounding the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands.9 In May 1969, Okinawa authorities set 
up a concrete national marker on the main island of the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands engraved with "Uotsuri-shima, Senkaku 
Islands, Yaeyama /\:i.11J~Iilff£f!f-J£" on the front side and 
"2392 Tonoshiro, Ishigaki-shi, Okinawa Prefecture; Erected by the 
City of Ishigaki ?tfljii!Ji'.~:l~)n~~!Df~=~n=1fi:i1!!, ~nfrfH~ 
"ii." on the rear. 10 Tensions quickly escalated as both the ROC and 
Japanese governments pressed forth competing claims of 
sovereignty over the islands and the right to investigate the oil 
potential of the surrounding waters. 
The dispute officially brokeout on July 17. 1970, when the 
Japanese ambassador in Taipei delivered a note to the ROC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserting Japan's sovereignty over the 
disputed islands and stating that any unilateral claims of the ROC 
government over the islands and its underlying continental shelf 
were void under international law. Later that year in September, 
the ROC flag was planted on the disputed islands by a group of 
Chinese protesters from Taiwan and consequently removed by the 
Okinawa authorities days later. It soon became clear that 
nationalist sentiments on both the Chinese and Japanese side could 
not be controlled and the islands dispute soon developed into the 
single most important political conflict between the ROC and 
Japan since the end of World War II. The dispute triggered a 
worldwide anti-Japanese protest known as the "Safeguard the 
Diaoyutai Islands Movement or Baodiao Movement iW-f9illb," 
which became a rallying call for all patriotic Chinese to defend their 
9 ECAFE Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral 
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP), Technical Bulletin, Vol. 2, May 1969. 
10 Yang Chung-kuei tlf~. Ryukyu's Past and Present --- With a 
Discussion of the Diaoyutai Problem 1Jt£!Cc!i~31l-Jfi~ffi.S/fff/lj (Taipei: Taiwan 
Commercial Press Ltd., 1980), p. 493. 
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territorial integrity from any foreign encroachments. The patriotic 
movement gained such widespread support among the Chinese ---
especially intellectuals and students in Taiwan, Hong Kong, as well 
as those studying overseas --- that it was likened to the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919 at the time. 11 The movement reached its 
height days before the handover of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, 
along with the Okinawa Islands, to Japanese rule on May 15, 1972. 
On May 13, thousands of overseas Chinese students mainly from 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, participated in protest marches in major 
U.S. cities. However, none of the series of official protests filed by 
11 The political significance of the Safeguard the Diaoyutai Islands 
Movement, which lasted roughly between 1970 and 1972, is notable in particular 
among Chinese students in Taiwan and those studying abroad in the United States at 
the time. In Taiwan, the movement, initially led by students from National Taiwan 
University, marked one of the first occasions whereby popular protest was tacitly 
permitted, though strongly discouraged, by the ROC government and educational 
authorities. In the United States, the political significance of the movement was no 
less great than it was in Taiwan. Demonstration rallies were staged in front of the 
embassy and consulate generals of Japan in Washington D.C., New York, Chicago, 
San Francisco, and many other cities, in which tens of thousands of Chinese students 
and ethnic overseas Chinese demanded the return of the islands to China, be it the 
ROC or PRC. What was even more politically significant was that it created a 
considerable negative impact on the ROC government's image among overseas 
Chinese students and professionals in the United States. What initially began as a 
unified and concerted effort among these overseas Chinese students and professionals 
(the majority from Taiwan} to voice their anger against the U.S. government's 
decision to transfer the islands to Japan, and more importantly, dissatisfaction with 
the ROC government's irresolute and ineffectual handing of the issue, finally 
resulted in an irreconcilable rift among them due to their changing political 
allegiances. The underlying question had become: Whether to switch political 
allegiance to the increasingly "promising" PRC regime, or to remain supportive to a 
ROC government whose international status was rapidly declining. Given the 
increasingly positive international atmosphere surrounding the PRC at the time, it 
was not surprising that more than a considerable number of overseas Chinese 
students and professionals in the U.S. had become fervent supporters of "Mao's 
China" by mid-1972. Afterwards, though the Safeguard the Diaoyutai Islands 
Movement itself gradually faded away, the resulting political differences that divided 
these overseas Chinese students remained strong during the next few years. It was not 
until the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping had regained his power and the cruelties 
and atrocities of the Cultural Revolution had been fully revealed, that the leftist 
tendency and "romance" with the PRC entertained by many Chinese students and 
professionals came to an end. Accordingly, their positions toward both the PRC and 
ROC also underwent considerable change. 
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the ROC and PRC governments nor the highly emotional 
"Baodiao" demonstrations could alter the U.S. decision to return 
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands to Japanese control. 
While there were also heated diplomatic exchanges between 
Japan and the two Chinese governments, the dispute was to be 
downplayed for the sake of wider bilateral relations between not 
only the ROC and Japan, but also between the PRC and Japan. 
Clearly, the 1970-1972 crisis was to be swallowed by larger political 
issues and circumstances that would leave the islands dispute 
unresolved. The ROC government was at pains to downplay the 
issue since the dispute erupted at a time it was experiencing serious 
diplomatic setbacks on the international stage. In October 1971, 
the United Nation General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758, 
permitting the PRC to occupy China's seat as Permanent Member 
of the U.N. Security Council, and compelling the ROC 
government to withdraw entirely from the organization. In the 
following February, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in 
part of an ongoing U.S. effort to normalize relations between 
Beijing and Washington. Meanwhile, with respect to diplomatic 
relations between the ROC and Japan, it was apparent that Japan 
was preparing to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to 
PRC, which naturally prompted the ROC to keep the dispute in 
low profile to avoid a further deterioration of bilateral relations. 
The PRC government, on the other hand, also sought to 
downplay the issue in order to prevent the dispute from disrupting 
negotiations for the anticipated establishment of diplomatic ties. In 
September 1972, Japan indeed officially recognized the PRC as the 
only legitimate Chinese government and severed diplomatic ties 
with the ROC. What changed ultimately for the ROC with 
respect to the islands dispute as a result of Japan's de-recognition, 
was that the sovereignty issue subsequently become a matter 
unresolvable through official dialogue or diplomatic means, 
although the ROC government nonetheless continued to lodge 
protests and official statements against Japan over the years 
whenever the dispute resurfaced. 
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2. The 1978 Crisisl2 
In 1978, the islands dispute re-erupted into another political 
crisis, this time primarily between the People's Republic of China 
and Japan. While the crisis made headlines in the Japanese media, 
it was given little attention in mainland Chinese newspapers perhaps 
due to China's intention to downplay the issue. As a result, little is 
known about what happened during the crisis on the Chinese side. 
On April 12, 1978, hundreds of mainland Chinese fishing vessels 
appeared in the waters surrounding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, 
an event which was greatly publicized by the Japanese media. This 
incident came at a sensitive time, since the PRC and Japan were 
working towards negotiating a peace treaty.13 Political observers 
believe that the appearance of the Chinese fishing vessels came as a 
protest to Japanese domestic anti-Treaty political forces who were 
insisting that the Senkaku issue be resolved as a pre-condition to 
signing the treaty. However, China's display of displeasure did not 
yield the results it initially hoped for. Instead, the strategy 
backfired as it caused wide dismay within the Japanese government 
and weakened the pro-Treaty forces. 
The incident was downplayed by the PRC three days later 
when Chinese Vice Premier Di Biao claimed that it was a 
"fortuitous incident" and would not happen again. To ensure 
preparations toward the signing of the treaty proceed smoothly, 
both countries soon agreed to shelve the sovereignty issue for future 
negouat10ns. On August 23, 1978, the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship was signed in Beijing. The policy of setting aside the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute was later confirmed and reiterated in a 
statement made by then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in a press 
conference during his visit to Japan on October 25, 1978. 
12 This section concerning the political developments during the 1978 
crisis is based primarily on the following rwo studies: Daniel Tretiak, "The Sino-
Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude," Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 
12 (1978), pp. 1235-1249; and Phil Deans, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute: The 
Unwanted Controversy, supra note 8. 
13 This treaty was not intended to be a "peace treaty" in the technical sense, 
which puts a legal end to a state of war berween nations, but rather a symbolic treaty 
for the purpose of consolidating bilateral relations and further promoting peace and 
friendship. 
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Responding to a question put forward by a Japanese reporter, Oeng 
said, 
Our two sides agreed not to touch upon this question when diplomatic 
relations were normalized between China and Japan. This time when we 
were negotiating the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the two sides again 
agreed not to touch on it... We call it Tiaoyu Island but you call it another 
name. It is true that the two sides maintain different views on this 
opinion ... It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, 
ten years... Our generation is not wise enough to find common language 
on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will 
certainly find a solution acceptable to all.14 
To this day, both the government of the PRC and Japan have 
constantly referred to Deng's principle of shelving the issue for the 
sake of larger bi-lateral relationships, which indeed has also been the 
sole reason as to why the Diaoyutai/Senkaku sovereignty issue still 
remains unresolved. 
3. The 1990 Crisis 
The island dispute resurfaced in September 1990 when it 
was reported that Japan's Maritime Safety Agency would soon 
approve, as an official navigation indicator, a new lighthouse erected 
on one of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands by the right-wing group, 
Nihon Seinensha ( B *1f~U or Japan Youth Federation) .15 This 
14 Peking &view, No. 44, November 3, 1978, p. 16. 
15 The relationship between Nihon Seinensha and the disputed islands dates 
back to 1978, when the right-wing organization built its first lighthouse on 
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island on August 13 of that year. Ten years later, in 
commemoration of the 1Oth anniversary of the first lighthouse, a new lighthouse was 
erected on the same island on June 9, 1988. In August of following year, the said 
organization submitted an application to the Japanese government requesting 
official recognition of the lighthouse as a navigational indicator, which was later 
denied and returned on April26, 1991. Again, on July 15, 1996, the organization 
built another make-shift lighthouse on Beixiao Dao/Kita-kojima and submitted 
another application to the Ishigaki Marine Safety Headquarters for its official 
recognition. Later that year on October 4, the application was again denied. (Based 
on the chronological description of the history of Nihon Seinensha provided on its 
website at: http://www.nihon-seinensha.com) 
Due to the extraordinary sensitivity held by the Chinese toward the 
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triggered a response whereby Mayor Wu Tun-yi, head of Taiwan's 
second largest city of Kaohsiung, initiated what was meant to be a 
nationalistic crusade by delivering the Olympic Torch of the 
"Taiwan Area Athletic Games" to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands as 
a show of Chinese sovereignty. Although the ROC government 
notified the Japanese government of this planned visit in advance, 
the Japanese responded by driving back from the islands the two 
Taiwanese fishing boats carrying the Olympic Torch, reporters, and 
television crews. When Taiwan television stations showed footage 
of the Taiwanese fishing boats being chased away by vessels and 
helicopters from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency, the response 
was a public uproar followed by a series of anti-Japanese 
demonstrations. For the Taiwanese public, the incident was 
regarded as a national humiliation. Once again the islands dispute 
brought bilateral relations between the ROC and Japan to a low 
point, not yet seen since the termination of diplomatic relations in 
1972. 
Soon after the ROC government issued a series of protests 
against Japan's actions, the PRC government also stepped in and 
pressured the Japanese government through diplomatic channels. 
With an intention to prevent a deterioration of relations between 
Japan and the PRC, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu 
indicated on October 25 that Tokyo would adopt a "cautious 
attitude" towards the lighthouse and intended not to recognize it as 
an official navigation indicator. Once again, the sovereignty dispute 
was shelved for the time being. 
4. The 1996-1997 Crisisl6 
disputed islands, each of the above instances triggered official protests from the PRC 
and ROC governments as well as public fury and a series of protest movements 
among Chinese communities worldwide. 
16 Events relevant to the disputed islands that took place in between the 
1990 and 1996-1997 Crises include the following: In February 1996, the Chinese 
government promulgated the "PRC Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law r:fl$l 
A~~~WflfUi&~J!Il.t" declaring its sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands and 
reserving the right to use military force to defend its territorial claims. See Gazette 
of the State Council of the People's Republic of China cfJ!tV-..~#tciiiJ!tiJ!§~:t}lfl, 
No.3 {March 13, 1992), pp. 69-71. 
In January 1996, the Japanese government observed a PRC oil-exploration 
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The fourth and most recent crisis re-erupted in July 1996 
after the Japanese Diet ratified the "United Nations Convention on 
the Law of Sea," establishing a 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
that excluded all foreign fishing. On July 14, the Japanese right-
wing group Nihon Seinensha, erected a five-meter, solar powered, 
aluminum lighthouse on one of the islands. The group also 
requested approval of the lighthouse as an official Japanese 
navigational indicator. The lighthouse was subsequently damaged 
by a typhoon but the group soon returned in September to make 
repairs. In response to these actions, which were regarded by the 
Chinese as provocative, several civil groups from Taiwan and Hong 
Kong sailed to the islands in protest, but were driven off by the 
Japanese coast guards. On September 26, the islands dispute took a 
further turn for the worse when a Chinese activist from Hong Kong, 
who originally planned to plant a PRC flag on one of the disputed 
islands, drowned in the stormy waters surrounding the island as he 
was trying to avoid the Japanese coastguards' blockade. This 
incident marked the first time that life was lost due to this highly 
sensitive territorial controversy. Pent-up anger toward Japan soon 
erupted in yet another wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations that 
swept through Chinese communities, especially in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and the PRC. Finally, on October 7, Chinese activists 
from Taiwan and Hong Kong succeeded in landing on 
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island and planted the flags of both the PRC 
and ROC, which were consequently removed days later by the 
Okinawa authorities. 
Since then, the islands have continued to be visited by 
political and civil groups from both the Chinese and Japanese sides 
for the purpose of demonstrating sovereignty over the islands. A 
few of the more notable instances include the following. On April 
27, 1997, a member of the city assembly oflshigaki, Okinawa, and 
a newspaper reporter from the Sankei Shimbun briefly landed on 
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island. On May 7, 1997, the islands were re-
visited by another group of Japanese activists led by a Japanese Diet 
ship conducting geological research near the disputed islands. The PRC government 
subsequently confirmed the ship's presence in the area, but denied that any oil-
drilling activities had taken place. 
In both instances, the Japanese government filed protests against PRC's 
actions and reiterated its sovereignty claim over the islands. 
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member from an opposition party. In response to such visits by the 
Japanese, a group of Chinese activists comprised of members from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States were quick to organize 
a visit to the islands on May 27, 1997. Their attempt to land on 
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island proved unsuccessful, however, as their 
flotilla of sixteen protest boats and ten additional boats with local 
and foreign media agencies were stopped short prior to reaching the 
islands by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency. During the 
incident, four protest boats experienced minor collisions with 
Japanese police vessels. Two Hong Kong activists jumped from 
their protest boat onto a Japanese police vessel during a collision, 
soon followed by a third Taiwanese activist from another protest 
boat. The activists were detained and questioned but released 
shortly afterwards. Hours later the ships headed back for Taiwan, 
concluding yet another climatic and highly publicized incident. 
What followed months later was yet another highly dramatic yet 
very courageous event involving another group of Chinese activists 
whose goal was to fly over the disputed islands and parachute down 
onto them, thereby overcoming any possible hindrances imposed by 
the ships of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency. The flight took 
place on September 2, 1997, departing from Philippine's Subic 
International Airport. However, minutes after take off, the plane 
suffered an engine failure and was forced to return to its point of 
departure. The plane crash-landed, but fortunately none of the 
passengers was injured.l7 
Since then, the magnitude and frequency of such acts of 
protest from both the Chinese and Japanese sides have begun to 
decline. Moreover, the desire of the governments of the PRC and 
Japan to downplay the dispute is clearly evident from the new 
fisheries pact treaty concluded in early November 1997 during a 
trip to China by the Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro 
commemorating the 25th anniversary of the normalization of 
17 Although this particular incident did not make front page headlines in 
Chinese newspapers and received relatively little public attention in contrast to 
previous attempts by other Chinese protesters to land on the disputed islands by sea, 
detailed repons on this incident were nevertheless carried on Tht United Daily Iff!; 
1M on September 6, 1997 (p. 3) and September 19, 1997 (p. 17) . 
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diplomatic relations.l8 Under the new agreement, the two 
countries will establish jointly controlled sea boundaries while 
leaving the waters surrounding the disputed islands untouched. The 
treaty also calls for continued negotiations regarding the 
overlapping of economic zones claimed by both nations. While 
such developments have certainly been a step forward in terms of 
avoiding further conflict between the claimants, it seems reasonable 
to conclude, given the past turbulent history of the islands dispute, 
that the present cooling of tensions can only be temporary, since the 
question of territorial ownership has by no means been resolved by 
the parties. The islands dispute continues to be a time bomb 
awaiting another unexpected ignition. 
18 Asahi Shimbun, November 4, 1997, p. 1. 
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IV. jAPAN'S POSITION AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE OF 
ITS ClAIM OF SOVEREIGNTY 
1. The Official Position of the Japanese Government 
Japan's official position toward the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 
Islands dispute has been explained in a series of official statements 
initially issued by the Okinawa Civil Government in the early 1970s 
and then followed on March 8, 1972 by an official statement 
entitled, The Basic View of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 
Senkaku Islands !J:flfJnllJ(J)fiJj:fjJ.tlc::/1§-T -5/fJ£-Jl.M (hereafter 
referred to as The Basic View) issued by the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. According to these official statements, Japan claims 
that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were terra nullius (or land 
without owner) at the time they were formally incorporated into 
Japanese territory in 1895. Therefore, the fundamental Japanese 
claim is that the disputed islands were acquired by virtue of 
"discovery-occupation," one of the established modes of territorial 
acquisition under international law, whereby valid title over a piece 
of territory may be acquired through occupation if it was 
recognized as terra nullius .19 The first paragraph of The Basic View 
19 Principles of international law have traditionally distinguished five 
modes of territorial acquisition, namely: prior occupation (discovery-occupation), 
cession, accretion, subjugation, and prescription. 
With respect to the principle of occupation, the generally excepted 
exposition is enunciated in Oppenhtim s lnttrnational Law, as follows: 
Occupation is the act of appropriation by a state through 
which it intentionally acquires sovereignty over such territory as it 
is at the time not under the sovereignty of another state. It is 
therefore an original mode of acquisition in that the sovereignty is 
not derived from another state .... The territory of [another] state ... 
can only be acquired through cession, or, formally, by subjugation. 
Theory and practice agree upon the rule that occupation 
effected through taking possession of, and establishing an 
administration over, territory in the name of, and for, the acquiring 
state. Occupation thus effected is real occupation, and, in 
contradistinction to fictitious occupation, is named effective 
occupation. Possession and administration are the two essential 
facts that constitute an effective occupation. 
(1) Possession 
The territory must really be taken into possession by the 
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of 1972 seeks to demonstrate this: 
From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly made 
by the Government of Japan through the agencies of the Okinawa 
Prefecture and by way of other methods. Through these surveys, it was 
confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no 
trace of having been under control of China. Based on this confirmation, 
the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895 to 
erect a marker on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands 
into the territory ofJapan.20 
23 
The above argument is consistent with the official statement issued 
two years earlier on September 10, 1970, by the Ryukyu Civil 
Government entitled, "Views Concerning the Title to the Senkaku 
Islands and Sovereign Right Over the Development of Resources of 
the Continental Shelf ~liJ"j£(l)~ffff*fi.&.~*~llliJ(l)~~#H::OO 
i" ~ ±5&" In this earlier official statement, it is claimed that 
"Following the previous Cabinet Decision ofJanuary 14, 1895, [the 
disputed islands] were made Japanese territory and placed under 
the administration of Ishigaki Village, Yaeyama District, Okinawa 
occupying state. For this purpose it is necessary that it should take 
the territory under its sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring 
sovereignty over it (animus). This ... normally involves a settlement 
on the territory, accompanied by some formal act which announces 
both that the territory has been taken possession of and that the 
possessor intends to keep it under his sovereignty. 
(2) Administration 
After having taken possession of a territory, the possessor 
must establish some kind of administration thereon which shows 
that the territory is really governed by the new possessor. If, within 
a reasonable time after the act of taking possession, the possessor 
does not establish some responsible authority which exercises 
governing functions, there is then no effective occupation, since in 
fact no sovereignty is exercised by any state over the territory. 
Cited from Robert Jennings and Arthur Wattes (ed.), Oppenheim's 
International Law, Vol. 1 (1992), pp. 687-689. See also L. Oppenheim, 
International Law, 8th Ed., H. Lauterpacht, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, Green, 
1955), pp. 557-558. 
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, (1972) The Basic View on the 
Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands {provisional translation] [online] Available 
HTTP: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html. 
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Prefecture on April 1, 1896, based on Imperial Decree No. 13."21 
Clearly, the points made above by the Ryukyu Civil Government 
and Japanese Government are aimed at demonstrating that Japan's 
occupation of the islands was done in accordance with international 
law and that the incorporation process was legalized through 
governmental administrative procedures.22 
In The Basic View, it is further argued that "the [Senkaku] 
Islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores 
Islands that were ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty of China in 
accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which 
came into effect in May of 1895." The above point serves as a 
refutation of the Chinese claim that the disputed islands were 
traditionally Chinese territory belonging to the Island of Taiwan, 
and ceded to Japan according to Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. This article stipulates, 
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following 
territories ... : 
(b) the island of Formosa, together with all the islands appertaining or 
belonging to the said Island ofFormosa.23 
Since Japan argues that the disputed islands were ten-a nullius, they 
could not have been included among the islands defined in the 
treaty as appertaining or belonging to Taiwan. Moreover, since 
Japan's decision to incorporate Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands was 
made by virtue of Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895, and the 
21 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 128. 
22 The applicability oflmperial Decree No. 13 of 1896 to this dispute has 
been seriously questioned by scholars supporting the Chinese claim, since this 
document did not contain any reference to the disputed islands as claimed by the 
Ryukyu Government. This may explain the document's omission from the Basic 
View of 1972 issued nearly two years later by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. While 
the decree was initially widely used by the Japanese academia and media as evidence 
supporting Japan's case, some have subsequently discontinued using it as evidence in 
response to refutations from the Chinese side. For a full translation of the decree and 
more detailed discussion regarding its applicability, see Chapter V, section 3 of this 
study. 
23 Clive Parry (ed.), The Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 181 (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1983), p. 215. 
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Treaty of Shimonoseki was not signed until three months later on 
April 17 that same year, Japan claims that the incorporation of the 
disputed islands was an act separate and apart from the signing of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Consequently, the islands were neither 
subject to the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki nor to any of the 
subsequent treaties signed after World War II that related to 
Taiwan. Hence, Japan argues that it is not obligated to relinquish 
the disputed islands as it did with Taiwan in 1945. 
It is unfortunate that, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, Qing China and Japan failed to clearly define in 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki what exactly constitutes "all the islands 
appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa," which has 
now become subject to different interpretations by China and Japan 
with respect to the status of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1895. 
This disagreement in interpretation essentially translates into the 
central question of the dispute: whether the disputed islands were 
Chinese territory or instead terra nullius at the time of Japan's 
incorporation in January 1895. 
If the Japanese are correct in asserting that the islands were 
terra nullius, then they could not have been islands belonging to 
Taiwan and consequently would be excluded from the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, thus validating Japan's claim over the islands based on 
the January 1895 Cabinet Decision. If the Chinese are correct, 
however, in their assertion that the islands were Chinese territory, 
then the islands were not terra nullius, thus supporting the Chinese 
claim that the only legal basis for Japan's ownership of the disputed 
islands derives from the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
The Basic View seeks to address this question by asserting 
that after the conclusion of the Second World War, "China 
expressed no objection to the status of the islands being under the 
administration of the United States under Article III of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, [which] clearly indicates that China did not 
consider the Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan." As mentioned 
previously, after the conclusion of the Second World War, the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, along with all other Japanese territories 
previously grouped under the Nansei Islands, fell under the control 
of the U.S. military. In 1951, Article III of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty granted the United States sole powers of administration over 
"Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu 
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and the Daito Islands)." 
The fact that the disputed islands were included in the 
"Ryukyu Islands" as described above was further exemplified in 
several subsequent official proclamations issued by the U.S. 
administration authorities. On December 19, 1951, Proclamation 
11 was promulgated by the U.S. Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyus which specified the longitude and latitude of the 
geographical boundaries under U.S. administration. The 
coordinates were further defined in subsequent official 
announcement including Ordinance 68 of the Charter of the 
Ryukyu Government of February 29, 1952 and U.S. Civil 
Administration of the Ryukyus Proclamation 27 {USCAR 27) on 
December 27, 1953.24 In all of the above instances, the disputed 
islands were included within the polygon delimiting the territories 
placed under U.S. trusteeship. It follows that the Japanese 
contention is there clearly existed more than a few instances 
whereby China could have lodged a protest concerning the 
handling of the disputed islands if it indeed regarded them to be its 
territory. Instead, the Chinese Government neither demanded the 
return of the disputed islands nor expressed any objection to their 
placement under U.S.trusteeship. 
The Basic View further argues that the 1971 Ryukyu and 
Daito Islands Reversion Agreement serves as what may be viewed as 
a final confirmation of Japanese sovereignty over the disputed 
islands. The reversion agreement provided the following, 
With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in 
paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favor of 
Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with 
Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951... Uapan] 
assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any 
powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory 
and inhabitants of the said islands.25 
With the return of "administrative rights" over the islands from the 
24 Midorima Sakae *i<rdJ ~. Senkaku &tto !RIIJ11JIIJ (Naha: Hirugi Sha: 
1984), pp. 109-112. 
25 U.S. Treaties and other International Agreements, Vol. 23, Part I (1972), 
p.450. 
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United States under the reversion agreement, combined with the 
"residual sovereignty" maintained by Japan during U.S. 
administrative control of the islands, Japan argues that it has 
reclaimed full sovereignty over the disputed islands.26 
Finally, noting that "it was not until the latter half of 1970, 
when the question of petroleum resources on the continental shelf of 
the East China Sea came to the surface, that the Governments of 
China and Taiwan authorities began to raise questions regarding the 
Senkaku Islands," the Basic View concluded that "none of the 
points raised by the Government of China as 'historic, geographic 
or geological' evidence provide valid grounds, in light of 
international law ... ". 
Since the initial issuance of The Basic View in 1972, the 
official Japanese position has been consistent and frequently 
reiterated during subsequent flare-ups of the dispute. Also, as a 
result ofJapan•s actual possession of the islands, the official Japanese 
position since the opening of the dispute maintains that there is no 
dispute regarding the islands' ownership with China or Taiwan. 
During the most recent flare-up, a letter from the Permanent 
Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary General stated the following: "In view of the history of 
the Senkaku Islands and in light of the relevant principles of 
26 Although not formally included in the peace treaty, Japan relies on the 
statements given by the U.S. and British Delegates at the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Conference as its basis of retaining "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu and Bonin 
Islands during their U.S. administration. John Foster Dulles, the United States 
Delegate, stated at the conference that "Several of the Allied Powers urged that the 
treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of 
United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored 
completely to Japan. In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States 
felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, 
while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations 
trusteeship system, with the United States as administrating authority." See 
Government Printing Office, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, 
Vol. 1 (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 453. 
Kenneth Younger, the British Delegate, supported the U.S. position by also 
stating "as regards the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the [San Francisco Peace treaty] 
does not remove these from Japanese sovereignty; it provides for a continuance of 
United States administration over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 north latitude ... " 
For full text of Younger's statement, see Department of State, Conference for the 
Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with japan: Record of Proceedings 
(Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 88-97. 
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international law, there is no question that the islands are an integral 
part of the territory of Japan, and that Japan has always been 
exercising effective control over them. It is thus the position of the 
Government of Japan that no question of territorial title should arise 
with respect to those islands. "27 
In addition to such official statements that have reiterated 
the government's insistence that the islands are not in dispute, 
instructions from the Japanese Ministry of Education concerning 
the handling of territorial disputes in textbooks also reinforces this 
position. According to a report from The japan Times, when a 
textbook publisher submitted a draft of its geography textbook that 
contained the following description, "In the case of Japan, it has 
[territorial dispute] issues of the Northern Territories, the 
T akeshima islets and the Senkaku islands," the publisher was given 
orders to "[r]evise the descriptions because it is inappropriate to put 
the Senkaku issue in the same category with the Northern 
Territories and T akeshima." The ministry explained that the 
difference was that Japan currently does not effectively control the 
Northern Territories and the Takeshima islets, citing the official 
position reiterated at the Diet in 1995 by then Foreign Minister 
Yohei Kono. The finalized version of the text first cites the two 
territorial disputes of the Northern Territories and Takeshima islets, 
and continues with, "In addition, there are such problems as 
invasion of territorial waters as seen at the Senkaku Islands."28 
2. Supporting Evidence from the Japanese Academia and Media 
In addition to the Japanese government's stance toward the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute as summarized above, many 
Japanese scholars and media reports have supplemented the official 
27 Matsui Yoshiro ~jfJ;'~, "Legal Bases and Analysis of]apan's Claims to 
the Diaoyu Islands," Conference paper, International Law Conference on the 
Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Between Taiwan and Japan (Yi-lan, 
Taiwan, April2-3, 1997), p. 2. 
28 japan Timts, June 26, 1997. [Online] Available HTTP: 
http:/ /www.japantimes.co.jp/news/news6-97/news6-26.html; Tht Okinawa Timts 
Evming Edition, May 29, 1997, p. 1. 
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Japanese view with evidence they believe further substantiates the 
claim that the islands were terra nullius at the time Japan 
incorporated them, and Japan henceforth exercised "effective 
control" over the islands. Among many of the supporters of the 
Japanese claim, international law professor Okuhara Toshio :J!:~fftc 
!at of Kokushikan University, is perhaps the most fervent academic 
supporter of the Japanese claim. Over the years, Okuhara has 
published numerous articles aimed at supporting the Japanese claim, 
largely through the refutation of evidence presented in academic 
studies provided by supporters of the Chinese claim. 29 It would 
not be an overstatement to say that Okuhara's studies have 
provided the essence of all subsequent scholarly work supporting the 
Japanese claim. This has made his work frequently subjected to 
debate by Chinese and Japanese scholars supporting the Chinese 
claim. Some of his more important refutations of the Chinese 
claim will be briefly presented in the following chapter analyzing 
the Chinese claim, as they are best understood in reference to the 
Chinese standpoint. 
Among the many academic studies supporting the Japanese 
claim, one of the more important recent publications is a book 
entitled Senkaku Retto, by Midorima Sakae ~rd1 ~. a law 
professor at Okinawa International University. In his book, 
Midorima documents most of the evidence and arguments put 
forth by the Japanese government and academia up until the day of 
29 For studies supponing the Japanese claim provided by Okuhara T oshio, 
see "The Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and Problems on the 
Surrounding Continental Shelf," japanese Annual of International Law, Vol 15 
(1971); "The Problem of Territorial Rights over the Senkaku Islands--- Taiwan's 
claim and its Refutation ~MJIJS,(J)ilJffl"~r"',li---#~o:>.:E~ ~ -to:>m*'l,"Okinawa 
Quarterly #IIB¥fll, No. 56--- Senkaku Islands Special Issue (1971);"The Problem 
ofTerritorial Rights over the Senkaku Islands ~MJIJS,(J)'f!l=ff~~~r"',li," Asahi 
Asian Review fiJJB'TY'Tvl!':2.-, Vol3, No.2 (1972); "The Basis ofTerritorial 
Rights over the Senkaku Islands ~MJIJS,'f!l=ff~(J)*JlM," Chuo koron rp:!fc(L.'-Ifi, July 
1978; "The Legal Status of the Senkaku Islands during the Ming and Qing Periods 
llJlft:to J:: ~i1!fftl;:::to It :Q ~MJIJS,o:>~IY-Jit!!f.i'l," Okinawa Quarterly #IIB¥fll, No. 
63 --- Senkaku Islands Special Issue No.2 (1972); "Indisputable Territorial Rights 
of]apan over the Senkaku Islands--- The Uncovering of"A Historic Fabrication" in 
Inoue Kyoshi's Article IIJtJ~60.~1¥1JIJiso:> 8 *'lll=ff~---tf l:.li!fai83to:> rHf~IY-Jtm 
~J ~~I!<," japan and the japanm People B;;tt(J)B:*).., New Year's Edition 
fJT'*-ij- (1972). 
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the book's publication in 1984. With the aim of demonstrating 
that Japan has exercised effective control over the islands since its 
incorporation of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1895, Midorima 
records nearly all instances whereby the Japanese government 
displayed authority over the islands. The following is a presentation 
of the more important examples presented in Midorima's book. 
As a supplement to the official claim that the islands became 
Japanese territory in accordance to the discovery-occupation 
principle of international law, Midorima points to the career story 
of Koga Tatsushiro, a native of Fukuoka Prefecture, who Japanese 
scholars attribute as the islands' discoverer. Koga had been living in 
Naha since 1879 and went on several exploration missions for the 
purpose of finding new sites to carry out his business of catching 
and exporting marine products. Koga arrived at Kuba-shima 
(Huangwei Yu) in 1884 and found an abundance of albatross 
feathers and immediately expressed his interest in using the islands 
for his business. Koga filed his first application in 188 5 to the 
Okinawa Prefectural authorities to lease the islands but was denied 
on the grounds that it was not clear at the time whether or not the 
islands belonged to the Japanese empire. During the next ten years, 
Koga' s desire to lease the islands persisted and in 1894 personally 
went to Tokyo to present his application to the Ministry of Home 
Mfairs P-1~~ and Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce JJ!jtlj~ 
1ti' --- but was again denied due to the uncertainty of the islands' 
ownership .3D 
On June 10, 1895, six months after the passing of the 
Cabinet Decision to incorporate the islands (Chinese scholars note 
that it was six days after Japan had officially taken over Taiwan, see 
Chapter V, section 3), Koga filed yet another application directly to 
the Home Minister. More than a year later in September 1896, the 
Ministry of Home Mfairs finally approved Koga's application and 
loaned him the four islands, Uotsuri-shima (Diaoyutai Yu), Kuba-
shima (Huangwei Yu), Minami Kojima (Nanxiaodao), and Kita 
Kojima (Beixiaodao) for thirty years without rent. In the following 
year, Koga invested large amounts of capital to develop the islands 
for carrying out his business. 
During the first four years of Koga' s business, as many as 
136 persons were brought in to work on the islands. In an effort to 
30 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 114. 
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improve the living and working conditions on the islands, Koga also 
devoted himself to developing the islands, whereby he built houses, 
reservoirs, docks and bridges. In 1909, Koga received the 
prestigious Blue Ribbon Medal, a medal of honor awarded by the 
Japanese emperor, as a recognition of his efforts to developing the 
islands. Koga died in 1918 and his son, Koga Zenji i!Ji~~. 
continued to the use the islands mainly for fish and bird canning 
industries. In 1926, after the expiration of the previously obtained 
thirty years lease term, the Japanese government extended the land 
loan to Koga but required rent to be levied beginning the following 
year. Finally in 1932, the Japanese government changed the status 
of the four islands from state-owned land to private-owned land as 
the islands were sold to the Koga family. Koga's family-run 
business eventually came to an end on the eve of the Pacific War 
mainly because transportation expenses had become too costly as 
result of the war. Soon afterwards, the islands became once again 
uninhabited. 
Mter the Second World War, when the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 
Islands came under the administration of the United States, both 
Kuba-shima (Huangwei Yu) and Taisho-jima (Chiwei Yu) were 
designated as military firing practice grounds. Since one of the 
islands, Kuba-shima (Huangwei Yu), was owned by Koga, the 
United States signed a lease (Basic Lease, GRI. No. 183-1) with 
Koga in 1958 for permission to use Kuba-shima for military 
functions. In 1978, the four islands were sold by the Koga family 
for a symbolic price of thirty yen per tsubo (1 tsubo is equivalent to 
2.3 square meters) to members of the Kurihara ~Jjj( family, who 
currently reside in Saitama Prefecture ~::kYlt and continue to 
maintain the islands' ownership.31 Taisho-jima has, since its initial 
entry into the land registry in 1921, maintained the status of state-
owned land and currently belongs to the Ministry of Finance. In 
short, Japanese scholars frequently point to all of the above 
developments surrounding the Koga family as evidence of Japanese 
state authority over the islands manifested through acts of 
administration of land, institution of land leasing, and permission 
of the transferral of land ownership among private citizens. 
31 Nakamura Katsunori $Ft!IJ~, "The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the 
Senkaku Islands B*~f*~~ ~~Iii~~," Conference paper, Conference for The 
Tiao-yu-tai/Senkaku Islets Symposium (Taipei, Taiwan, May 24-25, 1997), p. 3. 
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Other instances frequently invoked as evidence of Japanese 
effective control over the islands since their 1895 incorporation 
mainly involve events such as formal entry of the islands into the 
land registration, successive field surveys conducted by government 
and academic agencies, as well as several emergency rescue 
operations. While Japanese scholars have indeed provided a 
considerable list of such instances, the following are a few of the 
more significant examples: In 1901, the first detailed land survey of 
the islands (excluding Chiwei Yu/Kubaseki-shima) was carried out 
by Okinawa Prefecture, whereby the first accurate reduced scale 
maps of the islands were also made. In December 1902, the 
surveyed islands were entered into the land registry under the 
administrative unit of Tonoshiro Village, Ohama Magiri, Ishigaki-
jima ~ffiSi*~fm·I~J~Jft-f and given lot numbers.32 Belatedly, 
Kumeseki-shima was for the first time entered into the land registry 
on July 25, 1921 and renamed as Taisho-jima.33 In 1940, a rescue 
mission was carried out by Japanese police officers dispatched from 
the Yaeyama Police Department after a civil aircraft flying from 
Naha, Okinawa to Keelung, Taiwan, made an emergency landing 
on Uotsuri-jima (Diaoyutai Yu). Another instance occurred in June 
1945, when 180 residents from Ishigaki-jima sailing to Taiwan were 
attacked by U.S. military aircraft, resulting in a shipwreck on the 
shores of Uotsuri-shima (Diaoyutai Yu). As the Japanese authorities 
were not immediately aware of such an occurrence, the victims were 
left stranded on the island for nearly two months. Finally, in mid-
August, Japanese police and military personnel arrived at the scene 
to rescue the remaining 130 survivors from this tragic incident. 
One piece of evidence also involving an emergency rescue 
mission perceived to be particularly persuasive in substantiating their 
case is a letter of appreciation issued by the Chinese consul 
stationed in Nagasaki in 1920. From the contents of this letter of 
appreciation, it is contended that the Chinese consul, an official of 
high rank, recognized the islands to be Japanese territory. This 
letter was first cited as evidence in the December 1972 issue of 
Okinawa Quarterly #ll;fifll. Subsequently, it has appeared 
32 Midorima Sakae, supra note 24, p. 102. 
33 Takahashi Shogoro iltMI±liR~. Notes on the Senkaku Islands ~fKJiiJIIJ 
/- r (Tokyo: Seinen Shuppansha, 1979), p. 105. 
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frequently in the media, with the most recent case being in a front 
page story of the September 23, 1996 the Sankei Shimbun ff€1!!1/i 
M. The full letter of appreciation reads as follows: 
Cenificate of Appreciation 
During the winter of the eighth year of the Republic of China [1919], 
Guo Heshun, and thiny-one other fishermen from Huei'an Prefecture, 
Fujian Province, were met with contrary winds and drifted to Wayo 
Island, Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of 
Japan. With the earnest rescue by Mr. Tamaesu from Ishigaki Village, the 
fishermen were able to survive and return to their homeland. Deeply 
moved by such neighboring sympathy and willingness to perform charity 
without hesitance, I hereby present this cenificate to express my gratitude 
and thankfulness. 
Feng Mian, Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki 
May 20th, The Ninth Year of the Republic of China [1920] 
The main point of focus of this letter lies in the words, "Wayo 
Island [identified as Diaoyu Yu/Uotsuri-shima by Japanese 
scholars], Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, 
Empire of Japan." Japanese scholars and media contend that this 
letter, which was written in the Consul's official capacity and 
affixed with an official seal, is a clear example of Chinese authorities 
recognizing the disputed islands to be beyond Chinese control and 
under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Empire. 
As mentioned in The Basic View, one of the main points 
which constitutes the Japanese claim is that both the PRC and 
ROC only advanced territorial claims over the disputed islands 
following the ECAFE reports, which suggested potentially large oil 
reserves surrounding the islands. For the purpose of supplementing 
this particular argument, Japanese scholars have directed attention 
to several instances as evidence that both the PRC or ROC 
governments acknowledged the islands to be beyond Chinese 
jurisdiction while failing to advance any objection to the islands' 
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being placed under foreign control. 
A few of the more important examples involve workers from 
Taiwan using the disputed islands as work sites for dismantling 
salvaged ships. On August, 12 1968, forty-five workers from 
Taiwan dismantling a salvaged ship were found on Minami-kojima 
(Nanxiaodao) by Ryukyu Government officials. The several 
permits shown by the workers to the Ryukyu officials included 
emigration permits issued by authorities of the ROC government. 
The workers did not carry either passports or the appropriate 
immigration permits issued by the Ryukyu government and were 
therefore requested to leave the island for illegal entry into territory 
under the jurisdiction of the Ryukyu Civil Government. 
Afterwards, the workers applied for permission from the High-
Commissioner of Okinawa and consequently received permission to 
return to their original work site to continue their business the 
following year. A similar instance also occurred in 1970 whereby a 
separate group of ship dismantling workers from Taiwan were 
found at Kuba-shima (Huangwei Yu) and ordered by Ryukyu 
officials to leave their work site. While Japanese scholars point to 
the above incidents as evidence of effective control over the islands 
by Ryukyu authorities, their main focus lies on the fact that the 
Taiwanese workers found at Minami Kojima were issued emigration 
permits by the ROC government which is an indication that the 
islands were not under Chinese jurisdiction.34 It is contended that 
this lack of challenge from the ROC government with respect to 
foreign jurisdiction over the islands is a clear indication that it did 
not regard them to be Chinese territory. 
Other instances have also attracted the attention of Japanese 
scholars and media and been used as evidence that prior to the 
reports of both the PRC and ROC China did not regard the 
islands to be its territory include the following. With respect to the 
PRC, a front page news report that appeared on the October 3, 
1996 edition of the Sankei Shim bun, reported that the PRC 
government evidently recognized the disputed islands as Japanese 
territory as revealed in a government sponsored publication. This 
particular publication is identified as the January 8, 1953 edition of 
The Peoples' Daily, China's official party newspaper, in which an 
article entitled "The People of the Ryukyu Islands Struggle Against 
34 Midorima Sakae, supra note 24, p. 76-79. 
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American Occupation" noted the Senkaku Islands as one of the 
subgroups of islands that constituted the Ryukyu Islands. 
Attention has also been placed on a Chinese high school geography 
textbook published by the ROC government's educational 
authorities in January 1970, which listed the islands under their 
Japanese names with no indication that they were Chinese territory. 
Additionally, Japanese scholars paint to several other maps 
published prior to the opening of the dispute in both China and 
Taiwan, which also labeled the disputed islands in a similar fashion, 
as examples that "the islands were treated as territory of Japan" .35 
The Japanese legal position toward the disputed islands can 
be best summarized as follows: It is claimed on behalf of Japan that 
the incorporation of the disputed islands in 1895 was completely 
legal under the principal of discovery-occupation under 
international law because 1) the islands were terra nullius at the time 
of initial occupation; 2) Japan displayed its intention and will to act 
as a sovereign to occupy the islands through the Cabinet Decision 
on January 21, 1895; and, 3) Japan henceforth demonstrated a 
continuous and peaceful display of state authority on the islands. In 
addition, with respect to invoking other principles of international 
law in supporting Japan's case, some Japanese writers have also 
suggested that even if China indeed maintained title to the 
disputed islands prior to 1895, given the lack of protest or 
competing claims from China, Japan's claim over the islands can be 
consolidated by the principle of acquisitive prescription.36 
It should be reminded that the key issue to the entire 
35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Concerning the Senkaku Islands ~ 
11/JtlllJIC."?v''"'C (May 1972). 
36 According to Malcolm N. Shaw's International Law (1991), acquisitive 
prescription is defined as "a mode of establishing title to territory which is not terra 
nullius and which has been obtained either unlawfully or in circumstances wherein 
the legality of the acquisition cannot be demonstrated. It is the legitimization of a 
doubtful title by the passage of time and the presumed acquiescence of the former 
sovereign ... " However, the required "passage of time" to establish valid title over the 
territory in question will "depend, as so much else, upon all the circumstances of the 
case, including the nature of the territory and the absence or presence of any 
competing claims." 
See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: Grotius 
Publications Limited, 1991), pp. 290-291. 
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dispute is whether the islands were terra nullius or Chinese territory 
on January 14, 1895 --- which in effect also determines their 
relationship with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. If the islands were 
indeed terra nullius as claimed by Japan, then the Cabinet Decision 
to incorporate the islands would remain a valid one; if the islands 
were Chinese territory, then their transferral to Japan was based on 
the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and should have been returned to 
China after the second world war. 
The next chapter presents the legal basis on which the 
Chinese claim over the islands is based. The main point of much of 
the argument on the Chinese side is that, contrary to what is 
claimed by Japan, the islands were not terra nullius but indeed 
Chinese territory, which thereby renders the 1895 Japanese Cabinet 
Decision a unilateral and illegal one. Since China claims a 
relationship with the islands that reaches back into history since the 
14th century, the task of demonstrating Chinese sovereignty over 
the disputed islands through a relatively long period has resulted in 
a rather lengthy --- and equally impressive --- presentation of 
historical evidence supporting its case. 
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V. THE PRC AND ROC'S POSITIONS AND EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE CHINESE CLAIM 
1. Official Positions of the PRC and ROC Governments 
While the governments of both the Republic of China and 
the People's Republic of China have in the past thirty years each 
separately issued numerous official statements reiterating their 
claims over the islands, their positions are essentially identical since 
they are based on a shared historical past. Any parting of the ways 
between the two governments exists only when dealing with events 
that occurred after 1949. Following a series of public 
announcements in mid-1970 made by ROC government officials 
asserting Chinese ownership over the islands, the first official protest 
filed by the ROC against Japan took place in February 1971. The 
PRC's first official claim came later, when its Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs issued an official statement on December 31 that same 
year.37 While the ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued 
numerous open statements and protests reaffirming sovereignty 
over the islands, none have been as detailed as the aforementioned 
1972 Basic View issued by the Japanese government or the PRC 
official statement issued in 1971, whereby a clear summary of what 
exactly constitutes the historical and legal basis of official claim is 
provided. Therefore, to fully understand the ROC's claim to the 
islands one needed to turn to the abundance of academic writings 
provided by scholars supporting the Chinese claim. Belatedly, in 
September 1996, the ROC Government Information Office finally 
published an informational pamphlet entitled An Objective 
Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Dispute 19flfr.t:i71111Mfb'JIJZfSf!l, which 
presented a brief yet comprehensive overview of the historical and 
legal claims held by the government. This pamphlet confirmed 
that the ROC official claim is indeed essentially consistent with 
that of the PRC's and with what the academia has been suggesting 
over the past twenty years. 
The common position of Beijing and Taipei according to 
both rhe 1971 PRC official statement and the ROC governmental 
pamphlet can be summarized as follows. Both governments claim 
37 For full text of said statement, see P~king Rroi~w, Vol. 15, No. 1, 
January 7, 1972. p. 12. 
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that historical records demonstrate that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 
islands were first discovered, named, and used by the Chinese as 
early as the 14th century. Therefore, Japan's claim that it 
incorporated the islands based on the principle of "prior 
occupation" is untenable, as the islands were not terra nullius. Ample 
Chinese, Ryukyuan, and Japanese historical records and maps can 
be used to demonstrate that during the five hundred years prior to 
1895, the Diaoyutai Islets belonged not to the Ryukyus, but to 
China --- a well-recognized fact by all of the aforementioned 
during that time. Such historical documents have shown that the 
boundary line between China and the Ryukyus existed in the high 
sea between China's Chiwei Yu/Kumeseki-shima (the most 
northeastward island of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku chain) and 
Ryukyu's Kume-jima. Moreover, in 1562, the disputed islands 
were incorporated into the Chinese costal defence system 
established by the Ming government to deal with intensified raids 
by the so-called Woko ~ Qapanese pirates, wako in Japanese). 
During the 18th century, the Qing government further placed the 
disputed islands within the costal defence system ofT aiwan, which 
were patrolled by Chinese naval forces stationed on the said island. 
In view of the disputed islands historical ties with China, in 
particular the island of Taiwan, both Chinese governments contend 
that China transferred the disputed islands in accordance to the 
1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-1895. By virtue of Article II of the peace treaty, 
China was forced to cede to Japan "the island of Formosa, together 
with all the islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of 
Formosa." Therefore, China contends that the disputed islands 
were incorporated into Japanese territory not by discovery-
occupation but rather by the signing of an international agreement, 
i.e., the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
It is uniformly agreed by both the PRC and ROC that after 
the conclusion of World War II, the disputed islands should have 
been returned to China as a result of Japan's renunciation of its 
claim to Taiwan and appertaining islands. It is important to note 
here, however, that as a result of the political differences that 
existed after 1949 between the ROC and PRC, the legal claims of 
the two governments differ somewhat as the two governments each 
point to different treaties signed separately with Japan after 1949. 
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The ROC legal position is that the disputed islands should 
have been returned to China under the provisions of the 1943 Cairo 
Declaration, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, the 1951 San Francisco 
Treaty, and 1953 Peace Treaty between the ROC and Japan. In 
1943 when victory for the allies seemed likely, China, Great Britain, 
and the United States jointly issued the Cairo Declaration which 
stated that the following, 
Japan shall be stripped off... all territories Japan has stolen from the 
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be 
restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all 
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed ... 38 
It can be seen that the references to Formosa and the Pescadores 
were patterned on the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Thus, there is 
no reason to suppose that reference to Formosa in the Cairo 
Declaration did not include "all islands appertaining or belonging 
to the said island of Formosa." The provisions iterated in the Cairo 
Declaration were reaffirmed by the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation 
which provided, as a condition of Japan's surrender, that "Japanese 
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, 
Kyushu and other minor islands as we [the Allies] determine."39 
When Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 
1945, it agreed to "accept the provisions of the declaration issued 
by the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain 
on 26 July 1945 at Potsdam."40 Moreover, by virtue of Article 2 of 
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty signed by Japan and the Allied 
Powers (excluding both the ROC and PRC), Japan renounced" all 
right, title, claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." Lastly, the 
terms were reiterated in Article 4 of the Treaty of Peace between 
38 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 448. 
39 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, Vol. 
II (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 1471-1476. 
40 U.S. Department of State, Occupation of japan, Policy and Progress 54 
(1946), p. 62. 
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the Republic of China and Japan signed at Taipei on April 28 1952 
which stated, 
Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and 
Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel 
Islands... all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded before 
December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as 
a consequence of the war.41 
This provision completes the chain of treaties and agreements that 
legally require Japan to renounce its claim to Taiwan and, by 
implication, all the islands that appertain to or belong to Taiwan. 
Also as a result of this provision, the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki 
became nullified. Viewed together, the above treaties and 
agreements form the legal basis of the ROC's claim to the disputed 
islands. 
As previously mentioned, the legal basis of the PRC parallels 
that of the ROC with respect to events prior to 1949. The PRC 
also relies on the 1943 Cairo Declaration, 1945 Potsdam 
Proclamation and Japan's acceptance of the Instrument of 
Surrender as its sole legal basis to the disputed islands. Since the 
PRC did not participate in the signing of either the 1951 
Multilateral Peace Treaty or 1952 Treaty of Peace between the 
ROC and Japan, the PRC government has consistently denounced 
the legality of both treaties and uses neither of them in its claim 
over the title of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, or even Taiwan for 
that matter. Instead, with respect to treaties or agreements signed 
after 1949, the PRC points to the Joint Communique between the 
People's Republic of China and Japan signed in 1972 which states 
that Japan "adheres to stand of complying with Article 8 of the 
Potsdam Proclamation. "42 The provisions in the Joint 
Communique are further confirmed by the Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between the PRC and Japan, signed on August 28, 
1978. In short, the PRC's legal basis is essentially identical to 
Taiwan's --- that a series of treaties and agreements between China 
and Japan renders any Japanese claims to the island of Taiwan and, 
by implication, all the islands that appertain to or belong to Taiwan. 
41 United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 158, p. 39. 
42 International Legal Materials, Vol. 17 (Sept. 1978), pp. I 054-55. 
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Noteworthy is that in regard to the PRC's position toward 
the placement of the disputed islands under U.S. administration 
after the war in accordance to Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, the PRC has constantly denounced it as illegal since 
it was signed with neither the presence nor consent of China. This 
point has also served as a refutation of]apan's claim that China gave 
no objection to the placement of the disputed islands under US 
administration. 
As demonstrated above, both the PRC and ROC 
governments view the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 as the only 
legal basis of Japan's claim to the islands. With respect to the 
Japanese contention that the islands were officially incorporated by 
a series of Japanese legal domestic procedures prior to the signing of 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China regards any such decisions or 
actions taken to annex the islands as invalid or illegal, since a 
unilateral claim of one state cannot possibly constitute legal title 
over territory that dearly belongs to another. 43 From China's 
perspective, the legal effect of a unilateral action by one State 
simply cannot be equivalent to an international agreement made 
between two States which deal with the same subject.44 Chinese 
and Japanese writers supporting the Chinese claim have further 
sought to demonstrate that while the said Meiji government's 
decision to incorporate the islands was by nature a unilateral one, 
more importantly, it was intentionally carried out in secrecy 
without any notification to the sole and only possibly concerned 
party, China. Thus, China was denied the information that might 
have generated a protest (see section 3 of this chapter). 
The brevity of the official statements of the PRC and ROC, 
however, has compelled numerous Chinese and Japanese scholars to 
supplement them by presenting more detailed accounts of historical 
evidence either mentioned in official statements, or those that may 
have been left out or discovered later. Indeed, scholarly works have 
proliferated over the past twenty years. Generally speaking, scholars 
supporting the Chinese claim have had three principal aims. First, to 
demonstrate through historical records and maps from China, 
43 Victor H. Li, "China and Off-Shore Oil: The Tiao-yu Tai Dispute," 
Stanford journal of International Law, VollO (1975), p. 152. 
44 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 261. 
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Japan, and the previous Ryukyu Kingdom that the disputed islands 
were recognized as Chinese territory evidenced by centuries of 
open, continuous, and uncontested use of the islands. Clearly this is 
aimed at invoking the principle of .. discovery-occupation" under 
international law. Second, the scholars hope to present in their 
entirety all major Meiji official documents that dealt with the 
incorporation process of the islands, from the initial intention in 
1885 to the final decision to officially incorporate them ten years 
later. It is contended that these official documents clearly 
demonstrate that the Meiji government understood very well that 
the islands were defined as Chinese territory under the traditional 
East Asian World Order. This awareness in turn led the Japanese 
Government to take a cautious and patient attitude toward the 
incorporation of the islands to avoid any possible confrontation with 
China. Chinese writers contend these Meiji documents are crucial 
evidence that only further reveals the islands' true ownership and 
undermine the Japanese claim that the islands were terra nullius at 
the time of their incorporation in 1895. The third and final aim is 
to refute the Japanese contention that China did not regard the 
islands as its territory because it expressed no objection to any of 
the post-World War II arrangements of the islands. 
The following is a presentation of all relevant evidence 
presented to this date to support the Chinese claim. The 
presentation follows the above outline. 
2. Historical Evidence Supporting the Chinese Claim 
Many Chinese and Japanese scholars have searched Chinese, 
Ryukyuan, and Japanese historical records to support the claim that 
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were first discovered, named, and 
used by the Chinese. It is worth noting that a significant amount of 
historical evidence used toward demonstrating China's historical 
claim over the islands has in fact been provided by a noted Japanese 
historian, Inoue Kiyoshi jJ: 1: 7ftf. 45 In his book entitled "Senkaku" 
45 Inoue Kiyoshi, Professor of History at Kyoto University, is also known 
for his prolific writings on the islands dispute, yet stands in direct contrast to 
Okuhara Toshio as one of the most fervent supporters of the Chinese claim. While 
Okuhara's writings have over the years provided the foundation on which most 
subsequent academic studies supporting the Japanese claim have been based, Inoue's 
writings have similarly provided a significant amount of evidence supporting the 
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Islands: A Historical Explanation of the Diaoyu Islands published in 
1972, Inoue provides much evidence from Chinese, Ryukyuan, and 
Japanese historical records which demonstrate that the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku were traditionally recognized as Chinese 
territory by all three counties. Much of the subsequent academic 
work done on the Chinese side since the publication of Inoue's book 
has relied heavily on evidence provided by Inoue, in particular those 
that concern the actual process by which the disputed islands were 
incorporated into Japanese territory in 1895. The following begins 
a presentation of all relevant historical evidence supporting the 
Chinese claim to the islands, which represents an accumulative and 
joint effort on numerous scholars, many of which are Chinese and 
some Japanese, in searching through vast amounts of historical 
records dating back to as early as the 14th century. 
In 1372, the Ryukyu Kingdom became a tributary state of 
the Ming Dynasty of China and for the next five hundred years 
offered tribute to the emperor of China. (For an explanation of the 
tributary system under the traditional East Asian World Order, see 
later.) Between 1372 and 1879, twenty-four investiture missions 
were sent by the Chinese Emperor to the Ryukyu Kingdom for the 
purpose of bestowing the formal tide of Zhongshan Wang tfllliJ: 
(Zhongshan King) to a new Ryukyu ruler. During each of these 
investiture missions to the Ryukyu Kingdom, Chinese imperial 
envoys kept detailed mission records which were to be submitted to 
the Chinese Emperor upon their return and later stored in 
government archives --- which indicates that they were official 
Chinese claim which have been cited frequently by Chinese scholars in subsequent 
studies on the subject. 
Inoue's"Senkaku" Islands':· A Historical Explanation of the Diaoyu Islands 
f5R/¥1111111JJ -19:#.f.tllfiJ~!i!ff.JMI!IJwas first published in October 1972 by Gendai 
Heironsha and re-published by Daisan Shokan in 1996 under its original tide in 
response to the re-occurrence of the 1996-1997 islands dispute crisis. 
Other publications by Inoue on the subject include the following, "The 
Tiaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands) are China's Territory~~~~ (~M?IJ~fJ': ,!:) ~;t 
~ffi!ilJ(-c:'~.Q," Historical Research lll!i!~lilf~ (February 1972); "The History and 
Sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-tai Islands (Senkaku Islands) ~~~~ (~M?IJ~~) <7)1Jf 
5l! c!:: ffil,,. r .. UI," japan-China Culture Exchange B t:frk {/:3(iift (February, 1972); The 
History and Sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-tai Islands -- A Re-assessment ~~ ~ ~ ( ~ 
M?IJ~~) <7)1Jf5i:!c!::~J6rJJ& (¥}~),Chinese Studies Monthly rpf!!llilf~!Jtll, No. 
292 (1972). 
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records accorded with the same legal efficacy as in any other official 
do cum en ts. 46 
In these detailed mission reports, Chinese envoys commonly 
recorded the route they took to reach the Ryukyu Kingdom, which 
typically began at the Chinese port city of Fuzhou, followed by 
passing a series of islands (including the disputed islands), and 
finally arriving at the Ryukyuan port city of Naha. This particular 
route was commonly referred to as the "Compass Route jffm" since 
it required the envoys to set and reset their compasses each time 
they passed by an anticipated island in order to reach the next one, 
ultimately leading them to their final destination. Scholars 
supporting the Chinese claim have placed particular emphasis upon 
these mission reports, since they contend that not only do these 
reports demonstrate that the disputed islands were first discovered 
and used by the Chinese as navigational aids over a period of about 
five hundred years, but more importantly, they contained passages 
indicating Chinese ownership over the islands. 
The earliest certain reference of the disputed islands is in a 
non-official Chinese navigational record entitled Fair Winds for 
Escort 11/fi/fUtJ~ written in 1403. This record identified the disputed 
islands within the Compass Route familiar to the Chinese 
navigators, and included directions suggesting the proper ways in 
setting and re-setting one's compass to successfully reach the 
Ryukyu Kingdom. The earliest official investiture mission record 
still in existence today dates back to 1534, and was written during 
the twelfth mission (the first and last mission were in 1372 and 
1866, respectively). It is unfortunate that earlier investiture mission 
records prior to 1534 have been lost due to fire at the imperial 
archives.47 Nonetheless, in these remaining mission records, it is 
shown that passing by the island Chi Yu (another name for Chiwei 
Yu/Kumeseki-shima, the most northeastward island of the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands chain) meant reaching the "boundary 
46 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 518; Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 
254. 
47 Wu Tianying ~~,A Textual Research on the Ownership of the 
Diaoyu Islands Prior to the Sino-japanese War of 1894-95 --- Also a Query to 
Professor Toshio Okuhara and Others Efl4=fliiitii9#.1.1TliJIII,.if!-¥iff B *l!lliflldil 
~(Beijing: Shehuei kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1994), pp. 40-42. 
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between China and foreign land." Moreover, as the Chinese 
investiture ships sailed further eastward, only upon the sighting of 
Kume Hill il*ll.J (known today as Kume-jima ~*l1s) did the 
envoys indicate the sighting of Ryukyu territory.48 Among the 
many existing investiture mission records, the following are a few of 
the most frequently cited. 
In 1534, Chinese investiture envoy Chen Kan P.!ffil. wrote in 
Records of the Imperial Missions to Ryukyu fJI!IJt£/C$1 the following: 
On the tenth, the winds heading to the south were brisk and the boat sailed 
swiftly. Though floating downstream with the current, the boat 
maintained a steady balance without being vigorously shaken. One after 
another, Pingjia Hill, Diaoyu Yu, Huangmao Yu [Huangwei Yu], and 
Chi Yu [Chiwei Yu] were left behind ... On the dusk of the eleventh, Kume 
Hill was in sight --- it belongs to the Ryukyus. The aborigines [Ryukyu 
people on board] rejoiced and were happy to have arrived home. 
··+B. mJil.~ii. :IIHj!mJR. ~.mmrrnff, ~1'~111. ~zp.sllJ, f'Jf! 
if4, ~Ji~if4. J§W,*J!, Ell'!Wfi··+-8~. ~iiJ~IlJ. 71MI~~. 
~ABJl. ~it~~. 49 
After departing from the Chinese port city of Fuzhou, a series of 
islands were passed by prior to reaching Ryukyu Kingdom. From 
the passage above, it can be seen that envoy Chen recorded the 
specific names of each island his ship passed by en route to Ryukyu. 
What this passage suggests, according to Chinese scholars, is that 
envoy Chen regarded all islands passed prior to reaching Ryukyu's 
Kume Island as Chinese territory, since only upon reaching Kume 
Island did he first indicate that it belonged to another country, the 
Ryukyu Kingdom.50 
48 For the purpose of this study, it is important to note that the characters 
shan (UJ hill/mountain) and yu (il4 island) were both used interchangeably in ancient 
Chinese texts to denote islands. 
49 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 44. 
50 An analogy that parallels the cited passage would run as follows: at one 
o'clock in the afternoon, I, John Smith, drove past Philadelphia; hours later, New 
York city was also left behind. On the next day at five o'clock in the morning, I 
arrived at Toronto--- it belongs to Canada. My Canadian ftiends in the car were 
excited to be home. (Continued on foiiJJwingpage) 
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In 1561, Chinese investiture envoy Guo Rulin ~~wrote 
in his edition of Records of the Imperial Missions to Ryukyu fi!JJfi:j(lfc 
the following, "On the first of the fifth intercalary moon we passed 
by Diaoyu Yu; on the third we reached Chi Yu [Chiwei 
Yu/Kumeseki-shima]. Chi Yu is a regional hill delimiting Ryukyu 
territory. With another day of [favorable] wind, Kume Hill will be 
in sight ~lifl W-il§f-Jfi.lti!t W.::.~~-~0 ~a::ff, :Wijft~t!rntli 
i:!1.o f'J- B z& l!PiiJ~il*tli·" Chinese scholars point to this 
passage to demonstrate that Chi Yu (Chiwei Yu/Kubaseki-shima) 
was considered a regional island at the Chinese frontier separating 
Chinese and Ryukyu territory. Hence, Chi Yu and the islands that 
came before it (collectively, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands) were 
well within the perimeters of the Chinese border; while islands that 
lay beyond it constituted Ryukyu territory, beginning from Kume 
Island. 
Among the many mission records written during the five 
centuries since Ryukyu became a Chinese tributary state in 1372, 
one of the most detailed and authoritative works is Zhongshan 
Mission Records c:f:lt1Jf1Jmllc written by Xu Baoguang ~~:J'C, the 
nineteenth Chinese investiture envoy to Ryukyu, in 1719. Xu's 
work contained detailed descriptions of the thirty-six islands 
comprising the Ryukyu Kingdom as well as various maps relevant to 
his journey, such as a map of the renowned Compass Route and a 
map of Ryukyu Kingdom. Xu specifically mentioned in the preface 
of Zhongshan Mission Records that his work was completed and 
validated with the assistance of high-ranking Ryukyuan officials 
sent by the Zhongshan Wang (Ryukyu King), in particular, the 
distinguished scholar T ei J unsoku @lUlU. As a result, envoy Xu's 
Zhongshan Mission Records was not only authoritative in the sense of 
its accuracy, but also because it reflected the official views held by 
Chinese scholars believe that it was only natural and logical for envoy Chen 
to omit any references of ownership of certain locations that he regarded as self-
evidently Chinese territory. With respect to the above analogy, Chinese scholars 
would similarly attempt to demonstrate that the American traveler, John Smith, 
would not find the need to specify in his travel diary that Philadelphia and New York 
were American soil, simply because their ownership is obvious to him. Yet, upon 
reaching a location that is not within the American border, John would most likely 
indicate that he has entered foreign soil by noting its owner. In John's case, this place 
is Toronto. 
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both China and Ryukyu at the time. 51 It has also been noted by 
Japanese scholars that Zhongshan Mission Records found its way to 
Japan and was translated into Japanese during the late Edo period, 
allowing it to become the most comprehensive and authoritative 
source of knowledge about the Ryukyu Kingdom at the time. 52 
With respect to Kume Island, envoy Xu specifically identified it as 
"a garrison hill on the southwest border of Ryukyu ~liJ(iffii¥f::1i:W-...t.M 
UJ." In addition, in neither of the descriptions of the thirty-six 
islands comprising Ryukyu Kingdom or the included "Map of the 
Thirty-six Islands of Ryukyu" were traces of any of the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands found. Therefore, it can be seen that 
Kume Island was indeed regarded as the doorstep to Ryukyu 
territory, a fact defined in clear terms and agreed upon by the 
Chinese and Ryukyuans. Supporters of the Chinese claim argue 
that when viewing the above three investiture mission records of 
Chen, Guo, and Xu altogether, one can unmistakably conclude that 
Ryukyu territory was regarded as beginning from Kume Island and 
the area east of it, whereas Chiwei Yu and the area west of it 
belonged to the Chinese. 
In response, some scholars supporting the Japanese claim, 
including Okuhara Toshio, have argued that while such ancient 
Chinese navigational records prove that Kume Island belonged to 
Ryukyu Kingdom, it does not necessarily connote that the islands 
prior to reaching Kume Island were Chinese territory, since the 
records did not explicitly say that each of the islands prior to Kume 
Island belonged to China. Okuhara therefore maintains that the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were terra nullius at the time. This 
point raised by Okuhara has been refuted by Chinese scholars by 
pointing to certain other more specific passages, such as those found 
in investiture envoy Wang Chi's fftl Records of the Imperial Missions 
to Ryukyu ffl!fit£/(lfl»written in 1683: 
At the fifth hour [between seven and nine o'clock] during early morning, 
Pengjia Hill was passed by; and at the tenth hour [five to seven o' clock] 
Diaoyu Yu was left behind. The boat sailed as if aloft in air, and was 
51 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 524. 
52 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, pp. 38-40. 
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accompanied by the singing of those aboard... On the twenty-fifth day a 
hill was in sight. Although Huangwei should come before Chi Yu [Chiwei 
Yu], the boat reached Chi Yu directly and Huangwei Yu was not seen. At 
dusk as the boat passed the outskirts (or noted as trough), heavy winds and 
strong tides rose up. One pig, one lamb, and five pecks of rice and congee 
were offered to the ocean. Paper boats were burnt, gongs stroked and 
drums beaten. The soldiers on board put on armor, sat straight while 
revealing their swords as if preparing for a battle; this guard of defense was 
not relaxed until a long time had passed. Upon [my] inquiring about what 
the outskirts meant, I was told that it was the boundary between Chinese 
and foreign land; and upon inquiring how the boundary was 
differentiated, I was told through estimation. [Emphasis added] 
~~J~~~IlJ. l!lf~J~~~f!IJL ~?i~ffiifl, llt'~1k00 ···=+liB~ 
UJ, !fl5tfi~tiW-*Ji, 1!\fnJ~~W--. *~fi~*Jit!!. MlJ~~ (*f'FW ), ~-*~· ~~-$~-. mn.4*~· ~~~~•ft. m•~ 
~.Rn~.~-~~z~g.~~Zfi~. B~~ZWt!!.W~ 
fiiifl, BH!!=···53 
When the investiture envoy's ship passed beyond the island Chiwei 
Yu and entered an area referred by the Chinese navigators on board 
as jiao ~ (outskirts) or gou A'4 (trough), envoy Wang asked what the 
area represented.54 The response he received was straightforward, 
"the boundary between China and foreign land t:fl*Z.W.if!." This 
particular area also noted as gou A'4 (trough) was more commonly 
known by its full name, heishuei-gou JIJ.l<M or "Black Water 
Trough," which derived its name from the sudden change in the 
color of sea water from dark blue to dark black perceivable to the 
eyes of those who sailed over it. Chinese historians familiar with 
such mission records note that this sudden change in sea water color 
was known to create a strong sense of fear and unpredictability 
among those who set sail across it, since reaching this area meant 
53 Wu Tianying, supra note 47 p. 56. 
54 Chinese historians have noted that the reason why envoy Wang recorded 
the area known as jiao ~ (outskins) also as gou it (trough) is because while the two 
Chinese characters are pronounced differently in many Chinese dialects, they are 
both pronounced as kan in Fukienese. As a result, when envoy Wang, a native of 
Jiangxi Province, learned from the Fukienese-speaking navigators on board that they 
had passed an area referred by them as kan, he recorded it as "outskirts" and "trough" 
since both appropriately described the area. 
See Wu Tianying, supra note 47 p. 100. 
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exiting familiar Chinese waters.55 In response, a habitual sacrificial 
ceremony found its origin in the purpose of praying for safety while 
sailing in alien waters. Other measures taken for the purpose of 
calming those on board included symbolic military preparations. 
In Records of Ryukyu Kingdom Jfit£1(/IJJ;t:J§ written in 1756, 
investiture envoy Zhou Huang f,!i)~ provides a comprehensive 
narrative of a geographical and historical background of the 
Ryukyus. Zhou's work also contained a brief description of the 
Black Water Trough and its location as follows, "(The Ryukyu 
Kingdom] is surrounded by the sea. To the west of its surrounding 
sea is the Black Water Trough which delimits Fujian Waters. To set 
sail from Fujian to reach the Ryukyus, one must advance through 
the blue waters and then cross the black waters [J!;ftlijt] Jl~~ifjifl, 
ifimi~ i§~*tfiW!MfifiW., fMmlmt$:£~~!0~7lt*iA11*." [emphasis 
added]56 This passage further demonstrates that the "Black Water 
Trough" served as the natural boundary that divided Ryukyuan 
waters from Chinese waters (Fujian waters). Since the disputed 
islands were located westward of the trough, they were clearly 
within Chinese waters. Viewed together with the previous passage 
found in envoy Wang Chi's Records of the Imperial Missions to 
Ryukyu, there can be no mistake that the "boundary between 
Chinese and foreign land" was indeed recognized to be the Black 
Water Trough that lay between Chiwei Yu and Kume Island. 
Modern oceanographers now know that what the ancient 
Chinese once referred to as the Black Water Trough, is in fact what 
is known today as the Okinawa Trough. Modern Chinese scholars 
on the subject point to the fact that nowhere between the mainland 
Chinese continent and the Ryukyu islands does there exist an area 
deeper than 200 meters, other than the 2,270~meter~deep Okinawa 
Trough that divides the two. Hence, what was known as the Black 
Water Trough to the Chinese diplomat~navigators, now known as 
the Okinawa Trough, was regarded as the natural boundary 
between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom. Chinese writers have 
also noted that, geographically speaking, the existence of the trough 
is indication that the disputed islands are associated with Taiwan, 
55 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 520. 
56 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 56. 
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not Okinawa. Noteworthy however, is that many modern Chinese 
writers on the subject have in their works mistakenly labeled the 
Okinawa Trough MtfillfiM with another term, the Ryukyu Trench 
~f4t#ii~.57 The reason for this confusion in terminology is due to 
the fact that the Chinese have been accustomed to referring to 
Okinawa by its historical name, Ryukyu. Normally, it is acceptable 
to use the term Ryukyu rather than Okinawa since they refer to the 
same group of islands. However, in reference to Okinawa Trough, 
the term Okinawa should not be replaced with Ryukyu since there 
actually exists a Ryukyu Trench located west of the Okinawa 
Islands. Obviously, the Ryukyu Trench is not what the Chinese 
intended in their references. While this error in terminology does 
not hinder the Chinese claim, it nonetheless deserves some attention 
and should be corrected for the sake of accuracy. 
Since the Black Water Trough was traditionally considered 
to be the natural boundary between China and Ryukyu as 
previously demonstrated, it is evident that both countries 
considered themselves to be adjacent to one another. Throughout 
the five hundred years of established tributary relations between 
China and Ryukyu, official statements that confirm the fact that 
China and Ryukyu traditionally regarded themselves as immediate 
neighboring countries have been frequent. One of the many 
instances that serve to illustrate this idea can be seen in a 
memorandum (ziwen ~:SC) written by the Ryukyu King in 1640 
addressed to the Governor of Fujian, which in its opening stated, 
"Ryukyu has been known to be stationed at the eastern corner for 
centuries, whose joy and sorrow is closely tied [to China], and land 
adjoined with Fujian in one continuous stream; sharing a natural 
bond [with Fujian] created by heaven and put in place by earth, and 
separated by a strait of delimiting water Witm~f4tt!t~]fi!~, f*mGffi 
g, IIIJtilflilij!, f:UjJ-Jllii, ~f;t!!~, j'M<~j&. "58 Chinese scholars 
contend that such statements only reinforce the point that there 
could not have possibly existed any islands that were te"a nullius 
57 I hereby express my appreciation to Prof. Ma Ying-jeou who verbally 
informed me of this information during our conversation in his office at National 
Chengchi University in December 1997. 
58 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 60. 
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since: 1) the disputed islands' existence was well-known to both 
China and Ryukyu; 2) Ryukyu territory began from Kume Island 
extending eastward; and 3) both countries regarded themselves as 
immediate neighbors separated by a "delimiting water." Although 
the name of the "delimiting water" was not specified in the said 
memorandum, it goes beyond saying that it referred to the Black 
Water Trough. 
In addition to these past mission records that dealt solely 
with the diplomatic exchanges between China and the Ryukyu 
Kingdom, supporters of the Chinese claim have also directed 
attention to several other historical documents to substantiate their 
argument. One Chinese ancient record frequently referred to is A 
Chronicle on japan B;fl:--written in 1556 by Zheng Shungong ~ 
~JjJ, a Chinese envoy to Japan. Many Chinese scholars regard 
Zheng' s reference of the disputed islands as indisputable evidence 
that the disputed islands did not belong to the Ryukyus, but in 
particular, to the island of Taiwan. In his book, Zheng writes, 
"Diaoyu Yu, a small island of Xiaodong t9f.lll.., 'J':~Ii!tNJHf!."59 It 
is worth explaining here that Xiaodong was another ancient Chinese 
name referring to the island of Taiwan. Therefore, supporters of 
the Chinese claim regard the significance of this particular passage, 
as it is an ancient version of saying: the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 
are "islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of 
Formosa" as noted in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
Consequently, the islands should have been returned to China as 
was Taiwan after World War II.60 
59 Yang Chung-kuei, supra note 10, p. 519-520. 
60 A supporter of the Chinese claim, Prof. Chiu Hungdah has noted that 
this particular piece of evidence may in fact present problems to the Chinese claim 
since Taiwan itself had not yet been officially recognized as Chinese territory at the 
time of the publication of Zheng Xungong's A Chronicle on japan B*-& in 1556. 
Indeed, this contention appears accurate considering that official Chinese authoriry 
on Taiwan had not been established until 1662, when the renowned Ming-loyalist, 
Zheng Chenggong ~pJG)jJ (Koxinga}, arrived at Taiwan and made it into an 
operational base for Ming loyalist resistance against the Qing. 
As will be shown later in this study, ample official Qing documents (local 
gazetteers or fangzhi) demonstrate that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were 
administrated under the Taiwan Prefecture of Fujian Province during the Qing 
Dynasty. And as already shown, official Ming documents (such as the envoy records} 
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In addition to navigational records, scholars supporting 
the Chinese claim have pointed to several historical maps produced 
by the Chinese and Japanese which denote the islands as Chinese 
territory. The most frequently invoked map is from the work of 
Hayashi Shihei f*-f-3JZ, an eminent Japanese scholar-cartographer 
during the Edo Period. Among Hayashi's most celebrated works is 
his Illustrated Survey of Three Countries _!JJJij'flf!!/~, a 
geographical treatise on Korea, the Ryukyu Kingdom and Ezo (now 
Hokkaido). Included in this publication is a map entitled "Map of 
the Three Provinces and Thirty-six Islands of the Ryukyus Jr,f~_:=:. 
~'1t.:=:.+:RS;Z.~," which is most frequently invoked by supporters 
of the Chinese claim as evidence that the disputed islands were 
well-recognized to be Chinese territory even by the Japanese. This 
map, which used the traditional four pigment coloring method, 
utilized the colors red, yellow, green, and brown to indicate 
geographical differences between and within nations. In the 
show that the previous Ming government regarded the islands as strictly within 
Fujian Province, and located within Fujian Waters (ll!w Min hat) --- rather than 
belonging to Taiwan simply because the later had not yet come under Ming China's 
authority. This therefore suggests that Zheng's account that the disputed islands 
belonged to Taiwan (at the time of the publication of his work in 1556) is indeed 
problematic. 
The reason why many Chinese scholars may have overlooked the above 
problem with Zheng's account is most likely due to their assumption that Taiwan 
was administratively a part of China prior to the 1600s ---a common assumption is 
that Taiwan was placed under the Penghu (Pescadores Islands) Sub-Magistrate 
Office (~mJ~MSJ Penghu xunjiamt) installed by the Yuan government in 1281 
which was retained by the Ming government until 1388 and later re-installed in 
1563. 
While the Penghu Sub-Magistrate Office indeed established official 
Chinese authority on the Pescadores Islands, the island of Taiwan was recognized at 
the time to be beyond its jurisdiction. Taiwan was not brought under official 
Chinese authority until Zheng Chenggong arrived and in 1662 drove out the Dutch, 
who had previously occupied Taiwan since 1624. Finally, after Zheng's regime was 
conquered by Qing forces in 1683, Taiwan's administrative status was officially 
promulgated by the Qing government as Taiwan Prefecture (of Fujian Province), 
with its prefectural capital at T ainan. 
As indicated by Qing local gazetteers, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 
subsequently came under the administrative division of Taiwan Prefecture. See next 
section of this chapter. 
Note: Despite the similarities in their names, Zheng Xungong and Zheng 
Chenggong bear no relation. 
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explanatory section of the map regarding the usage of colors, 
Hayashi notes that areas colored as red indicate the following: 
territories of China, an "uninhabited island" (Hayashi identifies it as 
Ogasawara Islands), and Kamchatka Peninsula (Russian territory at 
the edge of the Japan-Russian border).61 In Hayashi's map, the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands are situated on the well-known 
Compass Route and are colored as red indicating Chinese 
ownership. The Ryukyu Islands, which were depicted as beginning 
from Kume Island and extending eastward --- are colored yellow. 
While some Japanese scholars have sought to refute the importance 
of this map by arguing that Hayashi "mechanically" colored the 
disputed islands as red since he referred to the Zhong.rhan Mission 
Records while completing the map, Chinese scholars contend that 
this only further demonstrates the authoritativeness of the 
Zhongshan Mission Records among Japanese scholars at the time.62 It 
61 Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Diaoyutai 
Islets and Possible Solutions f.J#.I:~J!Jill1:M~fAr .. ,Rli&:!tfWiR1J~~fif~." Decade 
of the Storm --- A Recollection of the "Safeguard the Diaoyutai Islands Movement-
and the Days Studying Overseas /IJ.1/tfl!Fft-f!i!:I9Wiblfdfl~§:.iflZ@'/6 Shaw 
Yu-ming (ed.), (Taipei: Lienching Publications, 1991), p. 254. 
62 Some Japanese scholars have sought to undermine the validity of 
Hayashi's map as an indication of territorial ownership based on the fact that 
Hayashi colored the island of Taiwan (which was Chinese territory and a well-
recognized fact at the time of the map's publication) yellow instead of red. 
While many Chinese scholars have responded to this challenge presented by 
the Japanese by offering separate explanations as to why there exists a difference in 
the coloring between Taiwan and China, I personally have found them to be 
inadequate. I have sought to study the map itself and conduct some research on my 
own in order to seek for what might be a satisfactory answer. I believe that the 
following most closely explains the rationale behind Hayashi's decision to indicate 
China and Taiwan (or different regions of the same country) with separate colors. 
First and foremost, one must not overlook the limitations of the four pigment 
coloring system that Hayashi faced while creating this map. Many scholars have been 
unaware of an imponant feature of Hayashi's map: the area known to represent the 
homeland of the rulers of the Qing Dynasty, Manchuria, was also not colored red; 
instead green was used, the same color used for Japan. At first, this may appear to 
further suppon the Japanese contention that Hayashi's method of coloring cannot be 
used to denote territorial ownership. But upon further examination of the entire 
map, one will begin to appreciate Hayashi's genius and expertise as an exceptional 
cartographer-scholar. As one examines the territories of China in Hayashi's map, 
one will find that all together three different colors (i.e., red, green, yellow) were 
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used. However, keeping in mind that Hayashi also specifically noted that red was 
used to indicate territories belonging to China, one will realize the following: while 
Hayashi wished to use the very limited traditional coloring system to denote 
different countries, it was also his intention to denote different geographical features 
within a given country. To overcome the limitation of only four different colors, 
Hayashi had to wisely and carefully use and re-use the four colors to successfully 
denote borders between countries and geographical differences between within a 
country without causing any confusion. With respect to China, there is no doubt that 
an expert on geography such as Hayashi would not have known that Manchuria and 
Taiwan were Chinese territory. Aware that such territories were self-evidently 
Chinese territory but also geographically unique, Hayashi chose to depict such 
differences in his map by using two non-red colors, green for Manchuria and yellow 
for Taiwan, respectively. Using green for Manchuria also did not create any 
confusion regarding delimitation between Manchuria and foreign territory since no 
other neighboring country was also colored as green, except for Japan, which was 
separated from Manchuria not only by a Korea colored as yellow but also by sea. 
Also, Hayashi must have also been aware that it was rather unlikely that his Japanese 
fellowmen would be misled by the use of green for both Manchuria and Japan and 
hence mistake their country as belonging to Manchuria. Another instance of 
Hayashi's cleverness in his use of colors can be seen in his choice to color both China 
and Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula as red. It can be seen that Hayashi's intention to 
denote the border between Japan and Russia was also effective as the usage of green 
and re-use of red provided an obvious distinction. And lastly, with respect to the 
islands situated on the Compass Route, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were colored 
red, and the nearest Ryukyuan island on the route, Kume Island, was colored brown 
--- thus indicating the boundary between China and Ryukyu Kingdom. In short, 
while no two bordering countries in Hayashi's map shared the same color which 
allowed borders to be immediately apparent, areas which shared different 
geographical features could also be easily identified. 
If the above explanation proves to be true, then another minor point must 
also be noted. It can be seen from Hayashi's map, that while he regarded the 
Diaoyutai/Islands as Chinese territory, he may have been uncertain as to whether the 
islands were under Fujian Province or more specifically, under Fujian's Taiwan 
Prefecture. In any case, Hayashi chose to color the islands red, indicating a closer 
geographical relationship with Fujian Province. This seems understandable from 
Hayashi's point of view, since he sketched the islands closer to Fujian Province than 
to Taiwan Prefecture (Hayashi's map was not always in size or distant as 
proportioned as one would expect in modern maps). One may then question 
whether Hayashi's association of the disputed islands with Fujian instead of Taiwan 
undermines the Chinese contention that the islands traditionally belonged to the 
latter. To answer the above question once again requires an understanding of the 
administrative status ofT aiwan --- which will bring us to the conclusion that the 
above does not present a challenge to the Chinese claim. During the Qing dynasty, 
Taiwan Prefecture remained administratively under the jurisdiction of Fujian 
Province until it was upgraded to provincial status equal to Fujian in 1885. 
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has also been noted by supporters of the Chinese claim that the 
authoritativeness of Hayashi's maps were recognized by European 
scholars. Heinrich Klaproth, a German scholar of Oriental studies, 
translated the maps into French and published them back in 1832. 
In addition, the Meiji Government also found the very same maps 
of Hayashi to be useful evidence in demonstrating that the 
Ogasawara Islands were long considered by its people as Japanese 
territory during territorial negotiations with the United States back 
in the 1860s. 63 
The other most frequently invoked map is an official 
Chinese map entitled Imperial Map of Native and Foreign Lands lilWJ 
t:f15'f.-lift!lllll/, which was published in a series of volumes by the 
Hubei provincial government in 1862. In one of the maps labeled 
"Southern Portion" found in Volume Seven, the disputed islands 
were included as Chinese territory. As explained in the 
introductory section to this series of maps, all place names on the 
map followed the principle of "the name follows its owner -i!i~::l:. 
A. "64 This meant that in the case of the inclusion of foreign land 
on the map, their foreign names would also be listed. The disputed 
islands were labeled only by their Chinese names, whereas all islands 
beginning from Kume Island extending eastward, for example, 
were labeled first by their Ryukyuan names and then followed by 
their Chinese names. 
In addition to demonstrating that the disputed islands were 
traditionally well-recognized as Chinese territory, scholars 
supporting the Chinese claim have also focused on demonstrating 
that China displayed state authority over the disputed islands 
through effective control. The basis of this claim derives from the 
fact that the disputed islands were incorporated into the Chinese 
Therefore, at the time of publication of Hayashi's map, whether the disputed islands 
were indicated as belonging to Fujian Province or Taiwan Prefecture is irrelevant, 
since both the disputed islands and Taiwan Prefecture were under the jurisdiction of 
Fujian Province at the time. 
63 Takahashi Shogoro, supra note 5, p. 199. See also Yasuoka Akio ~ltqji!B 
~. The Meiji Restoration and Territorial Issues fJjJ#JifUii.!: f1Ji±flr11l (Tokyo: 
Kyoiku-sha, 1980), pp. 177-186. 
64 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 95 
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naval defence system beginning from the Ming Dynasty and lasting 
well into the Qing Dynasty. From the beginning of the 16th 
century, the Chinese coast suffered from increasingly frequent and 
ferocious raids by Japanese pirates (wako in Japanese). In response, 
the Ming government appointed Hu Zongxian i\ij*W as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Costal Defence in 1556, with 
the primary responsibility of deterring Japanese pirates. With the 
assistance of Zheng Rozeng ~;fit;, one of the most reputable 
experts on costal geography at the time, Commander Hu compiled 
a volume of thirteen scrolls collectively entitled Illustrated Treatise 
on Costal Defence llifilllllli in 1562. This volume recorded all 
Chinese military deployments in the costal area from the northern 
Liaodong Peninsula to the southern province of Guangdong, on the 
mainland and offshore islands. Within the first scroll of the volume 
entitled "Atlas of the Islands and Shores of the Costal Region ia#i 
Jl.JtJ;if," there contained two maps labeled Fu 7 and Fu 8, detailing 
all the islands offshore of Fujian Province. It is in these two maps 
that the disputed islands are included among others in the 
following order from right to left, Pengjia Shan, Diaoyu Yu, 
Huaping Shan, Huangmao Shan (Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima), 
Ganlan Shan, and Chi Yu (Chiwei Yu/Kumeseki-shima).65 Another 
publication demonstrating that the Ming reign incorporated the 
disputed islands within China's costal defence system is the Treatise 
on Military Preparations Jitfllj;·it published by Mao Yuanyi ~Jtfi in 
1621. Under the "Costal Defence" section of Mao's work is the 
map, "Atlas of the Islands and Shores of the Costal Region of 
Fujian fiij!78'lfill.JtJ;IIJ," in which the disputed islands are once again 
listed in the order previously found in the work of Hu.66 
Subsequent Chinese historical documents reveal that the 
disputed islands remained under China's maritime defence system 
well into the Qing Dynasty, only with increased ties to the island of 
Taiwan. A historical document entitled Records of An Inspection 
Tour of Taiwan ··IJ!~JJ/<, completed by imperial inspector-
general Huang Shujing upon his survey of Taiwan in 1722, holds 
further evidence of Chinese state authority over the disputed islands 
65 Ibid., p. 82. 
66 Ibid., p. 88-89. 
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manifested by the deployment of Chinese navel forces from 
Taiwan. In his book covering various topics about the island of 
Taiwan, Huang devotes a section to the island's military-related 
affairs entitled as "Military Preparation." In this section, the 
following is noted: 
In the nonh of the ocean behind the mountain [i.e., Taiwan] there lies a 
mountain named Diaoyutai where ten or more large ships can be 
anchored. 
Similar and occasionally more detailed descriptions indicating 
deployment of Chinese navel forces to the disputed islands as seen 
above are also evident throughout many of the local gazetteers ("Jj~ 
fang zht) covering the administrative areas of Fujian Province and its 
subsidiary, Taiwan Prefecture. Scholars who have devoted 
themselves to a serious learning of Chinese history would most 
likely also find himself quite familiar with these so-called local 
gazetteers. Generally speaking, these gazetteers were known as 
official records covering a vast variety of topics mainly focusing on 
the regional history and geography of a given geographical 
administrative unit under the Chinese empire. Since these 
gazetteers were compiled under the bureaucratic sponsorship of the 
central government of the Chinese empire and used by local 
officials as a basis for the implementation of government rule and 
public policy, these local gazetteers were authoritative official 
records in every respect. 68 
67 Ibid., p. 92. 
68 To further illustrate the close association between these local gazetteers 
and the State it may be useful to give a brief history of their origin. The prototype of 
the local gazetteer was what was known as tujing ~~~~ or tuzhi Ill;& (illustrated 
treatises) which date back as early to Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.). Beginning from 
the Sui period (581-618 B.C.), these treatises began to expand its content to cover 
various aspects of local affairs essential to the operation of government, such as local 
geography, administrative structure, local customs, renown historical sites, local 
worthies, etc. In 780 BC, the Tang Emperor made it mandatory for all sub-
prefectures (zhoujun #IW) to submit to the central government a local tujing every 
few years for the purpose of political reference. By the Ming Dynasty (1368-1643), 
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Following is a list of the many gazetteers written on Fujian 
Province and its subsidiary Taiwan Prefecture throughout the Qing 
Dynasty which contained descriptions indicating usage of the 
disputed islands by the Chinese naval forces: Revised Gazetteer of 
Taiwan Prefecture Dl.~§fiJif.f;'ft and Subsequent Revision of the 
Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture il~lfjiJJif.f;'ft both written by Fan 
Xian 1B~ in 1747 and 1764, respectively; Records ofTaiwan JEfiJ;'ft 
118 by Li Yuanchun ~J"C#, Subsequent Revision of the Gazetteer of 
Taiwan Prefecture il~lffiJif.f-1:: by Yu Wenyi ~Xfi in 1764, 
Revised Gazetteer of Taiwan County Dl.~JffiJff,t;: by Wang Bichang 
.:££,l§ in 1752, and Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province DlliMH!ifli 
;it by Chen Shouqi ~-~ in 1871.69 Some of these works even 
went further and indicated the precise administrative division to 
which the disputed islands belonged. In Chen Shouqi's Revised 
Gazetteer of Fujian Province Dl.litliJH!ifli,t;:, for example, the islands 
the fang zhi, or local gazetteers came to replace the formerly widely used tujing, with 
a expanded coverage on local affairs including topics such as establishment of 
administration, topography, tax revenue, population, military preparations, etc. In 
1412, the Ming central government ordered that the format and content of the local 
gazetteers to be standardized at all prefectural, sub-prefectural, and county levels; and 
in 1673, Qing Emperor Kangxi further ordered that gazetteers compiled on the 
provincial level must also follow state instituted directives. With increasing 
sponsorship from the central government through time, it can be seen that the 
number of publications of such official records increased from 28 during the Sung 
Dynasty (1068-1289) to an astonishing 4,655 during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). 
Since the compilation of gazetteers were based on the hierarchy of 
geographical administrative divisions, on the highest level of gazetteers stood the 
comprehensive gazetteers (yitong zhi -*if;!;) which covered the geographical histoty 
of essentially all areas under the Chinese Empire. Next in descending in order were 
the provincial gazetteers (sheng zhi l!tii!:; or tung zhi iiii!;;), followed by the 
prefectural gazetteers (fu zhi lf.Jii!:;), sub-prefectural gazetteers (zhou zhi #Iii!:;), 
department gazetteers (ting zhi Ia~), and lastly, the county gazetteers (xian zhi \Ill~). 
The above description of local gazetteers was based primarily on the 
following sources: Joseph Needham's celebrated series, Science and Civilization in 
China, Vol. 6 Part Ill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), pp. 45-49; and 
Prof. Guy Alitto's "A Comparative Analysis between Chinese Gazetteers and 
Western Historical Records" (in Chinese) Conforence Papers of the International 
Academic Conforence on the Study of Chinese Local Gazetteers (Taipei: Chinese 
Studies Research and Service Center, 1985.) 
69 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 92; Government Information Office of 
the ROC, An Objective Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Islands Dispute (1996). 
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are listed under the jurisdiction of the navel commands stationed at 
Gemalan Department, which was the administrative unit that n.ow 
constitutes the present day Yi-lan County llrlllf~. In the secuon 
"Key Locations of Each County 1'§-H~" under the chapter of 
"Costal Defence," Chen records the following: 
Gemalan Department 
Gemalan constitutes a depattment (ting 8) which to the north borders 
Sandiao, and to the east faces the ocean. Wild savages are found to gather 
and reside within; and pirate ships frequently lurk about [the area] ... Suao 
Harbor is located at the southern part of the Department, with a broad 
entrance capable of accommodating large ships -- it belongs to the defence 
sector of Gemalan. In addition, in the north of the ocean behind the 
mountain [ie., Taiwan] there lies Diaoyutai where a thousand or so large 
ships can be anchored. Xuebolan of Chongyao [both place names] can 
accommodate sampan boats. 
11SJ.!illf.8 
IIIJ.!ilii!!P87Ei ~tW..=:.iHf!~*li~ -~ l&~:ff~iatli* ... U~tta?'Eii¥1 
i-ir,Jtmiif?l1**•111J.!ilil5tWi~tii-U*r¥~tfl"Y-JffA~Ei-i~iif ?B*M-Tfl 
~3tzii¥J/Jl1Vfiififf1~t&ta. 70 
It is contended by Chinese scholars that such examples seen in 
Chinese official records are decisive information that demonstrates: 
1) that the islands were considered Chinese territory as evidenced 
from their inclusion in Chinese local gazetteers; 2) China's title over 
the disputed islands was perfected by its official and exclusive usage 
of the disputed islands which was entered into official records 
making such evidence the strongest and most direct evidence 
supporting the Chinese claim to the islands;71 and, 3) the islands 
were initially under the jurisdiction of Taiwan Prefecture, a 
70 Chen Shouqi !ll~jjt, Revised Gazetteer of Fujian Province mlli/311!JiB 
,B; (1871 ). The East Asian Library of the University of Chicago holds an extensive 
collection of Chinese local gazetteers, from which an original copy of Chen's &vised 
Gazetteer of Fujian Province was located and used for this study. 
71 One instance that further demonstrates the official and authoritative 
nature of official gazetteers is their usage by the Qing government to demonstrate 
what constitutes Chinese territory. During diplomatic negotiations between Qing 
China and Meiji Japan over the Taiwan Expedition Controversy in 1874, gazetteers 
of the Taiwan Prefecture were constantly invoked by the Qing government as 
evidence that it considered the entire island of Taiwan to be its territory. For details, 
see section 3 of this chapter. 
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subsidiary of Fujian Province, and then accordingly under the sole 
jurisdiction of Taiwan Province as the latter was upgraded to 
provincial status in 1885 --- a confirmation of the Chinese claim 
that the disputed islands belonged directly to Taiwan. The above 
view is also supported and reiterated in the pamphlet An Objective 
Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Dispute 19#.1.. t:i'?lli.Nfl:JJIDZfSiN published by 
the ROC government, stating that such patrolling authority 
displayed by Imperial China is the most effectual and conceivable 
evidence of past Chinese state authority and effective control over 
the islands. Lastly, given that the islands were extremely small, 
remote, and uninhabitable, it is contended that China's deployment 
of its navel forces over the islands was an adequate and only possible 
form of "effective control" during an era characterized by the 
traditional East Asian World Order. 
While the effort to search for evidence supporting the 
Chinese claim has certainly been enormous, it must be noted that 
this search has also resulted in the discovery of "evidence" that has 
been revealed to be of a dubious nature or nothing more than 
rumor. Altogether, there are two pieces of evidence that have been 
proven to be problematic through studies done by Chinese scholars, 
many of whom happen also to be the most prominent supporters of 
the Chinese claim. The first piece of problematic evidence concerns 
an Imperial Edict issued by Empress Dowager in 1893, and the 
second one concerns a court case between fishermen Taiwan and 
Okinawa over fishing rights in waters surrounding the disputed 
islands. For more than twenty years, the above two pieces of 
evidence have been frequently used to support the Chinese claim 
while the academic studies revealing their inadequacy continue to 
this day to be overlooked by the media, general public, and, often 
times, scholars. For the purpose of objectivity of this paper, these 
two evidence were not included along with the presentation of 
evidence not in question, but are presented and discussed separately 
as follows. 
The first piece of evidence that has been subjected to 
debate regarding its authenticity is what appears to be an Imperial 
Edict issued by Empress Dowager Cixi in 1893. According to this 
edict, Empress Dowager Cixi awarded to Sheng Xuanhuai Di11i11, a 
high-ranking official, three islands in the Diaoyutai/Senkaku chain 
to commend his gathering of highly effective medicinal herbs. The 
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complete translation of the edict is as follows: 
(Imperial Edict of Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi issued on the lOth month of 
the 19th year of Emperor Kuang Hsu, 1893) 
The medicinal pills submitted by Sheng Hsuan Huai, Tai Chang Szu Cheng 
have proved to be very effective. The herbs used in making the pills are said 
to have been collected from the small island ofTiao Yu Tai, beyond the seas 
ofTaiwan. Being made of ingredients from the sea, the prescription is more 
effective than that available in the Chinese mainland. It has come to my 
knowledge that the said official's family has for generations maintained 
pharmacies offering free treatment and herbs to destitute patients. This is 
really most commendable. The three small islands ofTiao Yu Tai, Huang 
Wei Yu, Chi Yu are hereby ordered to be awarded to Sheng Hsuan Huai as 
his property for the purpose of collecting medicinal herbs. May the great 
universal benevolence of the Imperial Dowager Empress and of the Emperor 
be deeply appreciated. 
(Seal of Queen Mother Tzu Hsi) 72 
~~~••~••~"•~•M••~••a~ -~~#-#*- ~ ~~i/i:$'1-~.f.~ .j, .tt:•&m-~..t.. 
~a~~~±~~~~~*~-~~~~-~~~~ 
~Jl-A-1-tllPM-~ iJ~.f·**~~*~~;..j, iJ'f~­
~·ttL~A. -l:**-•-tm Jt.ft~ 
~~~ll 
~ J:..1:::.-f.t -it-~ .t .J.. f; ~ Jll:. 
:it.~+iL~+.Fl 
Many Chinese use this piece of evidence to argue that an official 
document such as this imperial edict ordered by the Dowager 
Empress to her subject is a dear example of displaying state 
authority over the islands. While it is true that Sheng Xuanhuai did 
indeed maintain a well-known herbal pharmaceutical house 
Guangren Tang, and it is quite possible he actually had people sent 
to the disputed islands to collect medicinal herbs given his capacity 
as a high official himself and his close ties with Shao Youlian lmbtlt, 
the governor of Taiwan, the authenticity of the edict has been 
subject to considerable debate. 
The Japanese have cast doubt on its authenticity based on 
their belief that the document was nothing more than a commercial 
72 This translation is cited from Congressional Records-Proceedings and 
Debates of the 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117, No. 169, p. 17,967 (daily 
edition November 9, 1971). 
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advertisement for Sheng's pharmaceutical house; some Chinese 
scholars including Chiu Hungdah and Wu Tianming (both among 
the most prominent supporters of the Chinese position from 
Taiwan and China, respectively) who upon examining the 
document have also suggested that certain components of the edict 
are indeed problematic.73 Such components in question include the 
quality and color of the paper, the location and details of the 
imperial seal, certain expressions and terminology related to specific 
official positions, all of which were found to be either unusual in 
comparison to typical Qing official edicts or contained references 
that did not conform to actual historical events. 
For the purpose of an impartial and objective usage of 
evidence on the Chinese side, both Chinese scholars do not hesitate 
to point out in their studies that the imperial edict suffers from 
doubtful authenticity. However, as noted in Chiu's study, given 
that the imperial edict itself is not a genuine one, the fact remains 
that Sheng Yu-chen (also known as Grace Hsu}, the granddaughter 
of Sheng Xuanhuai, inherited the edict in question along with 
several letters concerning the edict from her father back in 1947 ---
long before the opening of the islands dispute. Therefore, it should 
be safe to conclude that the imperial edict in question was not 
"created" for the purpose of strengthening China's case with respect 
to the dispute since it already existed prior to the islands dispute. 
Perhaps it may be also suggested that while the imperial edict per se 
is not a genuine one and was possibly used merely as a commercial 
advertisement for Sheng's pharmaceutical house, evidently it was 
"fabricated" based on the common understanding of the Chinese 
public that the islands were Chinese territory --- in other words, an 
"edict" depicting Chinese state authority over territory that 
belonged to another country would be a self-defeating 
advertisement. At any rate, the uncertainties of the origin of the 
imperial edict and the problems inherent in the imperial edict itself 
seem sufficient to rule out the appropriateness of its usage as viable 
evidence supporting the Chinese claim. 
The second piece of evidence of dubious authenticity which 
73 See Chiu Hungdah, "A Study of the Edict (1893) Awarding the Three 
Islands of Diaoyutai by the Empress Dowager Cixi to Sheng Xuanhuai ~j!::*;:l§!ll~ 
f.(l:a~.::..!ii\Milm:11~~-(1893)Zfif~," Chinese International Law and 
International Affairs Yearbook cf1f.l!Jfllf/lfi!i:lilfllf1Jf:!/l~if.#G, Vol. 5 (Taipei: Taiwan 
Commercial Press, 1992), pp. 187-190; Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 57. 
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is also frequently used by supporters of the Chinese claim is a court 
case said to have occurred during the period of Japanese colonial 
rule over Taiwan. It is said that in a 1944 court case between Taipei 
County l!~tfH and Okinawa Prefecture itfl*l~ over the fishing 
jurisdiction of the waters surrounding the disputed islands, the 
Supreme Court of Japan ruled that the islands belonged to Taipei 
County on the grounds that they were historically a part of Taiwan 
and not Okinawa. It is hence argued that during times of Japanese 
colonial rule, even the Japanese government recognized the disputed 
islands as associated with no other but Taiwan County and placed 
them under its jurisdiction. 
The usage of this court case as evidence has for the past 
twenty years been extremely widespread with few questioning its 
authenticity. The ROC president, Lee Tung-huei, during a 
reception of politicians visiting from Japan, reportedly also 
mentioned to his guests the court case as evidence of the islands 
previously belonging under the jurisdiction of Taiwan during 
Japanese colonial rule.74 However, noteworthy is that for more than 
twenty years, none of those who point to the court case in question 
has ever been able to specify the case number or actual date of 
judgment, which has led most Japanese scholars to cast doubt as to 
the validity of such a ruling. In response to the confusion 
surrounding the validity of this piece of evidence and for the sake of 
objectivity, academic studies by Chinese scholars have led to a 
thorough search through the vast amount of Japanese court case 
archives.75 
According to these studies, it has been found that the court 
ruling in question was indeed non-existent and was most likely 
confused with another court case of a similar nature. The court case 
that was discovered instead concerned a dispute between fishermen 
from Taiwan and Okinawa during 1939-1940 over fishing rights 
not surrounding the disputed islands, but rather in the waters that 
are located between Ishigaki Island :Om., Yonaguni Island lf!~OO 
74 China Times, September 7, 1996, p. 4. 
75 Kuo Ming-shan ~B,ijllt, "An Overview of the Dispute over New Fishing 
Grounds between Taiwan and Ryukyu during japanese Colonial Rule BDJ~al1t 
M'*Zififl~t6)~$f4tla*." Chinese International Law and International 
Affairs Yearbook, Vol. 5 (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1992), pp. 201-204. 
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J!!l;, and lriomote Island i!§~J!Ih (all of which are Okinawa territory 
not in dispute). A settlement was finally reached between the 
Taiwan and Okinawan fishermen through mediation by the 
Japanese central government, deciding that joint exploitation of 
resources would best serve both parties. Therefore, while the 
authors of these studies are not hesitant to point to the non-
existence of the alleged court case, they nonetheless believe that 
there is more than ample evidence from other sources leading to the 
conclusion that "The Diaoyutai Islands were originally Chinese 
territory, what difference does a Japanese court ruling make?"76 
To this point, all historical evidence presented by the 
Chinese side that does not involve the actual process by which the 
disputed islands were incorporated by the Japanese government 
(which will be introduced in the following section as a continuation 
of the presentation of evidence supporting the Chinese claim) has 
been discussed in this paper. Before proceeding any further, an 
important point regarding the application of modern principles of 
international law to the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute deserves 
our attention. Many Chinese scholars have argued that when 
evaluating the various historical evidence put forth by the Chinese 
side, one must not fail to recognize important political realities of 
the time from which they originated, namely, an era characterized 
by the East Asian World Order (otherwise known as the Chinese 
World Order). 
The underlying concern is the following: whether principles 
of modern international law, which has its origin in the European 
tradition of international order, can properly judge a territorial 
dispute involving countries historically belonging under the East 
Asian World Order with fundamentally different ordering 
principles from its European counterpart.77 First and foremost, it 
should be noted that the East Asian World Order was a system of 
international relations characterized as Sinocentric and hierarchical 
rather than one based on sovereign equality of nations. Under such 
a framework, relations between nations were not governed by 
76 Chiu Hungdah, "The Diaoyutai is originally Chinese territory, what 
difference does a Japanese court ruling make? fJI.taM\:~tfllll± fiil~BA.f!J~~ 
? " China Times iflfl!J/ij'l/l, November 5, 1990, p. 2. 
77 Victor H. Li, supra note 43, p. 154-155. 
DIAOYUTAIISENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE 65 
principles of international law known to the West, but instead ?Y 
what is known as the "tributary system" instituted by lmpenal 
China. Insofar as non-Chinese states wished to have contact with 
the hegemonic power in the region, they were expected to formally 
recognize Chinese "cultural and political prestige" and the 
"universal preeminence of the Son of Heaven [the Chinese 
Emperor]" through subordination and maintaining a tributary 
relationship.78 In turn, the Chinese Emperor conferred title on the 
rulers of these non-Chinese states, including the Ryukyu Kingdom, 
through investiture missions and permitted such states to trade with 
China.79 Moreover, due to China's hegemonic position in the 
region, it seldom needed to forge or rely on formal agreements 
with its subordinate tributary nations to officially declare or specify 
what constituted Chinese territory. Boundary lines between China 
and its surrounding tribute states were sufficiently clear and 
customarily recognized and respected by all of the nations under 
the traditional world order. 
Clearly, the East Asian World Order was completely 
different from the European order under which nation-states were 
theoretically "equal in sovereignty and mutually independent" with 
a strong emphasis on "precise division of territories" and "balance of 
power among the nations."80 The European World Order, which 
later defined the modern international world order through a 
system of equal sovereigns, came into collision with the East Asian 
World Order by the mid-19th century. Initially aiming to 
overcome Western influence and its military threat, Japan was able 
to adopt the new standards represented by the European World 
Order and learn to replace title to its territory previously recognized 
within the framework of East Asian World Order with "another 
title valid according to the law of the time of replacement" under 
78 John K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's 
Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 9. 
79 Countries that traditionally accepted a tributary status with China 
included Korea, Annam (Vietnam), Ryukyu, Siam, Burma, and several other near 
neighbors in Central and Southeast Asia. For a brief period (1404-1549), Japan also 
accepted a role in China's tributary system. 
80 John K. Fairbank (ed.), supra note 78, p. 9. 
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the new international (Western) world order.81 China, on the other 
hand, due to its reluctance to adopt the principles of prevailing 
international law at the time (which would require China to give up 
its millennia-old insistence of the traditional world order it created) 
did not complete this transition until the collapse of the Qing 
Empire in 1911.82 
After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan sought to 
challenge and redefine the traditional East Asian World Order that 
was still practiced by China, and to a lesser extent Korea. With 
respect to the status of the disputed islands, Chinese writers 
contend that as a result of China's gradual decline in prestige and 
power in face of Japan's rejection of the traditional world order 
through an increasingly expansionist foreign policy, the Meiji 
government was able to strip the disputed islands from any status 
held traditionally and reduce it to a mere terra nullius, a pretext 
necessary for a justifiable territorial acquisition under rules of the 
new order. 
Many Chinese scholars further contend that modern 
Japanese scholars on the subject continue to reject China's 
traditional ownership of the islands on the grounds that they were 
81 Matsui Yoshiro, supra note 27, p. 11. 
82 The difference between Japan's receptiveness and China's resistance to 
the usage of international law was evident throughout the 19th century. The 
rationale behind China's resistance to international law can be illustrated and readily 
understood in the following quotes. In 1874, tensions between China and Japan 
began to mount over Japan's intention to annex the Ryukyu Kingdom. While Japan 
sought to use international law to its advantage by refuting the centuries old Chinese 
suzerainty over the Ryukyu Kingdom, China objected to Japan's words and actions 
on the following grounds: "That which is known as wan guo gong fa Jll!fJ0$ (The 
Common Law of All Nations, or international law), is a recent compilation of the 
respective nations of the West, which does not include any recordings specifically 
related to our Qing Empire. Therefore, we will not adopt to its theories. By 
negotiating [with Japan concerning the status of Ryukyu] in accordance with 
principles of justice/righteousness alone should be sufficiently adequate." In 1878, 
when formal negotiations between China and Japan took place over ownership of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom, the Chinese minister to Japan protested by stating, "Uapan] always 
turns to the precedents of other [Western] nations, and this is truly troublesome." 
See Chang Chi-hsiung, "The Chinese World Empire and the Status of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom $¥1!tJH§I!fJ~ijtJ:.I!fJ~Jt!!f.ll," Conference Papers of the 
Third International Academic Conference on Sino-Ryukyuan Historical Relations 
(Taipei: Sino-Ryukyuan Cultural & Economic Association, 1991). p. 420. 
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terra nullius by evaluating historical documents through modern re-
interpretations uncharacteristic of situations of the time in which 
they were produced. While it is completely legal for the Japanese 
to place historical documents strictly under the lenses of modern 
international law regarding territorial acquisition, it may not be 
entirely sensible, since such documents were produced during the 
era of the East Asian W odd Order --- such an evaluation necessarily 
removes important political realities traditionally associated with 
the disputed islands, which must be considered when determining 
the islands' status. 
Clearly, such contentions of Chinese scholars have come as a 
response to several points made by the Japanese side. Japanese 
scholars have refuted most of the historical evidence presented by 
Chinese supporters (such as those provided earlier in this chapter) 
on the ground that they do not fulfill the requirements of the 
discovery-occupation principle as recognized under modern 
international law. First, Japanese scholars argue that although the 
disputed islands may have been first discovered and named by the 
Chinese, there was no display of any intent to occupy them for their 
sovereign. Second, the incorporation of the islands into the Chinese 
coastal defence system is not necessarily equivalent to declaring that 
they are Chinese territory. It is argued of the possibility that such 
islands were only strategically included in the defence system as a 
result of their inclusion in an area frequently visited by Japanese 
pirates.83 In other words, the concept of the "Chinese coastal 
defence system" is ambiguous. 
Chinese writers contend that while the above arguments 
indeed are plausible under modern concepts of international law 
concerning territorial ownership, none of these arguments rightfully 
describes the political realities that surrounded the disputed islands 
under the East Asian World Order. While it is true that Imperial 
China may not have manifested its sovereignty over the islands in a 
manner of a "modern state" in accordance to the modern version of 
the discovery-occupation principle, the abundant historical evidence 
presented by the Chinese side demonstrates that there was no 
confusion regarding traditional Chinese ownership of the islands by 
83 Okuhara T oshio, "The Problem of the Right of Sovereignty over the 
Senkaku Islands ~IIJ?Jj~Q)'1lJi1Uti1it.Qi6rRUi," Asahi Asian Review q}j£37~7 v 
1:::::1.-, Vol3, No.2 (1972). 
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either China herself, the Ryukyu Kingdom, or even Japan. 
As explained earlier, under the ordering principles of the 
traditional world order, it was not a customary practice for China 
to officially declare what was self-evident Chinese territory in a 
manner preferred by international law, especially when there was no 
acknowledged territorial competition. Simply, given the 
remoteness and inhabitability of these islands in pre-modern times, 
what more could Imperial China have done to display its ownership 
over these islands other than its open and notorious use of them as 
navigational aids on a route for diplomatic purposes and military 
posts where Chinese navel ships were deployed and anchored? 
While it is true that the concept of a costal defence system is not 
necessarily equivalent to territorial ownership today, such a 
distinction was not a significant one under the traditional East Asian 
World Order. Due to China's hegemonic position in the area, no 
other nation would have claimed territory ownership in an area 
where China's state authority was clearly acknowledged. On the 
other hand, China would also not have been able to randomly 
deploy its navel ships at its own discretion to territories recognized 
as belonging to the Ryukyu Kingdom or Japan without stirring 
agitation among them. 
In short, Chinese scholars insist that it cannot be denied that 
Imperial China indeed exercised some degree of "effective control" 
over the islands. Whether or not China's past display of state 
authority meets the requirements of international law concerning 
territorial acquisition thus depends on how the doctrine of 
"effective control" is applied.84 It is hoped therefore that, whether 
the case is to be judged under the modern version of the discover-
occupation principle or some form of intertemporallaw, the unique 
historical framework in which the disputed islands belonged to 
must also be taken into consideration. 
The following chapter is a presentation of the process by 
which the Japanese officially incorporated the islands into Japanese 
territory in the late 19th century, revealing that many high ranking 
Japanese officials were also aware of the islands' actual ownership at 
the time of the incorporation. For the Chinese, this serves as final 
evidence that the islands were considered Chinese territory and is 
presented as a classic example that the legacies of the traditional 
84 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 263. 
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world order remained strong during the late 19th century. It will 
be observed that a withering {yet still existent) recognition for 
previously prevailing traditional rules continued to play a significant 
role in the minds of many Japanese high officials, as they too were 
aware that many of the century-old traditional ordering rules could 
not be entirely dismissed at their disposal --- including those with 
respect to the ownership of the disputed islands. With this in mind, 
it took the officials of Meiji Japan a period as long as ten years until 
they decided that the opportune time had arrived to incorporate 
the islands. That time arrived in 1895 --- the year in which an ever-
victorious Japanese imperial military would pronounce a decisive 
victory over a humiliated and devastated China during the first 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. 
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3. The Process of Incorporation into Japanese Territory 
as Revealed in Meiji Official Documents 
The following section represents perhaps one of the most 
persuasive segments of the overall presentation of evidence 
supporting the Chinese claim, namely, a presentation of all original 
Meiji period official Japanese documents that dealt with the process 
by which the islands came to be under Japanese control. These 
documents consist mainly of confidential letters among officials 
between the years 1885 and 1895, as well as other relevant 
documents, such as the actual contents of the January 14, 1895 
Cabinet Decision. Chinese scholars on the subject contend that a 
thorough presentation of all of such documents unmistakably 
reveals that: 1) the disputed islands were well recognized to be 
Chinese territory under the traditional world order even by the 
highest level Japanese officials involved in the assimilation process 
which led to the indefinite postponed of the incorporation in 1885; 
2) the decision to finally incorporate the islands through Cabinet 
Decision of January 14, 1895 was passed in deliberate and total 
secrecy in order to avoid precisely what Japan now unjustly accuses 
China of failing to do back in 1895 --- the lodging of a protest 
against Japan's incorporation of the islands; and, 3) after quietly 
waiting for a ten year period since 1885, the decision to finally 
incorporate the islands in 1895 was not a "result of repeated surveys 
of the islands" as claimed by Japan, but was only due to China's 
catastrophic defeat on land and sea during the ongoing Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-1895, which had in effect rendered China no 
longer in a position to safeguard its territory through either military 
or diplomatic means. 
While many of such Meiji documents were brought to the 
public's attention during the early stages of the islands dispute by 
Inoue Kiyoshi, the renowned Japanese scholar supporting the 
Chinese claim, this study includes several relatively new documents 
whose existence may not have been fully acknowledged by scholars 
concerned with the subject. For the purpose of this study, I have 
chosen to present all of such Meiji documents in their entirety for 
the sake of objectivity (which undoubtedly added to the difficulty 
in completing this paper as translating them proved to be an 
enormously challenging task). Also stressed in this study is 
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accuracy in their English translations and to this end I have included 
the original Japanese texts of these documents in the Appendix. 
The following presentation includes all Meiji official letters and 
documents pertaining to the Japanese incorporation process of the 
disputed islands in 1895 that have been uncovered to date, with a 
consideration of their underlying implications to the islands' status 
prior to 1895. 
The sweeping institutional and economic reforms 
introduced in Japan following the Meiji Restoration in 1868 had in 
a short period of time enabled the Meiji government to adopt an 
increasingly active and forceful expansionist foreign policy. Japan's 
forceful assertion of its authority over the Ryukyu Kingdom in 
1874 was soon followed by its "opening" of Korea in 1876. By 
1879, the Meiji government abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and 
annexed it to form the administrative unit henceforth known as 
Okinawa Prefecture. In line with Japan's territorial ambitions, the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, which were located nearby the recently 
acquired Okinawa, naturally became among the next "logical" 
targets for further territorial expansion. 
From an exchange of a series of letters between high-level 
Japanese officials, it can be seen that the Meiji government's 
intention to occupy the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands was initially 
conceived in 1885. In a letter dated September 22, 1885 by 
Nishimura Sutezo ~t-f~:::::, the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate 7JP 
*'ll~~. addressed to Yamagata Aritomo Lll~:ff_ij_ij, the Home 
Minister, the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate requested additional 
instructions regarding the placement of national markers on the 
D iaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands. 
Although the letter was titled "Petition Regarding 
Investigations at Kumesekishima and Two Other Islands," the 
actual contents of the letter demonstrate that: 1) the letter was not a 
petition but in fact a letter reporting the progress made in 
investigating the islands; 2) the investigations were conducted by 
the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate as a result of "secret orders" 
previously ordered by the Home Minister, instead of the Okinawa 
Prefectural Magistrate's own initiative as often claimed by 
supporters of the Japanese claim; and, 3) the Okinawa Prefectural 
Magistrate indicated that the investigations revealed that the islands 
were already named by the Chinese and officially used as 
72 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
navigational aids, therefore suggesting that it may not be 
appropriate to place national markers on the islands. The Okinawa 
Prefectural Magistrate also cautioned the Home Minister of 
possible conflict with China if the latter were to decide that markers 
should be placed. The magistrate's letter reads as follows: 
Attachment Paper A 
No. 350 
Petition Regarding Investigations at Kumeseki-shima (!A**~) and 
Two Outer Islands 
In regard to the uninhabited islands spread out between this prefecture and 
Fuzhou, China, a summary of the surveys conducted at those islands in 
accordance to the secret order previously conferred to the secretary of our 
prefecture stationed in the capital is described as follows in the enclosed 
attachment paper (omitted). Because Kumeseki-shima, Kuba-shima (!A,ij 
~) and Uotsuri-shima ( ~aq~) have since ancient time been the names 
used by this prefecture to refer to them, and since they are uninhabited 
islands close to the islands, Kume (!A*), Miyako ('gii), Yaeyama (i\:fHLJ 
) under the jurisdiction of this prefecture, there should not exist any 
difficulties hindering their incorporation into this prefecture. Yet, due to 
their differences in terms of topography from the earlier repotted island 
Daitojima (situated between this prefecture and Osagawa Islands), the 
possibility must not be ignored that they are the same islands recorded as 
Diaoyutai (aqf!.!. it), Huangwei-yu (:#t~*Jl), and Chiwei-yu ($~*Jl) in the 
Zhongshan Mission Records (f/:ltl!MMI.i). If they truly are the same 
islands, then it is obviously the case that the details of the islands have 
already been well-known to Qing envoy ships dispatched to crown the 
former Zhongshan Wang, and already given fixed [Chinese] names and 
used as navigational aids en route to the Ryukyu Islands. It is therefore 
worrisome regarding whether it would be appropriate to place national 
markers on these islands immediately after our investigations. During the 
middle of next month, upon the return of the employed survey ship, 
lzumo-maru, which was despatched to conduct surveys of the two islands 
(Miyako, Yayeyama), I will immediately submit a detailed report. In 
regard to the issue of the placement of national markers, your further 
instructions are requested. 
September 22, 1885 
Nishimura Sutezo 
Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate 
To Count Yamagata Aritomo 
Home Minister [Emphasis is mine]85 
85 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan 
Foreign Affairs Documents) B*~~XIJ, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: 1950) p. 573. 
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Among the straightforward implications of this letter as previously 
mentioned, scholars supporting the Chinese claim place special 
attention to the fact that the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate did 
not investigate the islands on his own initiative, but rather in 
response to the secret order given by the Home Minister. This 
observation has led scholars to ask the following two questions: 1) 
Why was the letter submitted by the Okinawa Prefectural 
Magistrate labeled as a petition letter requesting permission to 
investigate the islands, when it was in fact the Home Minister who 
was planning and directing the matter from above? 2) Why did the 
Home Minister choose to secretly give his instructions in a manner 
that did not follow usual ordering procedures whereby directives 
are carried in official letters and sent to the intended receiver? 
Supporters of the Chinese claim believe that such a situation was a 
result of the Home Minister's intention to not only keep the matter 
sub-rosa, but more importantly, to remain behind-the-scenes by 
creating an impression that the investigations and placement of 
markers on the islands were requests of local authorities thereby 
masking any association to the Ministry of Home Affairs and 
suspicion of any military and strategic intentions behind such 
moves.86 
After receiving the above letter, the Home Minister decided 
to ignore the cautionary suggestions submitted by the Okinawa 
Magistrate and chose to proceed with his decision to have the 
disputed islands brought under Japanese control. After drafting a 
petition letter to the Grand Council of State for approval, the 
Home Minister enclosed the petition in a letter addressed to the 
Foreign Minister for the purpose of inquiring into the latter's 
opinion on the subject matter as a final step before submitting the 
petition for approval.87 The draft of the petition enclosed in the 
86 Historians have noted that Yamagata Aritomo was a conservative 
military and political leader who had a reputation for being Japan's foremost 
expansionist at the time. If one considers, say, Ito Hirobumi to be the civil 
politician, then Yamagata was the soldier, who had at all times stressed strategic 
priorities. 
87 The following is a brief description of the Dajokan ::t:i61:11r or Grand 
Council of State. The early Meiji government was collectively known as the 
Dajokan. The functions of the Dajokan was defined in the Constitution of 1868 
(Seitaisho) as "All power and authority in the empire centers in the Council of State 
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letter reads as follows, 
Attachment Paper B 
Petition to the Grand Council of State 
In regard to the investigations of the two outer islands of the uninhabited 
Kumeseki-shima spread out between Okinawa Prefecture and Fuzhou, 
China, the Okinawa Magistrate submitted a petition letter as indicated in 
the attachment paper. Although the above mentioned islands are the same 
as those found in the Zhong.shan Mission Records, they were only used to 
pinpoint direction during navigation, and there are no traces of evidence 
that the islands belong to China. Also, with respect to the names of the 
islands, it is merely a matter of difference of nomendenture between them 
[China] and us Oapan]. Therefore, upon completion of Okinawa 
Prefecture's investigations of the [said] uninhabited islands located in the 
vicinity of islands Kume, Miyako, and Yaeyama under the jurisdiction of 
Okinawa Prefecture, it is believed that there is no obstruction to placing 
national markers. I urgently request that this matter be decided. Enclosed 
in this petition is the aforementioned attachment paper. 
Home Minister 
To the Grand Minister ofState88 
From the above letter, it can be seen that the Home Minister sought 
to incorporate the islands by asserting that their close ties with 
China did not constitute a legitimate Chinese claim over the 
islands. However, as with the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate, the 
Foreign Minister did not share the view of the Home Minister. 
Upon receiving the above cited letter, the Foreign Minister dealt 
with the matter with great concern as he responded in a confidential 
letter addressed strictly to the Home Minister's personal attention. 
In this letter, it could be seen that the Foreign Minister was fully 
aware of the obvious relationship between China and the disputed 
islands and had thus decided that the matter required much greater 
caution. The letter reads as follows. 
(Dajokan). By this means the difficulty of divided government is obviated. The 
power and authority of the Council is threefold; legislative, executive, and judicial." 
Cited from Walter W. McLaren, japanese Government Documents, Vol. 1 
(Greenwood Publishing Group: 1979). 
88 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bumho Oapan 
Foreign Affairs Documents) B;f;:~!ZY:IF, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: 1950), p. 573. 
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Sent October 21 
Personal Correspondence No. 38 
[From] Foreign Minister Count Inoue Kaoru 
[To] Home Minister Count Yamagata Aritomo 
In response to your letter Annex A No. 38 received on the ninth of this 
month, in which you requested deliberation over the matter concerning 
placing national markers on the uninhabited islands of Kumeseki-shima 
and two other islands spread out in between Okinawa and Fuzhou [China] 
after investigating them, I have given much thought to the matter. The 
aforementioned islands are close to the border of China, and it.has been 
found through our surveys that the area of the islands is much smaller than 
the previously surveyed island, Daito-jima; and in particular, China has 
already given names to the islands. Most recently Chinese newspapers have 
been reporting rumors of our government's intention of occupying certain 
islands owned by China located next to Taiwan, demonstrating suspicion 
toward our country and consistently urging the Qing government to be 
aware of this matter. In such a time, if we were to publicly place national 
markers on the islands, this must necessarily invite China's suspicion toward 
us. Currently we should limit ourselves to investigating the islands, 
understanding the formations of the harbors, seeing whether or not there 
exists possibilities to develop the island's land and resources, which all 
should be made into detailed repons. In regard to the matter of placing 
national markers and developing the islands, it should await a more 
appropriate time. 
Moreover, the surveys conducted earlier of Daito-jima and the 
investigation of the above mentioned islands should not be published in the 
Official Gazette ('iff'K) or newspapers. Please pay special attention to this. 
The foregoing is my opinion on the matter. [Emphasis is mine]89 
75 
Scholars supporting the Chinese claim contend that the above letter 
demonstrates that the Foreign Minister was well aware of the fact 
that the islands were regarded to be within the sphere of Chinese 
sovereignty, which led him to advocate restraint. Had the Foreign 
Minister not considered the islands to be Chinese territory, there 
would be no other reason for him to fear that Japan's actions would 
"necessarily invite Qing China's suspicion toward us." This 
prompted him to immediately inform the Home Minister that not 
only should the matter be taken with a cautionary attitude, it 
should be postponed until "a more appropriate time." Chinese 
scholars contend that during a time the Chinese government had 
89 Ibid, p. 575. 
76 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
been reminded of possible violation of Chinese sovereignty by 
Japan, the only conceivable purpose behind the Japanese Foreign 
Minister's advice to forego the decision to incorporate the islands 
and keep the matter confidential was to prevent any legal challenges 
from China. While Chinese scholars point to the above letter as 
decisive evidence that proves Japanese officials at the time were well 
aware of the islands' Chinese ownership, it also demonstrates that 
the ordering principles of the traditional world order still had a 
lingering effect on the minds of such officials, who were not 
prepared to readily dismiss its validity in face of China. 
Since the disclosure of such Meiji official letters, efforts have 
been made by Chinese scholars to search for the Chinese 
newspapers articles referred to by the Foreign Minister in his letter. 
One of such newspaper articles has been found recently in the well-
known Shanghai-based newspaper, Shen Bao 1/=lf(l, dated September 
6, 1885, about a month prior to the Foreign Minister's letter as 
presented above.90 The article contained the following account, 
An Alarming Report Concerning the Island of Taiwan: The Shanghai 
Mercury has reported news received from Korea concerning several 
Japanese persons hoisting the Japanese flag on the island(s) northeast of 
Taiwan, apparently with the intention to occupy them. It is unclear what 
the implications [of this occurrence] are, it is thus recorded here and to be 
further supplemented pending future developments. 
a£wm <<:>cll!Ui» Jtlii@illiW*ffi,@., ~a•*~tilzlfli£, ififl"B 
*Ass•~~~·*li~•z~.*~~w~~.~z~~~~. 91 
Chinese scholars note that while the newspaper article spoke of 
"island(s) to the northeast of Taiwan," the Foreign Minister 
described them as "islands belonging to China," confirming that 
the minister was well aware of the islands belonging to Qing China. 
While the Shen Pao news report cites the source of this piece of 
information as The Shanghai Mercury Jt/lff(l, Chinese scholars have 
90 Shen Bao was founded on April 30, 1872 in Shanghai by Ernest Major. 
While the founder was not a Chinese national, the editors of the newspaper were 
mainly Chinese intellectuals and the newspaper was published in Chinese. Shen Bao 
was one of the more influential Chinese newspapers of the time. 
91 Wu Tianying, supra note 47, p. 100. 
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so far not been able to locate existing copies.92 
To return to the presentation of Meiji official documents, 
after the Foreign Minister sent the previously cited letter to the 
Home Minister, the Okinawa Magistrate submitted a letter on 
November 24, 1885 to the Home Minister as a follow up to his 
previous letter expressing concern over the islands' obvious 
relationship with China. The letter reads as follows. 
In regard to the matter under my jurisdiction concerning the uninhabited 
islands, I hereby submit as an attachment paper a report of the mission to 
investigate the said islands previously ordered upon me. In regard to the 
construction of national markers, as I already noted to you in my previous 
letter of inquiry, since this matter is not unrelated to China, if problems do 
indeed arise, I would be in grave repentance for my responsibility. As I 
am uncertain on how to handle this matter, I await for your most urgent 
instructions. 
November 24, 1885 [Emphasis is mine)93 
From the letter above, it can be seen that the Okinawa Prefectural 
Magistrate, who had become aware of the islands' status through his 
investigation of the islands, shared a view that resonated with the 
view expressed earlier in the Foreign Minister's letter. While the 
letters from the Okinawa Magistrate may not have been enough to 
alter the Home Minister's determination to place national markers 
on the islands, he dearly changed his mind after consulting with the 
Foreign Minister. On November 30, 1885, the Home Minister 
replied in a letter to the Foreign Minister that he had decided to 
forego the placement of markers on the islands in accordance with 
the suggestions of the latter. Included in this letter were specific 
orders to forego the placement of markers which the Home 
Minister requested the Foreign Minister to co-sign before issuing 
them to the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate. The attached order 
reads as follows, 
92 The Shanghai Mercury ( Wenhuei Bao) was an English Newspaper 
founded in Shanghai by J.D. Clark and C. Rivington on April17, 1879. See Wu 
Tianying, supra note 47, p. 100. 
93 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan 
Foreign Affairs Documents} F3*~1tj(IJ, Vol. 18 (Tokyo: 1950), p. 576. 
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Secret No. 218 (b) 
Based on the reasons given in your [previous] letter of inquiry, please 
acknowledge that construction [of the national markers] shall currently 
not to be undertaken. 
Both Ministers94 
On December 4, 1885, the Foreign Minister replied that he had no 
objection to the Home Minister's decision and gave his approval of 
the orders to be sent to the Okinawa Magistrate. For obvious 
reasons, the above series of letters have been regarded by Chinese 
scholars as direct evidence that the islands' Chinese ownership was 
recognized by Japanese officials who were knowledgeable about the 
islands. As indicated by the Foreign Minister's earlier letter of 
October 21, 1885, due to his concern that any actions to take the 
islands might provoke suspicion from Qing China, it was suggested 
that the Japanese government "should await a more appropriate 
time" to incorporate the islands --- which was indication that the 
intention to acquire the islands was not truly abandoned, but 
merely postponed pending the arrival of an opportune occasion. In 
the meantime, the Japanese government followed a policy of 
keeping the matter secret to avoid suspicion from China. For this 
purpose, all subsequent letters or documents related to the islands 
issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs after 1885 were classified and handled as documents of 
confidentiality --- including the final cabinet decision to incorporate 
the islands ten years later in 1895. 
Clearly, it was the view of the Japanese government that the 
opportunity had not arrived immediately since it denied two 
subsequent petitions submitted by Okinawa Prefecture in 1890 and 
1893. The first petition letter was submitted on January 13, 1890 
by Maruoka Kanji }Lflijj~Jili, the Okinawa Prefectural Governor 7tf! 
*'1~$, requesting the Ministry of Home Affairs to incorporate the 
islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture for the purpose 
of regulating fishing related business carried out by persons 
(identity not specified) around the islands.95 Maruoka's petition 
94 Ibid., p. 576. 
95 Along with a nationwide change in administrative policy put into effect 
by the Japanese central government in 1886, the official title name of Okinawa 
Prefectural Magistrate (kmrei !ll':<it) was changed to Okinawa Prefectural Governor 
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reads as follows, 
(A) Number 1 
In regard to the uninhabited island, Uotsuri-shima, and two outer islands, 
close to Ishigaki Island of the Yaeyama Islands Group under the 
jurisdiction of this prefecture, orders on the matter were conferred [by the 
Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry] on December 5 the same year in 
response to Report No. 384 of November 5, 1885. However, since the 
above mentioned uninhabited islands have heretofore remained under no 
specific jurisdiction, and due to the recent need to regulate marine 
product!, the Yaeyama Islands Office has requested their [the said islands'] 
appropriate jurisdiction to be decided. At this time, I intend to place 
them under the jurisdiction of the Yaeyama Islands Office, and hereby 
submit this matter for your approval. 
January 13, 1890 
Prefectural Governor 
To Home Minister 96 
Since the above petition was not approved by the ministry, a second 
petition was submitted about four years later on November 2, 1893 
by Narahara Shigeru ~~JJ.l{-, Maruoka's successor as Okinawa 
Prefectural Governor. In this petition, Narahara wrote, "Recently 
there have been persons attempting to conduct fishing related 
businesses at the islands and have involved many issues concerning 
regulation. As with the petition of the 18th year of Meiji [1885], 
since it is desirable to place markers on the islands and incorporate 
them under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture, your most 
urgent instructions are requested."97 However, as the Ministry of 
Home Affairs continued to deem that the long awaited opportune 
time still had not arrived, permission was not granted to Narahara's 
(chiji ~If$). 
96 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho ljapan 
Foreign Affairs Documents) B*~1tf(lf, Vol. 23 (Tokyo: 1952). 
97 Chang Chi-hsiung m~Mt. "The Problem of Territorial Sovereignty 
over the Diaoyutai Islands: An Evaluation of the Japanese claim under International 
Law fJH.taJIJ"'.1:DJ~r .. 1& : B*1lllf.1:fi~I!I~?*U," Bulletin of the 
Institute of Modern History, Vol. 22:Il (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1993), p. 121. A 
copy of this 1893 petition was transmitted to me among three other documents by 
Prof. Chang, who located it in the Diplomatic Recor<J. Office of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo. See next footnote. 
80 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
urgent request to have the islands incorporated and the matter was 
once again postponed for an indefinite time. 
Nearly a decade after the initial decision to forego national 
markers on the disputed islands in 1885, a series of events that took 
place beginning in the later half of 1894 allowed the Japanese 
government to re-consider its previous decisions. From a series of 
subsequent confidential letters written by Japanese officials 
throughout 1894, it can be seen that as of May 1894 the Japanese 
government policy to withhold the decision to place national 
markers was still intact. More importantly, the arrival of the long 
awaited "appropriate occasion" can be established as the last few 
months of 1894. It should be noted that among the confidential 
letters produced during the year 1894 presented in this chapter, I 
have included three relatively newly uncovered documents. While 
the contents of these three official documents have been partially 
cited in previous Chinese studies on the subject, for the purpose of 
this study, they will be presented in their entirety for the very first 
time as follows.98 
The first of these three official documents is an internal 
document of the Ministry of Home Mfairs dated April 14, 1894 
written by Egi Kazuyuki ii*-=fZ., Director of the Prefectural 
Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs P-JB;~,~~ 
fia~, and addressed to his superior, the Home Minister. From this 
document, it can be seen that neither had any new information on 
the islands been acquired by the Ministry of Home Affairs nor had 
the political circumstances matured enough to alter the 
98 I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Chang Chi-
hsiung of the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica .P~~Wt of the 
Republic of China, who generously took the time to send to me copies of several 
important Meiji official documents for use in this paper and offered his 
interpretations of them. The three confidential official documents presented in this 
chapter dated April 14, 1894, May 12, 1894, and December 15, 1894 were 
uncovered by Prof. Chang during the early 1990s in the archives of the Diplomatic 
Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan ?1-5~?1-~51!*'1-ftlt in 
Tokyo. The said three documents first appeared in partial citation in his work, "The 
Problem ofT erritorial Sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands: An Evaluation of the 
Japanese claim under International Law f.J~:a11JjJl::t:fUi•rR,II; B*lifi::t:M~ 
ii~~U." Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Vol. 22:11 (Taipei: 
Academia Sinica, 1993), pp. 109-135. As I have used and interpreted the said three 
documents differently from Prof. Chang, he is not responsible for any errors that I 
may have made in that regard. 
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government's policy of withholding the placement of markers on 
them. Egi' s internal document reads as follows, 
[Secret No. 34] 
[From:] Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau 
[To:] Minister [of Home Affairs] 
Petition Regarding the Construction of Jurisdiction Markers at 
Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima 
Okinawa Prefecture 
Please judge the appropriateness of my inquiring about the above matter. 
Additionally, as indicated in the attachment paper, although this matter 
was previously submitted back in 1885, due to the [Home Ministry's] 
concern that this matter involves negotiations with Qing China, orders to 
forgo construction [of the national markers] were conferred after 
consulting the Foreign Ministry. In addition, this matter was also 
brought to the attention of the Grand Council of State. 
Subject of Communication 
The petition dated November 2 oflast year concerning the construction of 
jurisdiction markers at Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima has been 
submitted. However, funher information on the following subjects is 
desired, 
1. The formation of the harbors of the said islands; 
2. The possibilities of development of the islands' land and natural 
resources; 
3. Whether there are evidence such as old records or folklore that 
demonstrate the islands belong to our country, or indicate their traditional 
relationship with the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands. 
_Month _Day, _Year 
The above is the subject of communication. 
Okinawa Prefectural Governor 
Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau 99 
Through the above internal document, Egi informed the minister 
that both the Okinawa Prefectural Governor and he had received 
the minister's instructions to find out certain aspects about the 
islands. It is thus evident that almost a decade after the initial 
investigations of the islands carried out by Okinawa Prefecture in 
1885, very little progress had been achieved in terms of obtaining 
new information on the islands. Certainly, without possessing any 
99 Transmitted to me by Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung. Original Document at 
the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo. 
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new knowledge on the islands and no major events fundamentally 
altering Sino-Japanese relations, it is no surprise that Japan had 
maintained a consistent policy to forego placing national markers 
on the islands by denying subsequent petitions from the Okinawa 
Prefecture. 
As indicated in Egi's letter cited above, instructions from 
the minister were also received by the Okinawa Prefectural 
Governor. In a letter of response dated May 12, 1894, by the 
Okinawa Prefecture Governor addressed to Egi, the fact that no 
subsequent investigations of any kind of the islands had been 
carried out since 1885 was further confirmed. The letter of response 
from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor reads as follows, 
Return No. 153 
Your letter of inquiry, Secret No. 34, concerning the formation of the 
harbors and other related matters of Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima has 
been received. However, ever since the said islands were investigated by 
persons dispatched by police agencies of Okinawa Prefectural back in 1885, 
there have been no subsequent field surveys conducted. As a result, it is 
difficult to provide any specific reports on them. Enclosed as attachment 
papers are the previous investigation reports by the dispatched personal 
and the captain of Izumo-maru. Detailed copies of the above reports and a 
general map are both included in this letter of response. 
May 12,1894 
[From:] Okinawa Prefectural Governor Naraha Shigeru 
[To:] Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau of Ministry of 
Home Affairs Egi Kazuyuki 
Additionally, there exists no old records related to the said islands or any 
transcribed evidence or folklore and legends demonstrating that the islands 
belong to our country. The only relation [with the islands] is that 
fishermen from Okinawa Prefecture have since ancient times occasionally 
sailed from the Yaeyama Islands to the southern islands for fishing and 
hunting purposes. I hereby supplement this letter with the above 
information. [Emphasis is mine] 100 
From the letter above written by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor 
himself, it can be seen that no investigations of any sort were carried 
100 Transmitted to me by Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung. Original copy at the 
Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo. 
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out after 1885 by any agencies of the Okinawa Prefecture to further 
determine the status of the disputed islands. This is contrary, 
however, to the official claim of the Japanese government iterated in 
The Basic View of 1972 (previously cited in Chapter IV) which 
stated, "From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been 
thoroughly made by the Government of Japan through the agencies 
of the Okinawa Prefecture and by way of other methods."101 
The letter from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor dearly 
indicates that the Japanese government's The Basic View contains 
factual distortions. It may also be further concluded from the 
above-mentioned letter by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor that 
between May 12, 1894 (the day the above letter was written) and 
January 14, 1895 (the day the cabinet decision to incorporate the 
islands was finally passed), a major event of some kind must have 
occurred to allow Japan to alter its previously maintained decision 
to forgo placement of national markers on the disputed islands 
despite the fact that no new information had been acquired on the 
status of the islands since 1885. The long awaited "appropriate 
occasion" previously spoken of had finally arrived. 
To understand what may have been considered by Japan as 
a turning point that allowed it to reconsider its decision, a brief 
background of historical events that occurred with respect to China 
and Japan after May 1894 is helpful. By mid-1894, a Korean 
domestic uprising known as the T onghak Rebellion had become so 
widespread it threatened the Korean court. Unable to suppress the 
rebellion, the Korean government turned to Qing China for 
military assistance. As an effort to assist the Korean court and 
solidify its deteriorating position in Korea, China agreed to the 
Korean request and dispatched 3,000 troops on June 7, 1894.102 
China notified Tokyo of its action in accordance with the 1885 
Convention ofTianjin (Tientsin) signed by China and Japan, which 
included a clause stipulating that "before dispatching troops to 
Korea in the future, the signatories should notify each other in 
advance, and after the restoration of order, withdraw troops at 
101 Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan (1972) supra note 20. 
102 For a chronological outline of events during the Sino-Japanese War, see 
Hiyarna Yukio ML.U$;1i;, The Sino-Japanese War BMQf:t~-;6eJI:J;I{~~f!JJ~~-t:Jf'ii 
(fokyo: Kodansha, 1997) pp. 306-319. 
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once."103 Determined to use any pretext available to challenge 
China's position in Korea, Japan regarded China's action of 
dispatching troops as an opportune occasion to dispatch troops as 
well. Accordingly, no sooner had the Tonghak Rebellion been 
suppressed with the help of Chinese troops, Japan dispatched an 
army of 8,000 troops and seven warships under the pretext of 
protecting Japanese citizens in Korea. With the rebellion suppressed, 
China proposed to Japan a joint withdrawal that was supported by 
the Korean government and Western powers. However, determined 
to further take advantage of the situation, Japan rejected China's 
plan and suggested instead a proposal of joint intervention for 
internal reform in Korea --- a proposal Japan knew was unacceptable 
to China and would necessarily be rejected, thereby creating a 
pretext for military confrontation. Indeed, negotiations between the 
two nations became deadlocked, and led to a war signifying a 
competition for ascendancy of a prostrate Korea. The war was 
known as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. 
Hostilities brokeout on July 25, 1894 with a preemptive 
attack by the Japanese navy, which sank a Chinese troop transport 
ship carrying 1,200 solders. On August 1, Japan and China 
officially declared war on each other. The Japanese forces 
maneuvered brilliantly and proved victorious in battle after battle, 
on both land and sea. On September 15, at the pivotal battle of 
Pyongyang, China's best land forces suffered a crushing defeat. 
Two days later, China's Northern (Beiyang) fleet suffered a similar 
fate in a critical naval battle off the Yalu River in the Yellow Sea; the 
Chinese fleet was badly damaged and retreated to the Chinese 
naval base at Port Arthur after losing four ships and more than a 
thousand officers and men while the Japanese fleet suffered the loss 
of but one ship.104 In the meantime, Japanese land forces pushed 
forward to cross the Yalu River and entered into southern 
Manchuria. By early November, the Japanese advanced into the 
Liaodong Peninsula and seized the city of Dairen. On November 
22nd, the heavily fortified Chinese naval harbor, Lushun (Port 
Arthur), also fell into the hands of the Japanese; on the same day, 
103 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1995), p. 337. 
104 Ibid., p. 340. 
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China proposed a peace settlement to Japan. By this time, it had 
become clearly evident to both the Chinese and Japanese that the 
eventual victory of Japan was only a matter of time. In fact, earlier 
on October 8, the British minister in Japan learned that the Japanese 
government had been anticipating a final victory and therefore had 
already begun work on drafting its demands, including acquisition 
of Chinese territory, to be included in the peace terms. As the 
situation worsened for China, the Japanese Foreign Minister on 
December 18 further rejected China's proposal to have a peace 
conference held in Shanghai. The minister indicated that any 
conference must take place in Japan, thus signifying that it was 
China, not Japan, who was in the inferior position of pleading for 
peace.105 With this summary of the situation between China and 
Japan as it stood by the end of 1894, we now turn our focus to an 
evaluation of its implications and relation with respect to the status 
of the disputed islands. 
Seven months after the previously cited letter sent on May 
12, 1894 by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor reporting that no 
further information had been acquired on the disputed islands, the 
matter concerning the placement of markers on the disputed islands 
was once again revived in an internal document dated December 
15, 1894 by Egi, addressed to the Home Minister. In this 
document (as also in his earlier letter of April 14), Egi 
acknowledged that the reason behind the earlier decision that the 
placement of markers on the islands should not be undertaken was 
because the matter "involved negotiation with Qing China." 
However, based on his reasoning that "the situation today is 
greatly different from the situation back then," he then inquired 
about the minister's inclinations on the matter. Egi also prepared a 
draft of a preparatory proposal written on the behalf of the minister, 
which in the event that the matter was approved by the minister, 
could be submitted to the Cabinet Meeting requesting the 
necessary final approval. The contents of the preparatory proposal 
were largely based on the previously denied petition submitted by 
the Okinawa Prefectural Governor on January 13, 1890, citing the 
105 Li Kuo-chi *llllill5, "Chinese Public Opinion towards the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-1895 and Japan in the late Qing Period tl!f*IIIA!ft:jlBEfl~ 
'-l~&B:ifi:IY-1~~." Papm of the Conference of the JOOth Anniversary of the Sino-
japanese War (Taipei: National Normal University, 1995), p. 724. 
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regulation of marine product-related businesses around the islands 
as the purpose of requesting markers to be placed on the islands. 
Egi' s internal letter reads as follows. 
[Secret No. 133, December 15, 1894] 
[From:] Director of the Prefectural Administration Bureau 
[To:] Minister [of Home Affairs] 
Petition Regarding the Construction of Jurisdiction Markers at 
Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima 
Okinawa Prefecture 
As indicated in the attachment paper, although this matter was previously 
submitted in 1885, due to the [Home Ministry's] concern that this matter 
involves negotiations with Qjng China, orders to forgo construction [of the 
national markers] were conferred after consulting the Foreign Ministry 
[of Japan]. In addition, this matter was also brought to the attention of the 
Grand Council of State. However, since the situation today is greatly 
different from the situation back then, I humbly inquire about your 
intentions on the matter and submit the following petition for your 
reviewal. 
(The geographical history of Uotsuri-shima and Kuba-shima, etc., have 
been investigated and a synopsis of such matters has been acquired. It 
appears that the above islands are the two islands, Wahei-san (:fll5¥Ll.J) and 
Chiyogyo-shima (~i!~). located northeastward of the Yaeyama Islands, 
found on Map No. 210 of the Hydrographic Office, Navy Ministry. 
Based on the verbal descriptions of an official from the Hydrographic 
Office, it appears that the above two islands have not yet been previously 
claimed by any [nation]. From a rypographical perspective, it can be 
assumed that the islands are necessarily a part of the Okinawa Archipelago. 
Investigations have initially been carried out in the manner described in 
this section.) 
Petition to the Cabinet Meeting 
Attachment Paper: Matter concerning the construction of markers to be 
submitted to the Cabinet Meeting 
_Month _Day, _Year 
[From:] Minister [of Home Affairs] 
To Prime Minister 
(Attachment Paper) The islands, Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima, located 
northwestward of Yaeyama Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa 
Prefecture, have heretofore been uninhabited islands. Due to recent visits 
to the said islands by individuals attempting to conduct fishing related 
businesses, and that such matters require regulation, it is desirable to have 
[the islands] be put under the jurisdiction of [Okinawa] Prefecture as 
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requested in the Okinawa Prefectural Governor's petition. For the 
purpose of recognizing [the islands] under the jurisdiction of [Okinawa] 
Prefecture, markers should be constructed in accordance to the said 
petition. 
It is requested of the Cabinet Meeting to decide on the above matter. 
[Emphasis is mine]l06 
Finally, the above document reveals that, after nearly a decade, the 
decision to forego placement of markers on the islands was about to 
be reversed. To fully comprehend what had led to this change in 
policy with respect to the disputed islands, one must turn to a 
consideration of the historical and political background at the time 
this particular document was written. As shown previously, by the 
end of October 1894, the tide had turned against China as a result 
of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, as had been well 
recognized by both sides; and the above internal document was not 
produced until an even later date in mid-December when an 
already devastated China was eagerly seeking peace. Therefore, by 
taking into account this historical background, it can be readily 
understood what Egi meant at the time he said "the situation today 
is different from the situation back then" --- which was in fact the 
only reason given by him explaining why the matter had been 
brought up for re-consideration. Also, the assertion that the matter 
"involved negotiations with Qing China" in the letter confirms the 
fact that the Japanese officials were clearly aware of the islands' 
obvious relationship with China; yet there are no official documents 
from Qing China or Meiji Japan indicate that the matter was ever 
brought up by Japan and discussed with China. 
While examining the above internal document, one must be 
particularly careful with the contents of the second paragraph. At 
first sight, it appears that agencies of the Japanese Imperial Navy 
had investigated the islands to some certain degree. However, it 
can be seen in the wording of the paragraph that there exists a 
noticeable degree of uncertainty and ambiguity which reveals that 
the investigations were far from complete. Moreover, the paragraph 
specifically mentioned that the focus of the investigation was the 
geographical aspects of the islands, not their political background. 
106 Transmitted to me by Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung. Original copy at the 
Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo. 
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In an effort to determine how thoroughly the investigations were 
carried out, I have personally sought to evaluate the validity of the 
information given in the paragraph.107 
In the internal document, Egi remarked that "it appears that 
the above two islands [Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima] are, Wahei-
san {;f!l.srzl-U) and Chiyogyo-shima (j9;(!£), found on Map 
Number 210." However, it is not surprising to see that Map 
Number 210 invoked by Egi actually only contains Wahei-san and 
not Chiyogyo-shima (author's note: Japanese transliteration of 
Chinese name, Diaoyu Island), since they are two different names 
of the same island --- Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island. lOB Evidently, Egi's 
107 In order to examine what sort of information the Imperial Map 
Number 210 provided Egi, 1 decided to locate the map and examine it myself. 
Indeed, enormous amounts of time and effort were spent just to locate the map, but it 
eventually yielded fruitful results. After learning that the University of California at 
Berkeley maintains an excellent collection of nineteenth century Japanese maps 
produced by the Hydrographic Office of the Navy Ministry, I was fortunate to locate 
and acquire the maps needed for this study. I must note that Map Number 210 was 
published under two editions during the Meiji era. The initial edition of the map 
was published by the Hydrographic Office of the Imperial Navy on July 21, 1888 
under the title "Japan Kagoshima Gulf to Taiwan with adjacent coast of China" and 
re-printed every few months afterwards with occasional minor corrections. The 
second edition of the map covered the same geographical area as the previous version 
but contained substantial revisions. This edition of the map was first published on 
March 29, 1897 under a new title as "Japan and China: Nagasaki and Amoy," 
replacing the earlier edition. As suggested by the titles, both editions of the map 
included Japanese and non-Japanese territory. It was also indicated on the maps that 
the earlier edition was based on the British Admiralty Chart No. 2412, and the later 
edition was based on a 1891 edition of the same British map. Since Egi's internal 
document was written in 1894, it is certain that he consulted the earlier edition of 
Map Number 210 produced by the Japanese Hydrographic Office, i.e., the 1888 
edition. 
108 In order to understand why the main island of the disputed islands 
chain, Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island, was also known to the Japanese Navy as Wahei-san 
flli!ZLI.J during late 19th century, a brief history of the origin of the islands' names 
will be helpful. The term Wahei-san was derived from a series of British Admiralty 
Charts published since 1845, in which Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island was labeled as 
Hoapin-san and Huangwei Yu/Kubashima as Tiau-su. [Note: san and su are the 
Fukienese pronunciations of shan Ill (mountain) and yu ill (island) in Mandarin 
Chi~ese whic~ wer~ used int~rchangeably_for names of islands] The British Navy 
was mcorrect 10 usmg Hoapm-san and T1au-su to label Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island 
and Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima, respectively, since these Chinese names referred to 
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investigation of the islands was not characterized by precision since 
he mistook Wahei-san and Chiyogyo-shima to be two separate 
islands. It should also be noted that the names of the disputed 
islands in the map were Japanese transcriptions of their British 
names instead of their more commonly used Chinese or Japanese 
traditional names, which suggests that they were merely copied off 
British Admiralty Chart No. 2412.109 
other islands. Hoapin-su is the Fukienese pronunciation of1EJflt*l (Huaping Yu in 
Mandarin Chinese), the name of an island located northeast of Taiwan that bears no 
relation to any of the disputed islands. Tiau-su, on the other hand, is a transliteration 
of the Fukienese pronunciation of Diaoyu Yu, which is the main island of the 
disputed islands group, rather than Huangwei Yu/Kubashima the British Navy 
mistakenly identified. 
During the last quarter of the 19th century, when the Japanese Imperial 
Navy began relying heavily on British Admiralty Charts to compile their own 
nautical charts, the names Hoapin-su and Tiao-su, were adopted and transliterated 
back into a separate set of Chinese characters as, fll-'¥-Ll.J (Wahei-san} and -{g;:W-ftlU\ 
{pronounced at the time as Chi-a-u-su-shima}, respectively, despite the fact that they 
had already been commonly known to the Japanese by their correct Chinese names: 
Chiyogyo-sho Oapanese transliteration ofDiaoyu Yu ~i.t*l) and Kobi-sho Oapanese 
transliteration of Huangwei Yu Jl~*l). Since there then existed two sets of names 
for the islands using Chinese characters (excluding their native Japanese names, 
which would be the third set}, the Japanese Hydrographic Office used one of either 
two sets while never mixing them together to avoid confusion. For example, in the 
1888 edition of Map Number 210, the three main islands in the disputed islands 
group were labeled using their British-derived names as: Wahei-san fll-'¥-Ll.J {Hoapin-
san}, Chi-a-u-su-shima -{g;:W-ftlU\ (Tiau-su), and Ra-re-ri-iwa Jiit.Jm.~ (Raleigh 
Rock). In the later 1897 edition of the said map (not yet published at the time of 
Egi's said internal document of December 15, 1894), the same three islands were 
labeled using their original Chinese names as Chiyogyo-sho ~f.{l.*l, Kobi-sho JlR; 
*l, and Sekibi-sho $~*l. (Note: As with the Chinese, the Japanese traditionally 
used the characters san LlJ, sho *l and shima lb interchangeably to denote islands.) 
From Egi's internal document, it can be seen that he mistakenly asserted 
that Wahei-san fll-'¥-Ll.J and Chiyogyo-shima ~f.{l.lb were both on Map Number 210. 
Evidently Egi was not aware of the following two important facts: 1) the above two 
names denoted the same island; 2) the said map invoked by Egi only listed the name 
Wahei-san and not Chiyogyo-shima. Had Egi truly conducted a careful investigation 
of the disputed islands, it is difficult to imagine that such an erroneous mistake could 
have been made. 
I 09 My acquisition of the original copies of different editions of the 
Japanese Imperial Navy's Map No. 210 has indeed been extremely useful for the 
purpose of this study. While it has enabled me to uncover errors inherent in Egi's 
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internal document and further discuss their implications to the dispute, it has also 
allowed me to discover cenain errors in evidence presented by Chinese scholars 
supponing the Chinese claim. 
The evidence in question involves a confidential publication issued in 1895 
by the Japanese Navy Ministry entitled Manuscript of the History of the Sino-japanese 
War Bi#fltj/!ftJI;;F, which Chinese scholars believe can demonstrate that high-level 
Japanese navel commanders regarded the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands to be a pan of 
Taiwan and were unaware of the Cabinet Decision of 1895 to incorporate them. In 
the section entitled Expedition of the Taiwan Rebels •I!IIE/Il£/iE;;'V found in the said 
publication, the sea route taken by the Japanese navy on its way to Taiwan after the 
Sino-Japanese War was recorded in detail. The record shows that Kabayama 
Sukenori .,.llliUc, the newly appointed Governor-General of Taiwan, ordered that 
the gathering location for his .squadron prior to landing on Taiwan was to be "90 
nautical miles nonh ofTaiwan's Tamsui Bay (sea surface of Hsiao Keelung)." As the 
squadron approached the location, Kabayama funher specified it as "approximately 
five miles south from Senkaku Island ~~~~~/~1iifiHlB&." From this statement, 
Chinese scholars conclude that Kabayama himself regarded the disputed islands to be 
a part of Taiwan since he previously referred to the area as "Taiwan's Tamsui Bay 
(sea surface of Hsiao Keelung)." (For details of this contention, see Wu Tianying, 
supranote47,pp.115-120). 
However, after studying the Japanese Imperial Navy's Map No. 210 myself, 
I discovered that the island Kabayama referred to as Senkaku Island~~~~~. was in 
fact not the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. Map No. 210 had mislabeled the 
island Huaping Yu :tEJBUl as Senkaku Island ~~~~~.which is understandable since 
British Admiralty Charts (on which Japanese Navy maps were based) had always had 
the rwo islands confused. As noted in the previous footnote, mid-19th century British 
British Admiralty Charts contained the common error of mislabeling 
Diaoyutai/Uotsuri Island as Hoapin-su (which the Japanese rendered into Wahei-
san fll.ljlll.J), and accordingly mislabeling Huaping Yu as Pinnacle Island (which the 
Japanese Navy translated into Senkaku Island~~~~~). This mistake in terminology 
was corrected in later British Navy maps, whereby the name Pinnacle Island was no 
longer used to refer to Huaping Yu, but rather the group of islands known today as 
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. The fact that Kabayama meant to refer to Huaping 
Yu instead of the disputed Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands is further confirmed by the 
coordinates he gave, which corresponded exactly to the location ofHuaping Yu. 
I should also note that the same errors in mislabeling Huaping Yu and the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands can also be seen in mid-19th century U.S. navel maps. I 
have found that maps used by Commodore Matthew C. Perry during his famous 
expedition to Japan in 1853-1854 also referred to Huaping Yu as Pinnacle Island. It 
is also interesting to note that sailing records made during Perry's expedition 
contained the following passage: 
If bound to Lew Chew [the Ryukyus], from Hong Kong, pass through 
the Formosa channel during the southwest monsoon, giving Agincoun 
[Pengjia Yu], Crag [Mianhua Yu], and Pinnacle islands [Huaping Yu], 
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Egi's description of his investigation is shortly concluded by 
noting that "Based on the verbal descriptions of an official from the 
Hydrographic Office, it appears that the above two islands have not 
yet been previously claimed by any [nation]. From a typographical 
perspective, it can be assumed that the islands are necessarily a part 
of the Okinawa Archipelago." Again, it cannot be denied that the 
tone of such statements carries a certain degree of uncertainty. It is 
also curious why the identity or level of rank of the "official from 
the Hydrographic Office" responsible of providing such 
information was not specified. Why was such critical information 
supposedly forming the basis of a national decision on territorial 
acquisition only verbally conveyed by an unidentified person from 
the Hydrographic Office without any reference as to how and when 
such information was acquired? 
Perhaps more importantly, Egi was incorrect to assert that 
the disputed islands geographically formed a part of the Okinawa 
Archipelago, since it has been shown that the disputed islands are 
located on the edge of the East Asian continental shelf separated 
from the Okinawa Islands by the 2,270 meter deep Okinawa 
Trough. Japan's Hydrographic Office produced its first nautical 
map in 1871 and by the late 1880s certainly had acquired the 
technological capability to detect what was even noticeable by 
ancient Chinese navigators 110 --- a sudden change in sea color 
indicating a significant drop in sea depth. Had thorough 
investigations of the islands truly been carried out by the 
Hydrographic Office, it is curious that such an important 
off the north end of Formosa... Thence, shape a course so as to pass to the 
northward of Hoa-pin-san [Diaoyutai Yu/Uotsuri-shima], Tia-usu 
[Huangwei Yu/Kuba-shima], and Raleigh Rock [Chiwei Yu/Taisho-
jima], after which haul to the eastward, sight Koomisang [Kume-jima], 
and pass either to the northward or southward of it ... 
Note that the sailing route described above is identical to the ancient Compass Route 
taken by Chinese imperial envoys to the Ryukyu Kingdom. See Perry, Matthew C. 
and Francis L. Hawks, "Sailing Directions and Nautical Remarks," Na"ative of the 
Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and japan, Vol. 2 
(Washington: Beverley Tucker, Senate Printer, 1856), p. 374-375. 
110 The Japan Cartographers Association, Catalogue of Maps and Charts in 
japan issued since the Meiji Era (Tokyo: 1969), p. 158. 
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geographical feature separating the disputed islands from the 
Okinawa Islands could have been neglected. 
As previously demonstrated, judging from the first 
paragraph of Egi's internal document, it is evident that the decision 
to incorporate the islands had already been made based solely on 
the fact that "times have greatly changed" due to Qing China's 
defeat in the Sino-Japanese War --- Qing China was simply no 
longer in a position to file a legal challenge whether or not it was to 
have detected Japan's action of incorporating the islands. How 
could a decision of such national importance have possibly been 
made based on Egi' s summary of investigations which consisted of 
no more than three sentences? The brevity, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity of Egi' s summary accompanied by its obvious errors only 
serves to further demonstrate that such a description was hastily and 
carelessly added only "for the record" to serve as a seemingly viable 
justification to finally incorporate the islands. Even if the above 
information given in the second paragraph did indeed result from 
investigations from the Hydrographic Office, it is doubtful that the 
investigations were carried out for the purpose of determining the 
islands' political background since not only was the information 
that resulted far too vague and prone to error to determine such an 
important subject, but also because the official duty of the 
Hydrographic Office generally did not extend beyond conducting 
necessary field surveys for creating nautical charts. By the end of 
1894, whether or not Japan had the information to determine the 
status of the islands had become an issue of little relevancy (as also 
evidenced by the fact that the Home Ministry no longer felt 
compelled to order Okinawa Prefecture to resume investigations on 
the disputed islands despite its acknowledgment that no subsequent 
investigations had been carried out by Okinawa since 1885); and it 
is doubtful that any decisive information was truly collected during 
the last few months of 1894 that was not already known by Japan. 
As nicely put by another Chinese scholar, "there simply was nothing 
on or around the islands during the last year [between May and 
December of 1894] which could not have been discovered during 
the previous nine years to help determine the status of the 
islands."lll Simply, the arrival of the Sino-Japanese War greatly 
weakened the once formidable Qing Empire and rendered it unable 
111 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 249. 
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to safeguard its own territory through either political or military 
means, which was precisely the opportune occasion the Japanese 
government had been long waiting for. 
To return to the process by which the islands were 
incorporated, subsequent official documents reveal that with the 
removal of previous concerns in relation to China, the Japanese 
government proceeded smoothly and swiftly to bring the islands 
under the rule of the Japanese Empire. The previously cited petition 
letter drafted by Egi was quickly approved by Home Minister 
Nomura Yasushi !ft-1"~. and by December 27, 1894, a letter 
enclosing the petition had been sent to Foreign Minister Mutsu 
Munemitsu ~!l**· for his final voice on the matter. The letter 
reads as follows, 
Secret (in red) No. 133 
In regard to the matter of constructing jurisdiction markers on Kuba-
shima and Uotsuri-shima, and in accordance to Attachment Paper A 
consisting the petition from the Okinawa Magistrate, and the relating 
Attachment Paper B, orders [to forego the placement of makers] were 
conferred after our deliberation with your ministry during the 18th year 
of Meiji [1885]. However, considering the fact that the situation today 
has changed relevant to the situation back then, I plan to submit this 
matter to the Cabinet Meeting for approval in an attachment paper. I 
therefore request to discuss with you this matter in advance. 
December 27, 27th Year ofMeiji [1894] 
Home Minister Viscount Nomura Yasushi 
To Foreign Minister Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu [Emphasis is mine]ll2 
Though the previous concern of China detecting Japan's actions of 
incorporating the islands had greatly diminished, the Japanese 
government continued to maintain the confidentiality of the matter 
as demonstrated in the above letter, perhaps for unlikely but 
possible unexpected contingencies. At any rate, the above letter 
confirms that the sole reason leading to the reversal in the policy 
toward the islands was indeed based on "the situation today has 
changed relative to the situation back then" and nothing more. On 
January 11, 1895, the Foreign Minister replied in a letter stating 
that he proposed no objection to the matter. 
112 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan 
Foreign Affairs Documents) B;tJ'/.5!11:1/, Vol. 23 (fokyo: 1952), p. 532. 
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Finally, on January 12, 1895, the proposal was presented to 
Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi {JtjifWJt in an attachment paper 
under the title, "Secret No. 133: Matter <;:oncerning the Placement 
of Markers." Two days later, the proposal was further brought 
before the Cabinet Meeting on January 14, 1895 and the following 
resolution was adopted, 
The Home Minister has requested a cabinet decision on the following 
matter: the islands, Kuba-shima and Uotsuri-shima, located 
northwestward of Yaeyama Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa 
Prefecture, have heretofore been uninhabited islands. Due to recent visits 
to the said islands by individuals attempting to conduct fishing related 
businesses, and that such matters require regulation, it is decided that [the 
islands] be placed under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. Based on 
this decision, the Okinawa Prefectural Governor's petition should be 
approved. Since there are no disagreements on the matter, it shall proceed 
based on the above decision.113 
On January 21, 1895, as Prime Minister Ito gave his final approval 
to the cabinet decision, the scheme of Meiji Japan to incorporate the 
disputed islands, planned long before and awaiting only a decision 
on its timing, now at last was realized. 
While the Japanese government has, to date, consistently 
regarded the above Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895 as 
forming the legal basis for its claim over the disputed islands, 
scholars supporting the Chinese claim have pointed to some of the 
inadequacies that bring its legality into question. First, the cabinet 
decision only mentioned two of the islands belonging to the 
disputed islands chain, Diaoyutai Yu/Uotsuri-shima and Huangwei 
Yu/Kuba-shima, while leaving the third island, Chiwei 
Yu/Kubaseki-shima, beyond the scope of the incorporation. Second 
and more importantly, supporters of the Chinese claim place special 
emphasis on the fact that the Cabinet Decision in question (as with 
the entire incorporation process of the disputed islands) was carried 
out in total secrecy and was never notified to concerned states, in 
particular, Qing China.II4 
113 Ryukyu Government, "Reference 3: Official Documents," History of 
Okinawa Prefecture, Vol. 13 #iiiPf!.!i!,¥;+=: (1967), p. 593. 
114 For details on the second contention with respect to the legality of the 
Cabinet Decision under international law, see footnote 132. 
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Scholars supporting the Chinese claim contend that the 
reason for such confidentiality is obvious: simply that the Japanese 
government was aware that the islands had long been considered 
Chinese territory under the traditional world order. Therefore, 
despite the diminishing possibility of a Chinese protest due to Qing 
China's weakening position in the ongoing war, the Japanese 
government nonetheless maintained its policy of concealing its 
designs for the islands in order to ensure that the incorporation 
process precede without any unlikely yet potential diplomatic 
trouble from China. In fact, the first time the contents of the 
Cabinet Decision of 1895 were disclosed to the public did not 
occur until more than half a century later in March 1952, when it 
was included in japan Foreign Affairs Documents, Volume 23.115 In 
addition, Chinese and Japanese scholars on the subject have noted 
that national markers were in fact never placed on the islands 
following the Cabinet Decision of 1895 but instead were belatedly 
erected almost seventy years later on May 10, 1969 by the mayor of 
lshigaki city in response to heated controversy over the islands' 
ownership.116 Simply put, due to the secretive nature of every 
aspect of the Japanese incorporation of the islands, Qing China was 
deprived of the opportunity to generate any kind of protest against 
Japan's actions. 
Many supporters of the Japanese claim have argued that, one 
year after the Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895, the 
promulgation of Imperial Decree No. 13 on March 5, 1896 
incorporated the disputed islands into Japanese territory under the 
administrative unit of Yaeyama County of Okinawa Prefecture. 
Clearly, the purpose behind this argument is to foster an impression 
that the incorporation process of the disputed islands was legalized 
through Japanese domestic legislation procedures and proclaimed 
to the public. However, Chinese scholars have constantly refuted 
the applicability of Imperial Decree No. 13 to the islands dispute 
since nowhere in the decree could any references to the disputed 
115 The series known as Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (Japan Fortign Affairs 
Docummts) f3Jt?f.5!Jtll began its first publication in 1939, which is a 
chronological anthology of important documents selected from the archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
116 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 18. 
DIAOYUTAifSENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE 101 
islands be found. The entire decree reads as follows, 
WE, give sanction to the matter regarding the formation of Okinawa 
Prefecture, and hereby make the following proclamation: 
Imperial Signature Sign Manual 
Imperial Seal 
March 5, the 29th year ofMeiji 
Prime Minister Count Ito Hirobumi 
Home Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa 
Imperial Decree No. 13 (Official Gazette March 7) 
Article I. 
Excluding the two areas of Naha and Shuri, the rest of Okinawa 
Prefecture is to be divided into the following five counties: 
Shimajiri County Each magiri [traditional regional unit] 
of Shimajiri; Kume-jima; Kerama Islands 
group; Tonaki-jima; Aguni-jima; Iheya-jima 
Islands group; Tori-shima and Daito-jima. 
Nakagami County 
Kunigami County 
Miyako County 
Yaeyama County 
Article II. 
Each magiri ofNakagami. 
Each magiri of Kunigami; and Ie-jima. 
Miyako Islands group. 
Yaeyama Islands group. 
In the event that the boundaries or names of the counties need to be 
changed, they shall be decided by the Home Minister. 
Additional Clause 
Article III. 
The time at which this decree goes into effect shall be decided by the 
Home Minister. 117 
From the contents of the edict, it can be seen that the only islands 
placed under the administrative unit of Yaeyama County were 
those that have been known to constitute the Yaeyama Islands 
group; and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were nowhere to be seen. 
Since the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands geographically formed its own 
islands group separate from that known as the Yaeyama Islands 
group, had the imperial edict truly intended to include the 
disputed islands under Yaeyama County, it would have listed them 
117 Kanpo Bureau of the Cabinet P>l lil'Bl!lf.U, Horei Zensho, Vol 29-3 tlr<ft 
~If (If 2 9 #- 3) (Tokyo: Hara Shopo, 1979). 
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along with the Yaeyama Islands group. For example, in the case of 
Shimajiri County, each of the encompassed islands groups were 
listed individually; islands such as T ori-shima and Daito-jima, 
which were both geographically separate from any islands group, 
were also specified under Shimajiri County to avoid any confusion 
as to their appropriate administrative division. 
To further demonstrate that the disputed islands were not 
promulgated into Japanese territory by Imperial Edict No. 13 of 
1896, Chinese scholars have directed attention to a "Table of 
County District Areas" published by the Okinawa Prefectural 
Government. The table included a complete list of all 
administrative areas under each county of Okinawa Prefecture as of 
December 31, 1896. Under the section listing all areas 
administrated under Yaeyama County, the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 
Islands were once again absent from the list. Important is the fact 
that the said table specifically indicated it had been devised based 
on the division of administrative areas as determined by Imperial 
Decree No. 13.118 
In short, a careful examination of the imperial edict alone 
sufficiently reveals that it had nothing to do with the disputed 
islands; the only purpose of issuing the edict was to introduce a new 
county system to Okinawa Prefecture, which was an entirely 
separate issue unrelated to the disputed islands.119 On the other 
hand, the said imperial edict in fact proves the opposite of what 
many Japanese had originally intended --- that not only were the 
disputed islands not recorded into the land registry of any 
administrative unit of Okinawa Prefecture, but more importantly, 
the islands were simply never publicly proclaimed as Japanese 
territory by any government organs or in any official declarations. 
Perhaps for the reasons above, the imperial edict was never included 
as evidence in The Basic View of 1972 issued by the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry. Those Chinese and Japanese scholars responsible 
for uncovering all of the Meiji official documents presented 
heretofore contend that the secretive nature of the entire 
118 Ryukyu Government, "Reference 10: Statistical Records of Okinawa 
Prefecture -~~ 10: ilfli!IVif.*ltrr#HiX;," History of Okinawa Prefecture #Jill~ !il!, 
Vol. 20 (1967). See also Chang Chi-hsiung, supra note 97, p. 127. 
119 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 128. 
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incorporation process revealed through these historical documents, 
undermines the legality of Japan's possession of the islands based on 
the discovery-occupation mode of territorial acquisition. It is 
commonly pointed out that for discovery-occupation to be valid 
under international law, both possession and administration are 
necessary. As cited previously, with respect to possession, 
international law generally requires, 
The territory must really be taken into possession by the occupying state. 
For this purpose it is necessary that it should take the territory under its 
sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it (animus). 
This ... normally involves a settlement on the territory, accompanied by 
some formal act which announces both that the territory has been taken 
possession of and that the possessor intends to keep it under his sovereignty. 
[Emphasis is mine.]120 
Taking the above into consideration, the legality of Japan's 
incorporation of the disputed islands is indeed questionable since it 
has been revealed by Meiji official documents that the entire 
incorporation process was in fact kept secretive and no formal acts 
announcing Japan's incorporation were carried out. Additionally, 
Koga Tatsushiro, the first Japanese settler on the islands, submitted 
his final application to the Ministry of Home Mfairs to lease the 
islands on June 10, 1895, six days after Taiwan had been officially 
transferred over to Japanese control.121 Furthermore, approval of 
Koga' s application was delayed for more than a year and not given 
until in September 1896. As a result, actual settlement did not take 
place until 1897 when Koga began investing large amounts of 
capital to develop his businesses on the islands. 
As such, acts of settlement by Japanese citizens did not take 
place within a relatively concurrent time period in which the 1895 
Cabinet Decision took place (but were instead delayed for almost 
two years), and occurred only after the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki 
was signed. Since the Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895 was 
120 Oppenhiem s International Law, supra note 19, p. 689. 
121 Chinese scholars believe that the only reason that explains why Koga 
submitted his application immediately after Japan had officially taken control over 
Taiwan but not earlier that year was simply because he too was not aware of the 
Cabinet Decision ofJanuary 14, 1895. 
104 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIEs 
never accompanied by any formal acts announcing Japan's 
incorporation or acts of settlement on the islands back in 1895, 
Chinese scholars conclude that the only valid legal basis that can 
support Japan's claim over the disputed islands lies in the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki signed with Qing China on April17, 1895. 
To further demonstrate that the Meiji government's intention 
to keep the incorporation process a matter of confidentiality could 
have only resulted from its desire to prevent any awareness from 
Qing China, Chinese scholars point to several instances whereby 
other small islands whose status was truly terra nullius and whose 
ownership was not under dispute were incorporated by Japan in a 
manner that differed greatly from its handling of the 
Diaoyutai!Senkaku Islands. For example, in 1891 when the Meiji 
government decided to incorporate three small uninhabited islands 
southwest of the Ogasawara Islands, a letter from the Home 
Minister to the Foreign Minister specifically noted that efforts 
should be made to incorporate the islands in accordance with 
prevailing rules of international law at the time. As a result, the 
cabinet decision to incorporate the three islands was promulgated 
and made public on September 9, 1891 under Imperial Decree No. 
190,122 Moreover, not only did that imperial decree specify the 
exact names, coordination, and designated administrating 
authorities of the incorporated islands, such information also was 
published in the Official Gazette (Kanpo 'ffr¥/l) and carried in 
Japanese newspapers. In addition, back when the Ogasawara Islands 
were incorporated into Japanese territory in 1876, the matter was 
brought to the acknowledgement of concerned states as the 
Japanese government notified their respective ministers residing in 
Japan.123 
In should be noted that the approval of the incorporation of 
the Ogasawara Islands in 1891 and the denial of the petition of 
January 2, 1890 submitted by the Okinawa Prefectural Governor 
122 Inoue Kiyoshi, supra note 5, p. 131. Original documents can be found 
in japan Foreign Affairs Documents B;$:~3CJtlf, Vol. 24. 
123 Takahashi Shogoro, supra note 33, p. 114; YasuokaAkio '1C~IIB9J, The 
Meiji Restoration and Territorial Issues f!IJi'{;j{tJ!Jj !:1JJi±/tr11l (Tokyo: Kyoiku-sha, 
1980), pp. 177-186. 
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occurred in relatively the same time frame. Had the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands truly been regarded by the Japanese 
government as terra nullius, the decision to incorp~ra.te the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands similarly should have matenahzed as 
with the Ogasawara Islands, rather than being repeatedly denied 
and postponed. Furthermore, if one compares the vastly different 
manner by which the final step was carried out in incorporating the 
Ogasawara Islands in 1890 and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 
1895 -~~one with full disclosure and the other by entire secrecy ---
it is evident that Japan was still perfectly aware of the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands' relationship with Qing China. Hence, 
Chinese scholars are unanimous in their belief that the islands were 
not truly "incorporated" by the Japanese government, but rather 
"stolen" from a weakened Qing China. From the Chinese 
perspective, the Japanese claim that the islands were terra nullius and 
incorporated by virtue of the principle of discovery-occupation is to 
cloak its past territorial ambition over Chinese territory with high-
sounding yet unfounded justifications. 
Chinese scholars have been extremely sensitive to imperial 
Japan's past usage of international law to justify its territorial 
designs over territory of other nations, naturally those that belonged 
to China in particular. Indeed, there are striking similarities 
between the Japanese incorporation process of the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands in 1895 and an earlier event known as 
the Japanese Expedition to Taiwan of 1874, when Japan sent a 
military expedition to the eastern region of the Chinese island of 
Taiwan. The reason behind sending this military expedition as 
claimed by Japan at the time was to punish aborigines of Taiwan for 
killing 54 shipwrecked Ryukyuan sailors in late 1871. This was 
merely a pretext, however, considering Japan's military expedition 
was sent more than two years a&er the killings. 
The real objective of the expedition was to legitimize Japan's 
control over the Ryukyu Kingdom by asserting the exclusive right to 
speak for its "subjects," the Ryukuans, thereby challenging Chinese 
suzerainty over the Ryukyu Kingdom, as well as establishing a 
foothold in Taiwan. In June 1873, prior to Japan displaying any 
signs of sending a expedition to Taiwan, a Japanese envoy visited 
the Zongli Yamen t!J:I ( *I!I$W) iir, (Board of Foreign 
Relations, de facto Chinese Foreign Ministry), openly asserting the 
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right to speak for the murdered Ryukyuans. 124 In response, Zongli 
Y amen officials argued that since Ryukyu was a Chinese tributary 
and Taiwan was a part of China, the matter should be managed by 
China and its discretion alone and there was no need for Japan to 
act in place of China. One of the Zongli Yamen officials further 
stated in effect that the government could not always be held 
responsible for actions of the "untamed savages" of Taiwan since 
they lived in areas "beyond influences of government and 
civilization" --- a situation he regarded to be common in other 
countries as well, citing such examples as the Ezo (fl~) people of 
Japan and American Indian tribes of the United States.I25 
However, the Japanese government seized upon this assertion 
and argued that the absence of effective local Chinese 
administration over areas resided by Taiwan aborigines implied that 
such areas constituted "land without owner" under principles of 
124 For a comprehensive discussion of the diplomatic negotiations between 
Qing China and Japan over the Taiwan Expedition of 187 4 controversy, see Lin T su-
hou **~· History of External Relations of Taiwan aU?f.lllf*Je (Taipei, 
Sanmin Shuju: 1978), pp. 277-315; Chen Tsai-cheng l!jf{ftiE, "Sino-Japanese 
Diplomatic Negotiation over the Mudan Incident and its Settlement Uftif:$fll:ffi 
sligzlflBx~:&ltft," Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Vol. 22:II 
(Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1993), pp. 31-59. 
Most original official documents on the subject issued during the 
controversy by Qing China and Japan can be found in japan Foreign Affairs 
Documents, Vol. 7, pp. 1-338. 
125 As previously mentioned, due to the Qing government's reluctant 
attitude toward adopting western-originated ideas, it naturally had a poor 
understanding of principles of international law --- which was regarded by the 
Japanese government as an obvious weakness that it could exploit. From the Qing 
government's perspective, that there existed certain areas under its empire resided by 
"wild savages" beyond "influences of civilization and government" was regarded as 
natural considering the vast amount of territory it possessed. Since the concept of 
"sovereignty" and its requirements as defined under western international law were 
not well understood by many Chinese at the time, the Qing government did not 
believe that its treatment of areas resided by "wild savages" would jeopardize its 
territorial claim. Indeed, Qing China's lack of understanding of international law 
proved to be a considerable disadvantage that seriously impaired its ability to 
safeguard its territory and deal effectively in an international setting throughout its 
remaining years until it was overthrown in 1911. Time after time, national interests 
were sacrificed as the Zongli Yamen issued statements that were easily subject to 
distortion by imperial powers and further used as excuses to justify territorial 
encroachment over China. 
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international law --- which marked the first step in creating a 
pretext that would be used by the Japanese government to jus~ify 
later military actions toward Taiwan. Indeed, after the formation 
of the Office for the Taiwan Expedition in April 1874, the Japanese 
government dispatched an expeditionary force to Taiwan and 
argued that its actions could not be construed as a violation of 
Chinese territory since China lacked sovereignty over the areas 
resided in by the aborigines. Obviously, this view was not shared by 
Qing China, as well as several other countries including the United 
States and Britain.126 After realizing that its previous assertion 
regarding aboriginal Taiwan had been distorted by Japan to mean 
"land without owner" and further alerted by the British minister in 
China that a Japanese expedition force had already been sent to 
Taiwan, the Zongli Yamen immediately issued a letter on May 11, 
1874 to the Japanese Foreign Minister clarifying its position, 
[Taiwan] is an island lying far off admist the sea and we did not yet restrain 
the savages inhabiting it by any legislation nor establish any government 
over them, following in this a Maxim mentioned in Rei-ki [Book of Rites] 
"Don't change the usages of a people but keep their proper ones." But the 
territories inhabited by these savages are truly within the jurisdiction of 
China; and this is also the case with several savages inhabiting other remote 
provinces within the jurisdiction of China with whom China permits to 
126 Harry S. Parkes, the British Minister in Tokyo, wrote in a letter on 
April 16, 187 4 to Terashima Munenori, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that " [ d] uring 
residence of upwards of twenty years in China, I always heard that the whole of 
Formosa was claimed by China." Uapan Foreign Affairs Documents, Vol. 7, p. 25) In 
a subsequent letter on May 5 addressed to the Minister Terashima, Parkes again 
stated, "It is difficult to reconcile this statement with that made me by Your 
Excellency Uapanese Foreign Minister] that the territory inhabited by the savage 
tribes of Formosa is not under Chinese jurisdiction." (Ibid., p. 67) 
John A. Bingham, the U.S. Legation in Tokyo, also wrote in a letter on 
April 19, 1874 to Minister Terashima that if Japan decided that it must send a 
military expedition to Taiwan, then "China may decide that such act is hostile to her 
government within the territory of Formosa [Taiwan], and may accordingly meet 
and resist it with force of arms. To avoid such a result, which would be most 
fortunate for Japan, I cannot but say that Japan before approaching Formosa should 
obtain the written and authenticated consent of the Chinese government to the 
expedition proposed and its objects." (Ibid., p. 45) 
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preserve their own usages proper to them ... 127 
Determined to carry out its objectives, the Japanese government 
ignored Qing China's protest and maintained its position that 
"aboriginal Taiwan" was beyond Chinese jurisdiction. Aware of the 
seriousness of the issue, further efforts of the Qing government were 
made during diplomatic negotiations with Japan to demonstrate 
that the entire island of Taiwan constituted Chinese territory. 
Among the evidences presented by the Qing government, the most 
important one was the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture. In a letter 
issued on June 2, 187 4 by Li Henian *M~. Governor-General of 
Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces lllmftlfi (under which Taiwan was 
administrated), to Saigo Tsugumichi l:!Hllt'fii, leader of the 
Japanese expedition, it was pointed out that the aboriginal village 
that the "wild savages" responsible for the killing of the Ryukyuans 
belonged to paid annual provisions to the local Chinese authorities 
responsible for aboriginal affairs, which was duly recorded in the 
Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture. 
In late June, the Qing government further prepared copies of 
the said gazetteer, which were cited and displayed in front of the 
Japanese during the three rounds of inconclusive talks held in 
Taiwan. Although the Japanese government still maintained that 
the gazetteers were insufficient to demonstrate that Qing China 
displayed effective control, it nonetheless could not deny the fact 
that such records contained certain passages that strengthened 
China's position. Seeing that the gazetteers were the strongest 
evidence of Chinese control over the aborigines and occasionally 
127 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, japan Foreign Affairs Documents 
f3*~5Dtll, Vol. 7 (Tokyo: 1952), p. 77. 
In a letter from the Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces 
issued on the same day, the status of aboriginal Taiwan was further clarified: "[I] have 
found that the whole [area] of Formosa [Taiwan] has belonged to our country for 
long time and though there is the distinction of tame barbarians and wild barbarians 
they equally live in our land, and are our people, for two hundred years, just as the Yo, 
Dou, Mean and Lay who live in the borders of Canton, Kwansi, Hu-nan Hoo-pih, 
Yun-nan and Kwei-Choo, all these being what in the ancient times, were called the 
continuation of "wild dominion." Though the wild barbarians have isolated 
themselves in distant mountains and assumed wild habits and it is possible that the 
influences of civilization should not penetrate them and that the orders of the 
government should not reach them, yet they are within the limits of our Empire and 
subject to our jurisdiction." (Ibid., p. 79) 
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proved some level of effectiveness during negotiations, the Qing 
government continued to rely heavily on such records throughout 
subsequent negotiations. In a letter issued August 13, 1874 by the 
Zongli Y amen to the Japanese minister in Peking, gazetteers were 
once again invoked as follows, 
It should be noted that the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture (.ill/f.tl:J has 
long existed and was not published just recently for the sake of our debate 
with Your Excellency Oapanese minister] today. The gazetteer records the 
occupance regarding payment of provisions by the nineteen allegiant 
aboriginal villages during the third year of Yungzheng [1725]. The 
aboriginal village of Mudan [village whom the aborigines responsible for 
the killing of the Ryukyuans belonged to] is among the said nineteen 
villages .. .128 
On September 10, 1874, the Japanese Home Minister, Okubo 
T oshimichi -:k.!A iif!Hm, came to Peking himself to further negotiate 
a settlement. However, the fundamental position held by both 
sides remained unchanged as the debate continued to revolve 
around the question whether aboriginal Taiwan constituted Chinese 
territory. The Zongli Yamen continued to insist that Sino-Japanese 
relations be governed not by general principles of international law, 
hut by the Treaty of 1871 which stipulated nonaggression against 
each other's territory, while Home Minister Okubo retorted that 
Japan had not invaded Chinese territory since the Taiwan aborigines 
were not under Chinese jurisdiction.129 Again, the Zongli Yamen 
reiterated China's claim over aboriginal Taiwan based on evidence 
from the Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture in a memorandum dated 
October 16 stating, "If [such areas] do not belong to China, how is 
it they are included in [our] gazetteers... if [such areas] do not 
belong to China, why did [the aborigines] pay [us] provisions? :51' 
jlrpiJ, filJP.AJ'J.A.If.fi!: ... :5:::fjlrpiJ, filJ.I.-:1--? "130 
The diplomatic impasse between the two nations was finally 
brought to an end on October 30, 187 4 as a settlement was reached 
128 Ibid., p. 185. 
129 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, supra note 103, p. 317. 
130 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Oapan 
Foreign Affairs Documents) B*?'J..5tf(IJ, Vol. 7 (Tokyo: 1952), p. 273. 
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through the mediation of Thomas F. Wade, the British minister in 
Peking. China agreed to pay 500,000 taels for the murdered 
Ryukyuans and for the purchase of the barracks that were 
constructed by the Japanese in Taiwan, while Japan recognized 
Chinese authority over the entire island of Taiwan. For Japan, its 
first foreign military expedition obviously yielded desirable results 
that encouraged it to further embark on a path marked by 
territorial aggression towards its neighboring countries after the 
fashion of western imperialism. For China, on the other hand, "that 
it was willing to pay for being invaded, as the British minister in 
Japan Harry Parkes sarcastically described the case, was clearly an 
invitation to further foreign encroachment."l31 
Two major points that may be derived from the Taiwan 
Expedition of 187 4 episode that are relevant to this study are the 
following: 1} Imperial Japan's use of international law to justify its 
territorial ambitions toward territory of other countries was not an 
uncommon practice --- its assertion that aboriginal Taiwan was 
"land without owner" in 187 4 parallels its assertion that the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were terra nullius in 1895; in both these 
cases Japan was fully aware that such areas were claimed by China; 
2) During negotiations with Japan, Chinese local gazetteers became 
the most important and effective sources of evidence used by the 
Qing government to demonstrate what constituted its territory ---
usage of local gazetteers as evidence has significant implications for 
the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, since as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the disputed islands and their official usage also were 
recorded in such local gazetteers. 
From a consideration of the broad spectrum of events as 
presented in this chapter, Japan's reason for keeping its objective to 
absorb the disputed islands within its empire a discreet one is even 
more evident. Japan had learned from previous dealings with Qing 
China that if the incorporation was not carried out in secrecy, then 
the possibility of Qing China filing a diplomatic protest in the 
similar manner back in 187 4 would always remain --- which would 
seriously upset Japan's territorial plans for the islands. Simply, had 
the Japanese government been certain that the Diaoyutai/Senkaku 
Islands were truly "land without owner" and not Qing territory ---
as it continues to claim to this very day --- why was the 
131 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, supra note 1 03, p. 317. 
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incorporation process in 1895 never made public as it was with the 
three other Ogasawara islands in 1891? 
It seems that the only logical explanation is that Japan desired 
to have a free hand and avoid any potential diplomatic trouble from 
Qing China. Therefore, in light of the series of evidence heretofore 
presented in this chapter, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
islands were indeed "stolen" from China rather than "incorporated" 
by a Japan that was fully confident of a final victory in the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894-95. With respect to the Cabinet Decision of 
1895, since a unilateral decision of one nation cannot result in the 
loss of territory of another nation, its legality also appears to be 
questionable.132 Moreover, since the disputed islands were 
traditionally considered a part of Chinese territory, in particular, a 
part of Taiwan, that the only legal basis of Japan's claim over the 
islands was the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 seems a plausible 
assessment --- which follows that the disputed islands should have 
been returned along with the main island ofT aiwan to China after 
the Second World War. 
132 A summary of Chinese contentions regarding the questionable legality 
of Japan's incorporation of the disputed islands under international law is as follows: 
1) The disputed islands were not terra nullius, but instead Chinese territory 
---which rules out the legality of Japan's action of occupying the islands by virtue of 
the principle of discovery-occupation. 
2} The secretive nature of the incorporation process further weakens 
Japan's claim since the only concerned state, China, was not notified of this action of 
such legal importance. International law requires that for discovery-occupation to 
be valid, both possession and administration are necessary. With respect to 
possession, as cited previously, international law generally requires, 
The territory must really be taken into possession by the occupying state. 
For this purpose it is necessary that it should take the territory under its 
sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it 
(animus). This ... normally involves a settlement on the territory, 
accompanied by some formal act which announces both that the territory 
has been taken possession of and that the possessor intends to keep it 
under his sovereignty. [ Oppenhiems International Law, supra note 19, p. 
689; emphasis is mine.] 
In the case of the disputed islands, no settlement on the islands nor any formal acts 
announcing Japan's incorporation were carried out by the Japanese government back 
in 1895. 
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4. Chinese Refutation of the Japanese Claim 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the origins of the 
islands dispute finds its roots in the late 19th century, when Meiji 
Japan sought to use western-originated international law to justify 
its territorial ambitions against a weakening Qing Empire that 
continued to insist on the centuries-old East Asian World Order as 
the sole justification for its previously recognized territorial 
possessions. Yet another factor that has also contributed to the 
existence of this dispute concerns China's attitude toward the 
islands after the second world war. Japanese scholars have 
highlighted the lack of China's objection against Japan's 
incorporation of the islands in 1895 and their U.S. administration 
after the Second World War to demonstrate that China did not 
regard them as its territory. 
In regard to Japan's incorporation of the islands in January 
1895, as already shown, Japan's professed knowledge of the islands' 
Chinese ownership led it to secretly "incorporate" them which 
simply denied Qing China the information that could have 
generated a protest. Also, aside from the point that Qing China 
had traditionally considered the disputed islands to be a part of 
Taiwan, given that Japan's secretive "incorporation" of the disputed 
islands and the transfer of all of Taiwan happened only three 
months apart, that Japan acquired the disputed islands from other 
than the Treaty of Shimonoseki would have been inconceivable to 
Qing China. From Qing China's perspective, the disputed islands 
become Japanese territory as a spoil of war and was made legitimate 
through the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Being denied 
the information regarding Japan's earlier incorporation of the 
islands, there simply did not exist a reason or sound basis for Qing 
China to protest against Japan. 
In regard to China's absence of protest against U.S. military 
administration over the disputed islands after the second world war, 
the ROC and PRC governments have each issued separate 
statements explaining their positions on the matter. This study will 
address the ROC official position first, followed by that of the 
PRC. 
During the opening of the islands dispute in the early 1970s, 
the ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wei Tao-ming UBJ1 
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described his government's post-war attitude toward the disputed 
islands as follows, 
After World War II, our government deemed that U.S. military 
administration of the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets as a necessary procedure for the 
purpose of mutual defence. Afterwards, [the Republic of China] and the 
United States came into an agreement designating the perimeters for 
patrolling; later on fishermen from our country continued their 
operations within the said area.l33 
This position was reiterated in a memorandum on March 15, 1971 
by the ROC Ambassador to the United States as follows, 
Since the conclusion of the second world war, the United States 
government assumed military occupation over islands located south of 29 
north latitude pursuant to Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; 
the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets were also included within the boundaries of United 
States occupation, which the ROC government did not express its 
objection due to regional security concerns. However, this may not be 
interpreted as [my government's] acquiescence to the Tiao-yu-t'ai Islets 
being a part of the Okinawa Islands. Moreover, according to the general 
principles of international law, temporal military occupation of a given 
area does not prejudice the final disposal of sovereignty over said area.I34 
From the above statements, the primary reason the ROC 
government allowed the disputed islands to be placed under U.S. 
military control was for the purpose of "mutual defence" and 
"regional security concerns," an indication that the fate of the 
disputed islands became entangled in the cold-war situation that 
immediately followed the conclusion of the Second World War. In 
order to understand the rationale of the ROC government at the 
time, a brief summary of the political realities that surrounded the 
ROC and the disputed islands is helpful. 
In 1949, two years prior to the formal inclusion of the disputed 
islands into areas of U.S. trusteeship in 1951, the ROC government 
133 Lin Chin-ching f*l?im, "The Tiao-Yu-Tai Islands before International 
Law f.J#.raZIII~7$;," Conference paper, Conference for The Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) 
Islets Symposium (Taipei: May 24-25, 1997), p. 8. 
134 Cited and translated by the author from the official Chinese version of 
said memorandum, which can be found in Chiu Hungdah .li~ii. Modern 
International Law JJlftfJIJf11U1~ (Taipei: Sanmin Shuju, 1995), p. 542. 
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was defeated in the Chinese civil war (1945-1949) by the Chinese 
communists and forced to withdraw from the mainland and 
relocated itself on Taiwan. Henceforth, the ROC become 
politically, economically and militarily dependent on the United 
States. Therefore, when the 1951 Peace Treaty placed the former 
Nansei Islands (including the disputed islands) under U.S. 
trusteeship, the ROC government did not object to this move since 
it was well aware of the fact that U.S. military presence in the area 
only further secured its own national survival. More importantly, 
however, it must be noted that the ROC considered this post-war 
arrangement of the former Nansei Islands to bear no connection to 
the question of sovereignty --- since it was the opinion of the ROC 
government that the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty had 1already removed Japanese sovereignty 
from the Nansei Islands and that the subsequent U.S. trusteeship 
system was not intended to address the islands' sovereignty. 
In other words, to the ROC government, the placement of the 
Nansei Islands under U.S. military control was purely a strategic 
move necessary for the overall design to contain the threat of 
communism in the East Asia. That the ROC government regarded 
the placement of the Nansei Islands under U.S. military 
administration as an arrangement isolated from the issue of 
sovereignty is illustrated by its objection against the notion that 
Article III of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty had also allowed 
Japan to retain "residual sovereignty" over the said islands.I35 
135 On August 8, 1953, when the United States made public its decision to 
return the Amami Islands group, one of the sub-island groups that constituted the 
former Nansei Islands, to Japan, the ROC government immediately filed diplomatic 
protests on the grounds that there were no provisions in the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty that could be construed as authorizing the United States to resort to any 
procedures other than those stipulated in Article III of the said Treaty for the final 
disposition of the Nansei Islands. With respect to the notion that Japan retained 
"residual sovereignty" over the Nansei Islands during U.S. administration, which the 
United States relied on as the basis for its return of the Amami Islands to Japan, the 
ROC government responded that it could not agree that "the mention of the term 
'residual sovereignty' by the delegates of two powers [United States and Great 
Britain] without its embodiment in the actual wording of the [1951 Peace Treaty] 
could be construed to mean that it has been agreed upon by all the states." In another 
official statement issued by the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 24, 
1953, it was further argued that the U.S. interpretation that Japan retained "residual 
sovereignty" is inconsistent with the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which 
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Due to the close military alliance between the ROC and 
United States that began in the early 1950s, activities carried out by 
citizens from Taiwan in the surrounding waters of the disputed 
islands were seldom prohibited by the U.S. military. This situation 
resulted from the overlapping of U.S. military patrolled areas in the 
region. Article 7 of the Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty !:fl~ 
~[qJWJ-~tt-1 signed on December 2, 1954 stipulated that "The 
Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government 
of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such 
United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the 
Pescadores as may be required for their defence, as determined by 
the mutual agreement." 136 On the other hand, areas of U.S.-Japan 
defence cooperation were further embodied in Article 6 of the 1960 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty B *=:ti:-f**f-1 under the term "Far 
East," which was explained by the Japanese government to be .. areas 
north of the Philippines, Japan and its surrounding areas, as well as 
areas under the control of South Korea and Taiwan."137 Since the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and the surrounding areas of Taiwan 
both came under areas patrolled by U.S. forces, the boundaries 
between the two areas were not strictly enforced. 
provides that "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the Islands of Honshu, 
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we (the co-signatories of the 
Declaration of which the Republic of China is one) determine." However, since the 
international status of the ROC had greatly diminished after 1949 while post-war 
Japan had emerged as the cornerstone of American interests in East Asia, naturally the 
protests of the ROC government did not yield any results and the Amami Islands 
were returned to Japan the following year in 1954. In any case, this event 
demonstrates that the ROC regarded that the U.S. military administration of the 
islands to be isolated from the issue of sovereignty over the islands that constituted the 
former Nansei Islands. See Secretary Office of the Legislative Yuan :ll.i*~&:fiJJfit 
Conference Records of the Legislative Yuan Regarding the Objection Against the 
Return oftheAmami Islands to japan il.iiH!Jl&IJU;k~5(ffiiB*-~t1MlBII­
/f#1ffll1((!f= {March 1954). 
136 See Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Tiao-
yu-tai Islets and Possible Solutions Y-Jf.(l:a11JI!Jl::Efl~f:Ar<II&&!t~1Ji1~fif~," 
supra note 61, p. 280. 
137 "Guideline review redefines Japan's security role," The Daily Yomiuri 
(in English), September 23, 1997, p. 4. 
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As shown above, the ROC government has noted that 
fishermen from Taiwan were able to continue their traditional usage 
of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands as their operational base for 
fishing activities which were not disrupted until 1968 when the 
islands dispute brokeout. For these fishermen, the disputed islands 
also served as emergency shelters during bad weather conditions. 
Therefore, since the ROC government acknowledged that 
traditional usage of the disputed islands by personnel from Taiwan 
were never disrupted, and that military control of the disputed 
islands by its closest ally did not involve any issues concerning 
sovereignty, Taipei did not perceive an urgency to file any objection 
to the islands status insofar as they were under the control of the 
United States and not Japan. The ROC government notes that 
only when such activities carried out by its citizens were halted and 
that it was brought to its attention that the disputed islands were to 
be included within the islands to be returned to Japan in the late 
1960s, that it deemed it necessary to raise the issue with the United 
States and communicate its position regarding the disputed islands' 
final disposal. 
To substantiate the point that fishermen from Taiwan had 
traditionally used the disputed islands as operational bases which 
lasted until the late 1960s, Chinese scholars point to several 
documents. While initial use of the islands as fishing bases by 
Taiwanese fishermen began in the second half of the 19th century, 
their number increased steadily at the turn of the century. This is 
well-documented in Marine Products of Taiwan ft;tf(J)J]<iJE 
published in 1915 by the Production Bureau of the Government-
General in Taiwan B *ft~~~ .lf-JJlJai)lU as follows, "As an 
operational base for bonito-fishing boats from Taiwan, the fishing 
grounds surrounding the Senkaku Islands constitutes (sic) ... one of 
their most important deep sea fishing grounds." 138 That such usage 
persisted until the late 1960s is further confirmed in news report in 
Yomiuri Shimbun dated September 18, 1970 as "Illegal entrance 
into Japanese waters surrounding the Senkakus and illegal landing 
on the islands by Taiwanese fishermen is as frequent as a daily 
occurrence ( B 'M'~Si$). Today, although Taiwanese fishermen no 
138 Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Tiao-yu-
tai Islets and Possible Solutions f9P.ta;tJ•±tt~r.,,&&lt~n~~if~." 
supra note 61, p. 267. 
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longer have access to the waters within the disputed islands' 
territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, the outer areas continue to be an 
important fishing ground on which many continue to depend for a 
living. 
Therefore, the significance of the past and present usage of the 
disputed islands as fishing grounds by Taiwanese fishermen 
according to the Chinese scholars can be summarized as follows: 1) 
continued usage of the islands after the second world war did not 
create any urgency for the ROC government to file any objection 
toward the United States over these otherwise seemingly 
insignificant islands; and, 2) there has existed a long-standing 
"special economic and geographical relationship between the islands 
and Taiwan as demonstrated by the activities of the fishermen" 
which when viewed together with ample historical evidence 
presented in previous chapters, further support the claim that the 
disputed islands are politically, geographically and economically 
linked with the island ofT aiwan. 
Chinese scholars contend that the reason why the disputed 
islands were mistakenly excluded from the territory returned to 
China in 1945 was mainly because concerned nations overlooked 
the possibility that what constituted the administrative unit of 
Taiwan at the time of Japan's surrender in 1945 may not have 
corresponded exactly to what previously constituted the Chinese 
Province ofTaiwan back in 1895. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, Qing China had long regarded the disputed islands as a 
part of Taiwan, instead of the Okinawa Islands. In 1895, when 
Japan used its victory to remove the disputed islands from their 
Chinese ownership, it also ended their administrative status under 
Taiwan and re-grouped them under Okinawa Prefecture. However, 
when the second world war was close to an end, since the United 
States was unaware of the disputed islands' historical relationship to 
Taiwan, their administrative status under Okinawa Prefecture at the 
moment of Japan's surrender was naturally yet mistakenly adopted 
by the U.S. authorities as a matter of routine. 
Meanwhile, as Japan accepted the terms set forth by the allies 
to return Taiwan back to China in 1945, only those areas that 
constituted the administrative unit of Taiwan during Japanese 
colonial rule that were returned. Soon afterwards, during the 
drafting of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the above errors 
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were not remedied as the disputed islands were misplaced under 
the provisions of Article III, which formally granted U.S. authorities 
administrative powers over them. The disputed islands were 
therefore never restored to their pre-1895 status and remained 
within the Ryukyu Islands under U.S. military control. 
While the Chinese often argue that the United States and the 
framers of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty had mistakenly 
grouped the disputed islands along with the rest of the Okinawa 
Islands, it would only seem fair to also find fault with the Chinese 
government for not correcting this error, especially since it 
concerned Chinese territory. It also seems reasonable to say that 
the main reason for the Chinese government's negligence on the 
issue was that it too was not aware there had been administrative 
changes carried out by the Japanese between 1895 and 1945 over 
the areas that constitute the administrative unit of Taiwan. The 
question is then, why did this happen and what are its implications 
to the islands' dispute? Since the first part of the question has been 
rarely discussed, I have attempted to shoulder some of the 
responsibility in searching for an answer. The following is my 
opinion on the matter. 
It should be noted that among the various Chinese territories 
that Japan evacuated from and returned to China in 1945, the 
island of Taiwan was a special case that differed from others in that 
it was the only area over which the government of the Republic of 
China had never had experience exercising control. Other areas 
such as Manchuria, Northern China, and the eastern Chinese costal 
regions, had all during one period or another been within areas of 
effective governance of the ROC government until they were 
invaded and occupied by Japan. With respect to Taiwan however, 
since the ROC government was not founded until 1912, even 
though it represented the Chinese government that resumed control 
over Taiwan in 1945, it was not the same Chinese government that 
had last governed Taiwan before transferring it to Japan back in 
1895. 
In other words, the ROC government had never produced any 
administrative records concerning the former island province of 
Taiwan simply because it had never been under the ROC's effective 
control. Therefore, when the ROC government began its 
administration over Taiwan in 1945, naturally it did not rely on 
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administrative records (local gazetteers) on Taiwan from the 
previous Qing Dynasty, but instead relied on the more up-to-~ate 
administrative records and statistics compiled by the previous 
colonial Japanese government in Taiwan. In doing so, the ROC 
naturally and conveniently adopted the administrative 
arrangements of Taiwan created during Japanese colonial rule, 
which was inconsistent with the original administrative 
arrangements under the Qing government. As a result, until past 
local gazetteers were reviewed by the ROC government, the 
disputed islands' original administrative status under Taiwan 
remained hidden. 
Another reason that may explain the ROC government's 
negligence over the status of the disputed islands after the war is 
because virtually all maps at the time labeled the disputed islands 
under their general Japanese name, Senkaku Islands, to denote their 
Japanese ownership prior to 1945. From a Chinese perspective, the 
characters that represent the Senkaku Islands appear foreign and 
distinctively Japanese, which indeed can be misleading as one 
overlooks their traditional relationship with China. Had the 
Chinese name, Diaoyutai Islands, been preserved and used in place 
of Senkaku Islands, perhaps the Chinese government would have 
promptly realized their Chinese origins and demanded their return. 
The more important question is then, how does the ROC 
government's negligence toward the disputed islands immediately 
after the war affect its legal claim over them? Chinese scholars 
contend that the ROC's claim of sovereignty over the disputed 
islands were not diminished because of their placement under U.S. 
military control after the war. Considering the contents of Article 
III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which stipulated, 
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United 
Nations to place [the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands] under its trusteeship 
system, with the United States as the sole administering authority ... 
Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the 
United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of 
administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and 
inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters,l39 
it 1s evident that such a arrangement bears no relevance to the 
139 United Nations Treaty Series, supra note 7. 
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problem of sovereignty over these islands. Chinese scholars also 
point to a series of statements issued by the U.S. Department of 
State which also support the view that Article III of the said treaty 
bears no implication concerning their sovereignty {see next chapter). 
Moreover, since recent discoveries in historical evidence have funher 
substantiated the Chinese claim that the disputed islands had 
formed a part of Taiwan before the signing of the 1895 Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, Chinese scholars contend that its sovereignty over the 
disputed islands were protected in all legal agreements and treaties 
that dealt with Taiwan after the second world war --- including 
Article II of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1954 
Taipei Peace Treaty, in which sovereignty over Taiwan was returned 
to China. In other words, Chinese scholars contend that its 
sovereignty over the islands were fully protected by Article II as 
against Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.l40 In 
addition, it is contended that the ROC government's belated 
realization and objection to the disputed islands being placed under 
U.S. military control should not weigh heavily against China, as 
mere silence cannot be construed as renouncing sovereignty over the 
islands.141 
140 Tao Cheng, supra note 1, p. 252. 
141 In an effort to further determine whether ROC's lack of protest will 
have serious legal implications to its claim to the islands, I have sought to consult 
related principles of international law. Contemporary principles of international 
law concerning an absence of protest provide the following, "[t]he significance of an 
absence of protest will to a large extent depend upon all the circumstances of the 
situation; failure to protest by a state being directly and substantially effected by the 
act in question will be of greater significance than failure by a state not so effected." 
See Oppenheim s International Law, supra note 19, p. 1195. 
In considering the present islands dispute with the above definition, it 
should be noted that since the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands were tiny, remote, and 
uninhabitable, their placement under foreign control did not "directly and 
substantially" affect the national interests of the ROC. In addition, ROC citizens 
were able to continue their traditional usage of the islands after the war. 
Perhaps more important is the fact that the disputed islands were placed 
under a system of trusteeship administrated by a temporal Administering Authority 
after the war, rather than being effectively controlled by any State for its name or 
sovereign. Hence, the ROC's lack of protest should not have serious adverse 
implications since neither did it intentionally or tacitly recognized any claims of 
sovereignry of another State (which did not exist} over the disputed islands between 
1945-1972. 
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What then is the PRC's official position on this matter? .A5 
with the ROC, its is doubtful! that the PRC was aware of the past 
association between the disputed islands and Taiwan until vast 
amounts of historical evidence suggesting this were uncovered later 
on. However, since the PRC has consistently denied the legality of 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951, it has accordingly 
regarded U.S. military control over the former Japanese Nansei 
Islands, including the disputed islands, as illegal. Thus, any actions 
undertaken by the U.S. concerning the disputed islands were not 
recognized by the PRC government. Additionally, the PRC shares 
a position that parallels the ROC's legal claim over the disputed 
islands --- that a series of war-time and post-war agreements 
involving the territory of the island of Taiwan restored Chinese 
sovereignty over the disputed islands. 
Other points of refutation put forward by the Chinese include 
the following. First, with respect to the other Japanese contention 
that a number of state-sponsored Chinese publications treated the 
disputed islands as Japanese territory, the common official response 
is that such publications merely reflect the fact that the disputed 
islands were under U.S. administration since the end of the war. It 
is contended that no greater significance should be placed on such 
publications other than their recognition of the above political 
reality--- the disputed islands were under U.S. military control and 
no more. 
Second, in response to the evidence and documents presented 
by the Japanese to prove Japan's effective control over the disputed 
islands and China's recognition of that fact (such as the previously 
cited 1920 Certificate of Appreciation), Chinese scholars contend 
that such evidence is irrelevant to the dispute since there is no 
denying the fact that these islands, together with Taiwan and the 
Pescadores, indeed came under Japanese control between 1895-
1945 as a result of the Sino-Japanese War. Instead, the Chinese feel 
that the issues lie in whether the disputed islands were free for the 
taking in 1895 and whether they should have been returned to 
China after the second world war. 
In conclusion, China's absence of objection against the 
disputed islands' placement under U.S. military control, even if not 
affecting its legal claim over the islands, was undoubtedly a serious 
political misstep. While abundant historical evidence seems to 
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suggest that China has the stronger sovereignty claim, it may prove 
to be futile in bringing the islands back under Chinese control 
islands --- considering current political realities characterizing Sino-
Japanese relations and the economic interests surrounding the 
islands (see final chapter). Had the Chinese government promptly 
raised the issue back in 1945, its international prestige and status as 
a victor nation at the time suggests that there would have been far 
less political barriers in reclaiming the islands back then. Perhaps 
only time will tell whether this political misstep will prove to be a 
lost opportunity that will end up costing China to permanently lose 
these islands. 
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VI. THE U.S. POSITION REGARDING THE DISPUTE 
Finally, it is worth including the U.S. position toward the 
islands dispute in this study since not only has the United States 
been involved directly with the islands between 1951 and 1972, but 
both the Chinese and Japanese sides continue to invoke past U.S. 
rhetoric and action to strengthen their respective claims. The 
Japanese point to the American inclusion of the disputed islands 
under the boundary definition of the Nansei Islands as evidence 
that the United States. is in agreement with Japan's contention that 
the islands were associated with Okinawa. Moreover, they point to 
the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty between the United 
States and Japan signed on June 17, 1971 as legal evidence 
supporting Japan's claim of sovereignty over the islands. The 
Chinese, on the other hand, despite the signing of the reversion 
agreement with Japan and the subsequent transferral of the islands 
to Japanese administration, point to several United States official 
statements made since the opening of the dispute that the United 
States government in fact takes no position on the sovereignty issue. 
Prior to the transfer of the islands to the Japanese on May 15, 
1972, both the PRC and ROC governments filed protests against 
the United States inclusion of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands under 
the area covered by the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. Japan 
similarly protested against the United States for its neutral stance 
toward the sovereignty issue. Despite the U.S. decision to include 
the disputed islands within the territories covered by the reversion 
agreement, several official statements specified that the agreement 
did not affect the determination of sovereignty nor the legal status 
of the islands. Following several official statements issued by the 
U.S. State Department stating the U.S. policy of neutrality toward 
the sovereignty debate, Secretary of State William P. Rogers further 
reassured this policy before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on November 9, 1971. He stated, "This treaty does 
not affect the legal statues of those islands of all. Whatever the 
legal situation prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation 
after the treaty comes into effect." 142 Similarly, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee also stated the following, 
142 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, Senatt Executive Report, No. 92-10, 92nd 
Congress, 1st Session, p. 6. 
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The Republic of China, the People's Republic of China and Japan claim 
sovereignty over these islands. The Department of State has taken the 
position that the sole source of rights the United States in this regard 
derives from the [San Francisco] Peace Treaty under which the United 
States merely received rights of administration, not sovereignty. Thus, the 
United States action in transferring its rights of administration to Japan 
does not constitute a transfer of underlying sovereignty nor can it affect the 
underlying claims of the disputants. The Committee reaffirms that the 
provisions of the Agreement do not affect any claims of sovereignty with 
respect to the Senkaku or Tiao-yu Islands by any state.143 
Naturally, the distinction made between "administrative rights" 
and ~sovereignty" in these U.S. official statements is of particular 
significance for the Chinese, who find support in the assertion that 
United States could not have transferred to Japan that which it did 
not own, namely, sovereignty of the disputed islands. 
However, despite the United States' affirmation that the 
provisions of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement were not 
predicated on the transfer of sovereignty, Japan nonetheless believes 
that its claim of sovereignty is still justified. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, during U.S. administration of the Nansei Islands, 
the United States and Japan had an exclusive mutual understanding 
that Japan retained some degree of "residual sovereignty" over the 
areas occupied by the United States. Mter the U.S. decision to 
return the "administrative rights" to Japan under the reversion 
agreement in 1972, Japan contends that its previously-held "residual 
sovereignty" over the islands was as a result consolidated into full 
sovereignty. 
Successive U.S. administrations have continued to reaffirm the 
U.S. policy of neutrality with respect to the sovereignty dispute. 
During the most recent 1996-1997 flare-up of the dispute, U.S. 
State Department briefer Glyn Davies stated on September 23, 
1996: 
We expect the claimants to the islands will resolve their differences and do 
so peacefully. We urge all the claimants to exercise restraint as they move 
forward on this process ... We're not going to predict what's likely going 
to happen. We're simply going to confine ourselves to calling on both 
sides to resist the temptation to provoke each other or raise tensions over 
those islands. From a U.S. standpoint, though we understand it has a great 
143 Ibid. 
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emotional content, it's not the kind of issue that's wonh elevating beyond a 
war of words, where we are not. So that is our position on it.144 
Clearly, it is the policy of the United States to remain officially 
neutral, although the fact is that the disputants in the sovereignty 
dispute all rely to a varying extent on the actions and rhetoric of the 
United States to strengthen their own individual claims and weaken 
those of others. There can be no denying that the issue has been 
further complicated by the contradictions between U.S. action and 
rhetoric concerning the islands dispute. On one hand, Japan relies 
on the U.S. transfer of the disputed islands as confirmation of 
Tokyo's sovereignty over the islands, while the Chinese on the other 
hand find support in the rhetoric of the United States for refuting 
that same claim. 
More importantly, despite the low-key posture concerning the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku controversy adopted by the United States, one 
must not overlook Washington's legal obligation to defend the 
islands should they come under military attack. When ratifying the 
Okinawa Reversion Treaty in 1972, the United States also agreed to 
the continued application of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
over all areas denoted as Okinawa, including the disputed islands. 
Article V of the U.S. Japan Security Treaty stipulates: 
[The United States and Japan] recognizes that an armed attack against 
either Party in the te"itories under the administration of japan would be 
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet 
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and 
processes. [Emphasis is mine] 145 
Thus, despite its official neutrality, the United States is technically 
bound to defend Japan's claim over the islands in the unlikely-yet 
not entirely impossible-event of armed confrontation between 
China and Japan. Some U.S. scholars have noted that there is no 
automatic commitment on the part of the United States to defend 
144 Larry A Niksch, "Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal 
Relationship and Obligations," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 
(September 30, 1996). 
145 [Online] Available HTTP: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/q&a/ref/l.html. 
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the islands since any of its actions would have to be taken "in 
accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." 
Japanese scholars have criticized such an interpretation, however, by 
arguing that U.S. inaction would undoubtedly cripple American 
credibility vis-a-vis its Asian-Pacific allies.146 
On September 16, 1996, The New York Times reported that 
Walter F. Mondale, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, indicated 
that "the United States takes no position on who owns the islands ... 
American forces would not be compelled by the treaty to intervene 
in a dispute over them." Japan responded to this statement by 
expressing concern over what appeared to be a change in U.S. policy 
toward the disputed islands, noting possible implications 
concerning U.S. commitment to joint security. This concern of the 
Japanese was partly ameliorated when a front page news report of 
Yomiuri Shimbun cited Kurt M. Campbell, U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, as saying during 
an interview with the newspaper that "the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty of 1972 stipulates that the Senkaku Islands be placed under 
the administration of Japan. With regard to this issue, [the United 
States'] responsibility for the maintenance of security is clearly 
defined. "147 
If the United States believes that its interests can be best served 
through policies that strive to ease regional tensions and promote 
stability, then perhaps it should be noted that Washington's 
insistence of a policy of neutrality and ambiguity toward the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute has done little, if anything, to help 
reduce tensions or encourage reconciliation among the disputants. 
This lack of U.S. initiative is clearly regrettable considering that the 
United States itself has been involved in varying degrees with the 
islands since the end of World War II. Although endeavoring to 
stay out of the dispute, should the United States continue to insist 
upon a policy of neutrality despite its legal obligation to defend the 
islands when the need arises, there can be little doubt that its 
146 See Schachte, William L. Jr., Thoughts on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
Dispute, Conference Papers for the International Law Conference on the Dispute 
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands between Taiwan and Japan (Yi-lan, Taiwan: 1997). 
Also see Nakamura Katsunori, supra note 31. 
147 Yomiuri Shimbun (Evening Edition}, November 28, 1996, p.l. 
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longstanding alliance with Japan and possibly overall joint security 
arrangements in the Asia-Pacific would suffer --- presumably the 
exact pitfalls U.S. neutrality was originally intended to avoid. . 
This study does not intend to discuss whether the Umted 
States should either publicly express a more clear cut determination 
to stay out of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute or, through 
mediation and good-faith counseling, encourage the parties to refer 
the dispute to the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) or other third 
party arbitration. The complexity of this issue is beyond the scope 
of this study. However, given the inherent contradictions and 
potential risks in past and present U.S. policy concerning the 
dispute as outlined above, this issue deserves greater attention and 
further discussion. 
VII. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
From a lengthy presentation of the bases of claims advanced 
by each of the disputants, it can be observed that the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute has classic legal characteristics. 
It is a dispute that centers on legally relevant facts that have been 
subject to different interpretations. Considering that international 
tribunals have been set up and are well-suited to deal with such 
territorial disputes, the question is then, what are the prospects of 
presenting the case to the International Court of Justice for a 
judicial settlement? A second question that may follow is, if a 
judicial settlement proves unlikely, what are the prospects of setting 
up a cooperative development zone for joint development of the 
natural resources surrounding the islands? As stated earlier, while 
this study does not intend to go into an in-depth discussion of what 
may be the best viable option to resolving the dispute, it nonetheless 
wishes to briefly address these questions by providing a background 
of the current political realities surrounding Sino-Japanese relations 
and cross-strait relations between the PRC and ROC that will 
undoubtedly be crucial when seeking a final solution to the dispute. 
To return to the question concerning the prospects of 
presenting the islands dispute to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) at The Hague, the following political circumstances 
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confronting the disputants must be first pointed out. First and 
foremost is the issue concerning the status of the Republic of China 
on Taiwan in the international community. When the Republic of 
China was expelled from the United Nations and replaced by the 
Peoples' Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of 
China in 1971, it was also expelled from all U.N. related 
organizations, including the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. Without being considered a "State" by the United Nations 
and being excluded from membership, the ROC cannot have access 
to the ICJ. Given the well-known and longstanding rivalry between 
the PRC and ROC, and that the former currently occupies one of 
the five permanent seats in the U.N. Security Council, the prospects 
of the ROC being readmitted into the U.N. General Assembly or 
resuming its status as a active signatory to the Statute is dim ---
which essentially rules out any possibility for the ROC to seek 
settlement through the ICJ in the foreseeable future. Therefore, 
bringing the islands dispute before the ICJ is only an option 
concerning only the PRC and Japan, since both nations are current 
members of the U.N. and signatories to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. 
However, perhaps a more fundamental question concerns the 
willingness of the disputants to resort to a judicial settlement, which 
brings us to consider the applicability of compulsory jurisdiction of 
the ICJ over the dispute. In situations when one disputant has not 
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations a 
declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ, it is 
entitled to decline an ICJ judicial settlement. To date, the PRC 
has not deposited its recognition of compulsory jurisdiction, which 
is a relatively minor issue in relation to the islands dispute, since it is 
unlikely that it would be inclined to prevent the islands dispute 
from being taken to court --- it enjoys a position of having nothing 
to lose. Japan, on the other hand, deposited its recognition of 
compulsory jurisdiction in 1958, but with two important 
reservations: 1) that the other disputant must also have agreed to 
compulsory jurisdiction; and, 2) that the subject under dispute be 
limited to "situation or facts" after 1958.148 Since Japan could 
148 Chiu Hungdah, "A Study on the Territorial Dispute over the Tiao-yu-
tai Islets and Possible Solutions a9f.ta"J".:t:ftl~~r.UB.liUt~nit~fM~," 
supra note 61, p. 294. 
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argue that the disputed islands were incorporated back in _1895: it 
could decline judicial settlement through the ICJ, even 1f Chma 
accepts compulsory jurisdiction. 
Perhaps more important, however, is Japan's fundamental 
attitude toward a judicial settlement on territorial disputes which 
can be seen in a statement issued by Foreign Ministry Press 
Secretary Hiroshi Hashimoto on February 13, 1996 as follows, "As 
far as I understand, we have no intention to do so, because in 
general I can tell you, unless the two parties agree, they cannot go to 
the International Court of Justice." 149 Japan's response should not 
come as a surprise considering that the islands are currently under 
its possession. Bringing the dispute before the ICJ presents the 
obvious risk that if the court rules against Japan, then Japanese 
occupation of the islands and all associated advantages would be 
brought to an end. Simply put, Japan recognizes that courts can be 
unpredictable. Therefore, unless the PRC decides to take a 
stronger stance toward the issue by pressing for a special agreement 
requiring both countries to agree to a judicial settlement, either 
through the ICJ or third-party arbitration, it can be assumed for the 
present that settlement through judicial means is an unlikely 
option.150 
The other remaining alternative is to establish a joint 
development zone for the exploration of natural resources around 
surrounding the islands in a cooperative effort while leaving aside 
the issue of sovereignty. Ideally, this offers an interim solution in 
which neither state renounces its sovereignty claim to the islands nor 
recognizes the legitimacy of another state's while making it possible 
149 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Press Conference by the Press 
Secretary {13 February 1996). [online] Available HTTP: http://www.mofa.go.jp/ 
announce/press/1996/2/213.html. 
150 The PRC government has been long criticized by Chinese communities 
for taking a low profile stance toward the issue. A quote by historian Ian Nish well 
describes the situation: "The capaciry of one power to influence the course of action 
of another varies in accordance with the degree of the supplicant's dependence on the 
first." See Ian Nish, Origins of the Russo-japanese War (New York: Addison Wesley 
Longman, 1996), p. 234. 
Political observers have frequently pointed to the fact that due to China's 
incentive to secure receival of low-interest loans from Japan, its bargaining position 
in issues concerning Sino-Japanese relations has been weakened accordingly. 
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to address resource problems. As with the prospects of a judicial 
settlement, however, the applicability of this option to the islands 
dispute also faces a series obstacles, divisible into two categories: 1) 
present political circumstances; and, 2) disagreement among the 
parties concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
Once again, the ROC's status in the international community 
proves to be a major barrier to this option. Since Japan derecognized 
the ROC and established diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1972, 
relations between Taipei and Tokyo have remained unofficial. This 
unofficial relationship greatly limits the scope of joint development 
between the ROC and Japan, since any joint exploration of 
hydrocarbon resources in the continental shelf will necessarily 
require direct involvement of the concerned governments. In the 
face of constant political pressure from the PRC, any cooperative 
efforts between the ROC and Japan will have to be limited to a 
private level, and the only remaining possible area whereby such 
efforts may be worthwhile with respect to the islands' resources is 
setting up a regional fishery agreement, and nothing further. 
Therefore, unless the political rivalry between the PRC and ROC 
ceases to exist, it would be naive to envisage any trilateral 
agreements for the development of the potential hydrocarbon 
resources in the sea-bed appertaining to the disputed islands.l51 
To say that problems exists for the ROC in entering into a 
cooperative agreement for the development of the disputed islands' 
sea-bed resources, is not to say that the PRC and Japan appears 
more likely to succeed in creating one. In fact, in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, attempts were already made by both the PRC and 
Japan to realize this proposal of joint development of the 
continental shelf surrounding the islands.152 While both 
151 Note that the political rivalry between the PRC and PRC is not uni-
directional. In September 1996, when the ROC government issued its guidelines in 
handling the islands' dispute, it similarly rejected any cooperative agreements that 
would involve the PRC. See Government Information Office of the ROC, An 
Objective Evaluation of the Diaoyutai Islands Dispute, ( 1996). 
152 Some studies have questioned whether the Oiaoyutai/Senkaku Islands 
should be entitled to any continental shelf or EEZs beyond their territorial sea of 12 
nautical miles due to their geological features. Article 121.3 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Sea of Law (UNCLOS) stipulates "Rocks which cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic 
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governments seemed to have endorsed the idea at the time, bilateral 
discussions during a working-level talk held in Beijing in November 
1980 soon revealed that there existed too large a gap between the 
two governments' opinion on how to properly delimit the 
continental shelf. The conflicting opinions can be summarized as 
follows: "If the area covered by joint development extended right 
up to the Okinawa Trough, the Japanese would have felt that the 
Chinese would gain a lot without giving away anything. Whereas 
for the Chinese government, if joint development was limited to 
the continental shelf on the Chinese side of the median line between 
the baselines of the two countries, it would be ... the only party 
making a concession ... "153 
Even if the initial problem concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf can be overcome, considering the historical 
animosity and mutual suspicion that has characterized past Sino-
Japanese relations, one cannot refrain from wondering whether 
further issues of management and apportionment of the islands' 
resources and subsequent economic returns can be easily agreed 
upon. Therefore, even when it is recognized that joint development 
zone or continental shelf." Scholars have suggested that the disputed islands seem to 
fit the above definition since they are of volcanic formation and fail the test of 
habitation and economic viability. Without outside subsidies, it is doubtful that 
human survival can be possible on the islands. 
Based on the above reasoning, Prof. Ma Ying-jeou suggests that "the 
[Diaoyutai/Senkaku] territorial dispute can then be wholly detached from the 
continental shelf issue. However the territorial issue is eventually resolved and 
whoever ultimately acquires the sovereignty of the Tiao-yu-t'ais [Diaoyutais], the 
disputing states would be unable to take advantage of the islets' strategic location in 
claiming portion of the seabed of the East China Sea beyond their territorial sea." See 
Ma Ying-jeou, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China 
Sea, supra note 1, p. 104. 
However, due to the potentially large economic implications of the 
disputed islands' seabed, it can be assumed that the concerned disputants will 
maintain that the islands are beyond the limitation of the Article 121.3 of the LOS 
Convention and therefore entitled to both continental shelf and exclusive economic 
woes. 
153 Chi-kin Lo, Chinas Policy Towards Te"itorial Disputes --- The Case 
of the South China Sea Islands (Routeledge: London, 1989), p. 174. Lo's work 
provides a brief account on the efforts of the PRC and Japanese government made 
toward joint development of the islands' resources during the late '70s and early '80s. 
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offers the more attractive outcome whereby all concerned parties 
can benefit, as opposed to the zero-sum judicial settlement or the 
present stagnant situation whereby no development of the 
hydrocarbon resources have been undertaken, there are still enough 
barriers that make this option an unlikely one for the foreseeable 
future. 
Considering the many difficulties inherent in the possible 
solutions to the islands dispute discussed above, perhaps it would 
require nothing less than a miracle to find a resolution. 
Nevertheless, any efforts taken to resolve the issue in a rational and 
equitable manner requires all disputants to understand where they 
each stand in relation to one another in light of the relevant 
historical evidence and their implications under applicable rules of 
international law. Such information would prove crucial for the 
disputants in determining whether judicial settlement or joint 
development of the islands resources is the more viable path. 
It is unfortunate however that historical and legally relevant 
evidence concerning the status of the disputed islands has been 
frequently subjected to both intentional or unintentional misuse, 
misinterpretation, and distortion during the past quarter century. 
As a result, it has been very difficult for most legal studies on the 
subject to produce accurate evaluations of the bases of claims of 
each disputant. A clarification of such evidence relevant to the 
dispute has long been overdue and therein lies one of the primary 
reasons why this study was made. 
In this study, enormous efforts have been made to collect, 
verify, and examine almost every piece of evidence available to date 
to provide the necessary groundwork for further analysis of their 
legal implications. This study does not pretend, however, to 
provide the in-depth appraisal of the legal evidence or compare the 
Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute to prior court rulings concerning 
legal territory disputes from the past, since that is currently beyond 
the ability of my untrained legal mind. It is hoped that these issues 
may be addressed in future revisions of this paper upon completion 
of my studies as a student in the field of law. In short, I hope this 
work offers a constructive step toward helping international lawyers 
determine the underlying question of the dispute: whether the 
disputed islands were terra nullius or Chinese territory at the time 
of their occupation by Japan on January 14, 1895. 
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Finally, whether or not the issue seeks its final settlement 
through international tribunals or through bilateral or even 
multilateral cooperation, a presentation of the evidence and bases of 
claims of both the Chinese and Japanese sides hopefully will allow 
all persons concerned with the issue to recognize the complexity of 
the dispute i.e, while both sides seemingly have infallible arguments 
supporting their respective claims, they are not free from weaknesses 
--- for instance, the manner by which the disputed islands were 
secretly brought within the Japanese empire in 1895 (which the 
Japanese government probably prefers to be kept secret), and the 
negligence toward the legal status of the disputed islands by the 
PRC and ROC governments after the Second World War (which 
both have failed to address persuasively). Considering that many 
Chinese and Japanese regard their own respective nations to 
indisputably be the rightful owner of the disputed islands, if all 
parties concerned with the dispute are able upon reading this study 
to refrain from provocative actions based on unquestioned self-
righteousness and intolerance of the others' argument, then the 
necessary first step in seeking a rational and equitable solution has 
been undertaken. 
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APPENDIX 
The Appendix includes original versions of all Meiji official 
documents pertaining to the incorporation process of the disputed 
islands uncovered to date which I have taken the responsibility to be 
the first in translating them into the English language. The original 
versions of these documents are included here for the purpose of 
objectivity and accuracy of this study --- which may be referred to 
in case of any unanticipated errors in my translations. As in 
Chapter V of this study, the documents are listed here in 
chronological order. 
Please note that the following documents labeled as 7, 8, 9 and 
10 are currently kept at the Diplomatic Records Office of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 91-5~'91-~~~ftg in Tokyo and 
cannot be found in the official publication series, Japan Foreign 
Affairs Documents B *?1-5tie11. I have been fortunate to obtain 
original versions of these four documents for use of this study from 
Prof. Chang Chi-hsiung ~12ftl of the Institute of Modern History, 
Academia Sinica $ :9HiJf~~ of the ROC, who first uncovered their 
existence in an earlier academic study published in 1993. While 
Prof. Chang's earlier study included excerpts of the said 
documents, I have chosen to present them in their entirety 
(followed by slightly different interpretations) in this study. In 
doing so, it may be noted that the entire contents of these four 
documents are, for the very first time, presented in a publication of 
any sort. 
1. Letter from the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to the Home Minister 
(September 22, 1885) 
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2. Petition letter to the Grand Council of State enclosed in a letter from 
the Home Minister to the Foreign Minister (October 9, 1885) 
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3. Letter of response from the Foreign Minister to the Home Minister 
(October 22, 1885) 
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4. Letter from the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to the Home Minister 
(November 24, 1885) 
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5. Orders from the Home Minister and Foreign Minister conferred upon 
the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to forgo placement of national 
markers (December 5, 1885) 
~m=-A~/= 
lfilii.fii'J.1'll, §l'l!N:71!-e~,vM 1-•t'~~::\'-• 
138 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIEs 
6. Petition from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor requesting the 
Ministry of Home Affairs to incorporate the disputed islands under the 
jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture Qanuary 13, 1890) 
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7. Subsequent Petition from the Okinawa Prefectural Governor requesting 
the Home Minister and Foreign Minister to grant permission to place the 
disputed islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture 
(November 2, 1893) 
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8. Internal document from the Director of Prefectural Administration 
Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Home Minister (April 14, 
1894) 
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9. Letter of response from the Okinawa Prefectural Magistrate to the 
Director of Prefectural Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (May 12, 1894) 
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10. Internal document from the Director of Prefectural Administration 
Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Home Minister (December 
15, 1894) 
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11. Letter from the Home Minister to the Foreign Minister (December 27, 
1894) 
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12. Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895 
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13. Imperial Decree No. 13 of 1896 
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SELECTED BffillOGRAPHY 
The Selected Bibliography is intended to provide the reader with easy 
access to the more important sources upon this study was based or which 
were consulted. The sources are grouped under three main categories, 
reflecting the language in which they were written. Each of these three 
categories are then grouped under four subgroups, namely, newspapers, 
academic papers and shorter pieces, government publications and 
pamphlets, and books. 
I. SOURCES IN CHINESE 
1. NEWSPAPERS: 
China Times lf:tNFJ/l!itll (ROC on Taiwan) 
Peoples Daily .Ali! B til (PRC) 
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Institute of Modem History (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1993) Vol. 22:II, p. 
105-139. 
-------, "The Chinese World Empire and the Status of the Ryukyu 
Kingdom tfl¥"tltW~Ui1MlfC.3:111~!1!!Ui," Conference Papers of the Third 
International Academic Conference on Sino-Ryukyuan Historical Relations 
(Taipei: Sino-Ryukyuan Cultural & Economic Association, 1991). 
Chen, Tsai-cheng ~:ftiE, "Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Negotiation over the Mudan 
Incident and its Settlement ttftit.$¥Fffii31ieZ rp Bx~.&::ltmi," 
Bulletin of the Institute of Modem History, Vol. 22:II (Taipei: Academia 
Sinica, 1993). 
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lblfdfi.!EilfZ&I •• Shaw Yu-ming (ed.) (Taipei: Lienching Publications, 
1991). 
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Diaoyutai by the Empress Dowager Cixi to Sheng Xuanhuai a:::t:FolllfJ 
f!-a~=~~ill1!1WI¥Jm:fi{1893) Zif~," Chinese International Law 
and International A./foirs Yearbook, Vol. 5 (Taipei: Taiwan 
Commercial Press, 1992), p. 187-190. 
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Ryukyu Kingdom during the Ming Dynasty 11JJftJ1f!IC±fiiJIJ51-fllf*'Zfiff 
~(Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1992), p. 49-74. 
Kuo, Ming-shan msi!Jltll, "An Overview of the Dispute over New Fishing Grounds 
between Taiwan and Ryukyu during Japanese Colonial Rule B~a• 
~Zififi~$f~*•" Chinese International Law and 
International A./foirs Yearbook, Vol. 5 (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial 
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